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Resumen 
El efecto de los factores institucionales en el gobierno corporativo: 
implicaciones para la inversión transfronteriza 
La protección del inversor está condicionada por la estructura de propiedad de la empresa y por 
el marco institucional del país en que esté basada. La atomización de la propiedad en las 
compañías cotizadas hace general el conflicto de interés entre directivos y accionistas, pero las 
empresas con un accionista de control se enfrentan a un segundo conflicto: los accionistas de 
control pueden abusar de su posición en detrimento del inversor minorista. En los países de 
derecho anglosajón, la dispersión de la propiedad raramente permite representación en el 
consejo a los inversores, pero el sistema legal facilita una notable protección al inversor. Por 
contra, los países con tradición civilista tienen un sistema de protección del inversor 
comparativamente más débil y las empresas frecuentemente tienen uno o varios accionistas 
relevantes que pueden controlar al equipo directivo de una manera efectiva (La-Porta et al., 
1999). 
En esta tesis identificamos mecanismos de gobierno corporativo relevantes para la atracción de 
capital extranjero, y prestamos especial atención al papel de los consejeros extranjeros para 
superar el sesgo doméstico de los inversores -home bias effect-. Comparamos la efectividad de 
la composición del consejo en distintos países para atraer inversores e incrementar el valor de 
la empresa, teniendo en cuenta el poder relativo de los principales accionistas de cada empresa. 
Por ultimo investigamos el impacto de la estructura de propiedad en la valoración empresarial, 
y su relación con el mecanismo de gobierno corporativo más extendido: la presencia de 
consejeros independientes. 
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Primero estudiamos las transacciones del mercado de capitales en las que el gobierno 
corporativo es especialmente relevante, dadas las asimetrías de información asociadas: 
aumentos de capital y salidas a bolsa. En estas transacciones, las empresas se enfrentan a un 
grado adicional de dificultad para atraer capital extranjero, dado el sesgo doméstico de los 
inversores -home bias effect-. Tanto las acentuadas asimetrías de información como el sesgo 
doméstico hacen a estas transacciones idóneas para analizar la efectividad del gobierno 
corporativo. Identificamos un reducido grupo de recomendaciones de gobierno corporativo que 
alientan la confianza de los inversores extranjeros para superar estos obstáculos y proveer 
financiación a empresas españolas que realizan aumentos de capital o salen a bolsa. De las 64 
recomendaciones contenidas en el Código de Buen Gobierno para sociedades españolas, 10 
recomendaciones relativas al consejo de administración, los estatutos y la junta general de 
accionistas; así como 6 relativas a los comités del consejo, son relevantes y positivas para atraer 
capital extranjero. Cuando un accionista de control está presente en la empresa, otras 7 
recomendaciones son relevantes y positivas para atraer capital extranjero. También 
encontramos que una elevada proporción de consejeros extranjeros aporta un fuerte incentivo 
para que los inversores extranjeros participen en transacciones del mercado de capitales y que 
las empresas optan por un elevado porcentaje de consejeros extranjeros o por el cumplimiento 
de las recomendaciones relativas a los comités del consejo de manera alternativa.  
En segundo lugar investigamos por qué, pese a la abundante literatura que estudia la 
contribución de los consejeros externos, menos sesgados y teóricamente mejor preparados para 
juzgar el desempeño de los directivos y proteger a los accionistas, los resultados sobre su 
contribución no son concluyentes. Hemos revisado los estudios de composición del consejo y 
desempeño empresarial con un doble enfoque. En primer lugar, hemos compensado la crítica 
habitual sobre la ausencia de consejeros genuinamente independientes y su designación por 
motivos de legitimización con una definición más exigente de independencia. Cuando tenemos 
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en cuenta el marco institucional, encontramos significatividad estadística para la relación entre 
proporción de consejeros “fuertemente independientes” y la valoración de la compañía: esta 
relación es positiva en los países anglosajones. En segundo lugar, nos hemos sentido atraídos 
por la escasa atención dedicada a los consejeros externos que representan a un inversor. Los 
consejeros externos que representan a un inversor -consejeros “dominicales” en España- son 
especialmente adecuados para facilitar la provisión de recursos a la empresa -resource 
provision-, además de la tradicional función de control y supervisión -monitoring- de los 
consejeros externos. Los relevantes volúmenes de fondos precisos para lograr representación 
en el consejo son un incentivo para dedicar recursos, facilitar contactos y dedicar abundante 
tiempo al equipo directivo, dado el tamaño de la inversión que arriesga el inversor representado 
por el consejero dominical. Como las empresas habitualmente no tienen designados “consejeros 
dominicales” hemos analizado los currículums de 1977 consejeros en busca de vínculos con 
accionistas relevantes. De nuevo precisamos del contexto institucional para llegar a resultados 
significativos. Encontramos que en países de tradición civilista, en los que la concentración de 
la propiedad permite la representación en el consejo de accionistas significativos, el efecto 
positivo de los consejeros dominicales no compensa el efecto negativo de que varios consejeros 
dominicales correspondan a un único y poderoso accionista, que puede abusar de su posición 
en detrimento de los inversores minoristas. Sin embargo, la presencia conjunta de consejeros 
dominicales y una coalición de control que limite el poder del mayor accionista tiene un efecto 
positivo en la valoración de la empresa. 
En tercer lugar, exploramos por qué, pese a la extendida presencia de accionistas relevantes o 
blockholders, que tienen los incentivos y los recursos para realizar una función de control y 
supervisión efectiva para influir en los directivos, oponerse a decisiones que no estén alineadas 
con los intereses de los accionistas y para favorecer decisiones encaminadas a la creación de 
valor, hay escasa evidencia empírica de su relación con el desempeño empresarial. Dado que la 
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presencia de consejeros independientes es también un mecanismo de gobierno corporativo muy 
extendido para el control de los directivos y la protección de los inversores, hemos explorado 
la interacción entre ambos mecanismos, la presencia de blockholders y consejeros 
independientes, beneficiándonos de nuevo de nuestra definición reforzada de independencia. 
Encontramos una relación estadísticamente significativa y positiva entre una presencia conjunta 
de la proporción de consejeros independientes, el capital en manos de blockholders y la 
valoración de la empresa. Los consejeros independientes parecen actuar como un complemento 
a la presencia de blockholders. En segundo lugar, a medida que la participación accionarial del 
inversor se incrementa, tiene mayores incentivos para involucrarse y que la empresa incremente 
su valor Holderness (2003), por lo que el total de capital en manos de blockholders debería 
tener un impacto positivo en la valoración de la empresa. Pero la presencia de un blockholder 
que sea accionista de control influirá negativamente en la valoración. Encontramos que la 
presencia de un accionista de control es estadísticamente significativa, mitigada por el peso del 
resto de blockholders. Por último, encontramos significatividad estadística entre la valoración 
empresarial y la presencia de una coalición de control formada por el segundo y tercer 
accionistas con mayor participación, que pueden compensar el poder del mayor inversor. El 
efecto neto de los blockholders sobre la valoración dependerá del poder relativo de esta 
coalición: si el capital total en manos de blockholders es suficientemente alto, o bien el principal 
accionista o bien la coalición actuarán como accionistas de control, impactando negativamente 
en la valoración. 
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Summary 
The effect of institutional factors on corporate governance: 
implications for cross-border investing 
 
Investor protection depends on the firm ownership structure and the institutional framework of 
the country where the firm is based. Diffusion of ownership in public firms extends to all 
companies the potential conflict between managers and shareholders, but firms with a 
controlling shareholder face a second conflict: controlling shareholders may abuse their 
position in detriment to minority investors. In common law countries, dispersed ownership 
seldom allows investors to be represented in the board, but the legal system provides remarkable 
investor protection. In contrast, Civil Law countries have a relatively weak legal system of 
investor protection and firms usually have one or several relevant shareholders that can 
effectively control management (La-Porta et al., 1999). 
In this thesis we identify corporate governance mechanisms relevant to attract foreign 
investment, paying attention to the contribution of foreign directors to the overcoming of the 
home bias effect. We compare the effectiveness of board of director composition across 
countries to attract investors and increase firm value, considering the relative power of the main 
shareholders at each firm. Lastly we investigate the impact of ownership structure on firm value, 
and its relationship with the most widely used corporate governance mechanism: the presence 
of independent directors. 
We firstly study capital market transactions where corporate governance is particularly relevant 
given the information asymmetries associated to them: capital increases and initial public 
offerings. In these transactions, firms face an additional degree of difficulty to attract foreign 
capital, due to the home bias effect. Both the enhanced information asymmetries and the home 
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bias effect make these transactions ideal to analyze the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
We identify a reduced set of corporate governance recommendations that foster foreign 
investors to overcome these obstacles and provide financing to Spanish firms conducting capital 
increases and IPOs. Out of the 64 recommendations contained in the Spanish Good Governance 
Code, 10 recommendations dealing with the board of directors, bylaws and general shareholder 
meeting; and 6 recommendations dealing with the committees of the board are found to be 
relevant and positive for attracting foreign capital. When a controlling shareholder is present at 
the firm, another 7 recommendations become relevant and positive to attract foreign capital. 
We also find that the presence of a high proportion of foreign directors is a strong incentive for 
foreign investors to participate in capital market transactions and firms use as alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms a high proportion of foreign directors and compliance with 
Committees recommendations  
Secondly we investigate why, in spite of the abundant literature focusing on the contribution of 
outside directors, less biased and theoretically better prepared to judge manager’s performance 
and protect shareholders, there are no conclusive results on their contribution. We have revisited 
the studies of board composition and firm performance with a two-fold approach. Firstly, we 
have compensated public criticism about the lack of genuinely outside-independent directors 
and their nomination to gain legitimacy with a more stringent definition of independence. When 
we account for the institutional framework, we find statistical significance for the relationship 
between the proportion of strongly independent directors and firm valuation: this relationship 
is found to be positive in common law countries. Secondly, we have been attracted by the scant 
attention devoted to outside-proprietary directors that represent investors. Outside directors that 
represent a significant investor or “proprietary directors” are particularly well suited for the 
resource provision role, in addition to the traditional monitoring role of outside directors. The 
significant amounts of funds necessary to get board representation are an incentive to commit 
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resources, provide contacts and devote extensive time to assist the management team, given the 
size of the investment at risk made by the shareholder represented by the proprietary director. 
Since firms generally do not report “proprietary directors” we have examined the curricula of 
1977 directors in search of ties with relevant shareholders. Again, we need the institutional 
context to arrive at a significant finding. We have found that in civil law countries, where 
ownership concentration allows relevant shareholders to have board representation, the positive 
effect of proprietary directors does not compensate for the negative effect of several proprietary 
directors representing a powerful largest shareholder, who may abuse his position in detriment 
to minority investors. But the joint presence of proprietary directors and a “controlling 
coalition” that limits the power of the largest shareholder has a positive impact on valuation. 
Thirdly we explore why, in spite of the widespread presence of blockholders, who have the 
incentive and resources to perform effective monitoring and influence the firm’s management, 
opposing managers’ actions that not aligned with shareholders’ interest and fostering decisions 
that lead to value creation, there is little empirical evidence about their relationship with firm 
performance. Since independent directors are also a widespread mechanism to judge manager’s 
performance and protect shareholders, we have explored the interaction of both mechanisms; 
blockholders and independent director, benefiting again from our adjusted definition of 
independence. We find statistical significance for a joint and positive relationship between the 
proportion of strongly independent directors, blockholders capital and firm valuation. 
Independent directors seem to act as complement to the presence of blockholders. Secondly, as 
the ownership stake of the investor increases, he has a greater incentive to increase firm value 
Holderness (2003), so total capital accumulated by blockholders should have a positive impact 
on valuation. But if one of those blockholders is a controlling shareholder, he will negatively 
impact valuation. We find statistical significance of the presence of a controlling shareholder, 
mitigated by the volume of the remaining blocks. Lastly, we have found statistical significance 
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of the positive effect on valuation of the presence of a controlling coalition between the second 
and third shareholders, who can compensate for the power of the largest investor. The net effect 
on valuation of blockholders will depend on the relative power of this coalition: if the sum of 
blockholders capital is high enough, either the largest shareholder or the coalition may become 
a controlling one, negatively impacting valuation. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Recurring accounting frauds and corporate failures, from Enron and WorldCom in 2001, to 
Madoff in 2008 and Toshiba in 2015, have contributed to the increasing relevance of corporate 
governance, attracting the attention of regulators, investors, corporations and scholars alike.  
Corporations have thousands of shareholders and professional managers in charge of their 
operations. Not only these professional managers may have a conflict of interest with 
shareholders, conflict may also be found between controlling shareholders and minority 
investors. Corporate governance deals with mechanisms aimed at mitigating these conflicts and 
improving investor protection. 
But investor protection also depends on the firm ownership structure and the institutional 
framework of the country where the firm is based. Diffusion of ownership in public firms 
extends to all companies the potential conflict between managers and shareholders, but firms 
with a controlling shareholder face a second conflict: controlling shareholders may abuse their 
position in detriment to minority investors. In common law countries, dispersed ownership 
seldom allows investors to be represented in the board, but the legal system provides remarkable 
investor protection In contrast, Civil Law countries have a relatively weak legal system of 
investor protection and firms usually have one or several relevant shareholders that can 
effectively control management (La-Porta et al., 1999). 
In this thesis we will identify corporate governance mechanisms relevant to attract foreign 
investment, paying attention to the contribution of foreign directors to the overcoming of the 
home bias effect. We will compare the effectiveness of board of director composition across 
countries to attract investors and increase firm value, considering the relative power of the main 
shareholders at each firm. Lastly we will investigate the impact of ownership structure on firm 
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value, and its relationship with the most widely used corporate governance mechanism: the 
presence of independent directors. 
1. Two generations of corporate governance are not enough 
Corporate governance research was initiated with a first generation of studies that analyzed the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms aimed at preventing corporate fraud and 
failure: first at the United States and later extended to other countries (Denis & McConnell, 
2003)-. A second generation of studies has been developed to analyze the impact of legal 
systems and institutional frameworks on corporate governance in each country (Aggarwal, Erel, 
Stulz, & Williamson, 2009; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Iliev, Lins, Miller, & Roth, 2015). After 
these two generations of research, individual corporate governance mechanisms in a particular 
country have been analyzed, the contribution of the legal system to investor protection has been 
assessed (La-Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000b) and firm-level governance 
indexes across countries have been compared (Aggarwal et al., 2009). But there is a need to 
explore the link between individual mechanisms and the institutional framework in which these 
mechanisms are adopted. For argument sake: how can any conclusion be reached on the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance if no attention is paid to 
whether  the country is characterized by dispersed ownership and the need to control managers 
or by a concentrated ownership structure, where controlling shareholders closely monitor 
executives?  
Before stating our research question let us make some theoretical considerations on corporate 
governance first. In corporations, unlike small companies, (1) professional management is in 
charge of the company on behalf of shareholders and (2) ownership is unequal, with some 
shareholders owning a bigger proportion of a company than others do. Corporate governance 
arises in front of the conflicts poised either by management pursuing their own interest, rather 
than shareholders’ interest; or by controlling shareholders extracting rents in detriment of 
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minority shareholders. We will focus on publicly traded companies, since although all 
corporations are subjected to these potential conflicts of interest, publicly traded companies 
play a dominant role in corporate governance, due to the larger number of shareholders involved 
in them. Moreover, compared with private companies, publicly traded companies face an 
additional challenge: shareholders are able to easily transfer their shares to others should they 
believe that management or the controlling shareholder is behaving opportunistically. 
Corporations are governed by their board of directors, no wonder that corporate governance 
study of board of directors is paramount. Members of the Board –“directors”- are formally 
appointed at the Shareholders Meeting, but there is significant controversy over to which extent 
the executives influence directors’ appointments rather than shareholders’ interests. Boards are 
in charge of designing the strategy of the firm and monitoring its execution by the top 
management team, but unfortunately the distinction between directors and executives is not 
clear. Sometimes the chairperson of the board is also the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and 
occasionally the CEO and other executives are members of the board of directors, so 
controversy arises again over the motivation of the board to effectively control the top 
management team. Corporate governance deals with the size of the board, its composition –
executives versus outsiders- and leadership structure –whether the chairperson is also the CEO.  
Board of directors are also in charge with designing a compensation package for the top 
management team that aligns the interest of managers and shareholders. By establishing the 
structure of the executive compensation, the board of directors can incentivize the top 
management team to protect the interests of the shareholders.   
There are other corporate governance topics that do not deal directly with available instruments 
to protect shareholders’ interest but are certainly aspects indirectly influencing shareholders’ 
protection, such as the ownership structure, the takeover market and the institutional 
framework. Ownership structure has a great importance on corporate governance: owners of 
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significant percentage of capital –“blockholders”- may control managers and pursue overall 
shareholder value but there are also benefits available to blockholders, such as the possibility 
of extracting corporate resources, receiving private benefits of control that reduce the value of 
the firm to the other shareholders. This does not necessarily imply outright theft, it can be done 
through related party transactions not conducted at market prices, for example contracting 
consulting services from a company owned by one blockholder. 
In spite of the control performed by the board of directors and the controlling shareholders, the 
executive team may be inadequate, unable or unwilling to manage the firm as to maximize its 
value. In these cases, the takeover market offers shareholders the possibility of selling their 
shares at a premium, transferring control of the firm to the bidder, who will in turn change the 
management team (Zhou & Guillén, 2018). Although the threat of a takeover may discipline 
managers, it may also work as a perverse incentive to “empire building”, making the firm grow 
overpaying for acquisitions aimed at complicating the takeover (Unsal & Rayfield, 2019). 
In countries where firms’ ownership structures are widely held, individual shareholders own 
small fractions of the firms’ shares, and shareholders have limited incentives to devote 
resources to monitoring the executives of the firm. In this environment it is essential that the 
institutional framework of the country guarantees that managers will not expropriate the funds 
invested by shareholders. In their seminal work “Law and Finance”, La-Porta, Lopez-de-
SIlanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1998) analyzed how the legal systems affected investor protection, 
the origin of those legal-based rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The 
legal system is not only relevant for corporate governance: investor protection fosters financial 
markets development, facilitates external financing of new firms, reduces the concentration of 
concentrated ownership, improves the efficiency of investment allocation, an facilitates private 
restructuring of financial claims in a crisis (La-Porta et al., 2000b). La-Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny (1997) show that countries that protect shareholders have more valuable 
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stock markets, larger numbers of listed securities per capita, and a higher rate of IPOs -initial 
public offerings-. Corporate governance also influences the real economy, since financial 
development can accelerate economic growth by enhancing savings and channeling these 
savings into the most productive investments. 
Corporate governance research was initiated with a first generation of country-specific studies 
–starting in the 70s with the United States and extended to other countries in the 90s  Denis & 
McConnell (2003)- that analyzed the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms aimed 
at preventing corporate fraud and failure. Examples of this first generation studies are the early 
work of Pfeffer (1972) on size and composition of board of directors in the United States, 
Wymeersch (1998) research on board of directors across Europe, Murphy (1999) in-depth study 
of CEO compensation in the US; Bryan, Nash, & Patel (2002) analysis of the use of equity in 
firm compensation structures in 43 different countries and Holderness (2003) research on the 
effects of insider and blockholder equity ownership on corporate decisions and on firm value. 
Following the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, the United States passed the Public 
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 called the “Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act”, which implemented restrictive regulations such as increased responsibility for the CEO 
and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) -it was required to sign off the accuracy of quarterly 
financials and subject to criminal penalties if found negligent-, further disclosures –off balance 
sheet corporate information and potential conflict of interest of financial analysts covering the 
firm- and last, but very importantly, increased independence for the board of directors (Agrawal 
& Cooper, 2016). As mentioned earlier, corporate governance addresses in the first place the 
potential conflict between shareholders’ interest and management pursuing their own. To 
mitigate this risk, the board of directors, appointed by the shareholders, decide on major 
strategic corporate decisions –versus the daily management of the company by the executive 
team- and requires independence from the firm and its executives. The “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” 
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increased the relevance of non-executive directors, particularly at audit committees. Regulators 
around the world enforced similar rules and recommendations in each country. But did they 
take into account the specific characteristics of each country institutional and financial 
framework? Do corporate governance mechanisms travel efficiently? 
A recent approach in corporate governance literature analyzes the impact of legal systems and 
institutional frameworks on corporate governance in each country (Aggarwal et al., 2009; 
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Iliev et al., 2015). Two corporate governance mechanisms have been 
mainly adopted worldwide after the regulatory wave initiated by the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” in 
the United States to protect investors. Firstly, the requirement to incorporate independent 
directors to the board, being the notion of “independence” defined by the regulator. Secondly, 
special transparency requirements for those firms which choose to have the roles of CEO and 
Chairman of the board held by the same person were included. In an apparent contradiction, 
regulators have incorporated these mechanisms worldwide in spite of the fact that academic 
research is inconclusive on their impact on firm performance, specially under different 
institutional settings  (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). 
Extant research has analyzed individual corporate governance mechanisms in a particular 
country and compared legal systems La-Porta et al. (2000b) and firm-level governance indexes 
across countries (Aggarwal et al., 2009). Our study will intertwine the traditional corporate 
governance analysis –study of individual mechanisms- with the institutional framework, to 
address the following research question: what is the effectiveness of different corporate 
governance mechanisms in each institutional environment? 
2. Scope and objective of this study 
Considering the gap in the extant literature, this research will examine the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm valuation by taking into account the institutional 
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framework, so that we provide a better explanation of the circumstances under which a 
particular mechanism is more effective. Investor protection has been proved to be higher in 
countries where ownership structures are less concentrated, where capital markets are greater 
and where efficiency of resource allocation and economic growth is higher (La-Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000a).  
Our study places a primary focus on corporate governance mechanisms that are at the reach of 
shareholders, since it is our goal to provide guidance on the choice of mechanisms to be 
implemented. Two mechanisms are clearly at the reach of shareholders: board composition and 
executive compensation. Since the theoretical and empirical literature on compensation is fairly 
well developed Murphy (1999), we will focus on board composition, a mechanism where the 
extant research is inconclusive. Dalton et al. (1998) provided evidence, through a meta-analysis 
of 85 studies of board composition and board leadership structure, that these board of directors’ 
features, do not seem consistently linked to firm performance. Following the agency theory, we 
will study board composition as a corporate governance mechanism to monitor and control the 
management of the firm. We will distinguish between executive directors or “insiders” of the 
firm that belong to the top management team, and outside directors, either independent directors 
or proprietary directors representing a significant shareholder-. We will examine the 
relationship between board composition and firm valuation under the mediating influence of 
the institutional framework and ownership structure. 
Although not totally at the reach of shareholders, we will also address the relationship between 
ownership structure, and more specifically the presence of significant shareholders, and firm 
value. Blockholders are shareholders with a relevant stake in the firm that allows them to gather 
more information on the firm than minority shareholders (Edmans & Manso, 2011). Investor 
relations departments may foster the acquisition of blocks -stakes over 5% of capital- by 
institutional investors. Monitoring managers is both time consuming and expensive and 
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minority shareholders face a free rider problem to afford monitoring and prevent managers from 
behaving opportunistically. In the case of blockholders, the size of their stake makes it 
worthwhile to dedicate resources to monitoring and getting involved with corporate decision 
making, even more so when their stake allows them to be directly represented at the board of 
directors. Blockholders have the incentive and resources to perform effective monitoring and 
influence the firm’s management, opposing managers actions that are not aligned with 
shareholders’ interest -i.e. a dilutive acquisition- and fostering decisions that lead to value 
creation -i.e. substitution of underperforming CEOs-. Since blockholders will either intervene 
or sell their shares if managers underperform, their presence in the capital is a positive signal 
for other investors. After having examined the relationship between board composition and firm 
valuation, we will analyze whether the presence of blockholders is a complement to the most 
relevant corporate governance mechanism related to the board: the presence of independent 
directors. 
This study contributes by developing a methodology to identify relevant corporate governance 
mechanisms in terms of cross-border investing, considering the effect on those mechanisms of 
an international board and the presence of a controlling shareholder. The adoption of these 
mechanisms incentivizes foreign investors to overcome the home bias effect and assume the 
host country’s institutional framework.  
The study also contributes to the literature on board composition by breaking up the outside 
director category and examining the impact of each kind of outside director under the mediating 
influence of the institutional framework of seven countries and the ownership structure of each 
firm. We provide a specific category of strongly independent directors that may influence firm 
valuation significantly, together with the identification of proprietary directors that, although 
representing significant shareholders, have attracted scant attention so far.  
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Lastly, the study will try to contribute to the literature on ownership structure by testing whether 
the presence of relevant shareholders is a complement to the most relevant corporate 
governance mechanism related to the board: the presence of independent directors. We take 
into account the role of controlling shareholders and the extent to which the power of the largest 
shareholder is contested to better understand the relationship between the presence of 
blockholders and firm performance. 
1.3 Study structure 
We start by reviewing the theoretical literature on chapter 2, discussing Agency Theory, 
Resource Dependence Theory, Stewardship Theory and Institutional Theory. Before analyzing 
the impact of different institutional frameworks we begin with the institutional framework of 
one country, Spain, to identify corporate governance mechanisms that have a significant impact 
in the decision of foreign investors to overcome the home bias effect and invest in a foreign 
country, assuming its particular institutional framework. In Chapter 3 we develop a 
methodology that assigns weights to 23 corporate governance recommendations in force since 
2006 and identify those recommendations statistically significant for the decision by foreigners 
to invest in Spanish companies.  
Chapter 4 analyses the relationship between board composition and firm valuation by 
examining two different kinds of outside directors: independent and proprietary directors.  We 
analyze the impact of board composition on firm valuation under the moderating effect of 
different institutional frameworks -civil law versus common law countries- and different 
ownership structures. 
After having examined the relationship between board composition and firm valuation, we will 
analyze in Chapter 5 whether the presence of blockholders is a complement to the most relevant 
corporate governance mechanism related to the board: the presence of independent directors. 
We investigate the relationship between blockholders and firm valuation in light of not only 
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independent directos, but also of the presence of a controlling shareholder and the relative 
power of the three main shareholders. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature offers different definitions for the term “corporate governance”, and it is useful 
to start with the most wide definition provided by Daily, Dalton, & Cannella (2003:371), 
according to which it is the “determination of the broad uses to which organizational resources 
will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad participants in 
organizations”. In the same vein are Aoki (2000:11) “the structure of rights and responsibilities 
among the parties with a stake in the firm” and Aguilera & Jackson (2003:450), who define 
corporate governance as “relationships among stakeholders in the process of decision making 
and control over firm resources”. 
Note that the above definitions use the terms “participants”, “parties” and “stakeholders”, since 
these definitions include different actors, such as shareholders, suppliers and employees. While 
shareholders make financial investments in the firm, suppliers and employees also make firm 
specific investments that are sunk costs, such as the design of a product or the learning process 
of a firm software. Under a stakeholder approach, corporate governance is “set to prevent that 
groups with more bargaining power extract rents from groups with less bargaining power in the 
case of an incomplete contract” (Arranz, 2015):96). Countries where employee protection is 
relevant adopt a stakeholder approach to corporate governance, such as Japan, Germany, 
Austria and Denmark, with two tier or dual boards, in which employee participate through the 
supervisory board. 
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The main objective of corporate governance studies is to protect the shareholder, so the main 
actor is the shareholder, who is risk bearer and residual claimant, and ownership rights and the 
need to mitigate the agency problem -aligning managers and owners’ interests- will be at at the 
center of corporate governance. Focusing on the owners of the firm, many definitions have been 
stated, such as Core, Guay, & Larcker (2003):27 “set of complementary mechanisms that help 
align the actions and choices of managers with the interests of shareholders”, Denis & 
McConnell (2003) ”set of mechanisms-both institutional and market-based-that induce the self-
interested controllers of a company -those that make decisions regarding how the company will 
be operated- to make decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners -the 
suppliers of capital-”, La-Porta et al. (2000b) “a set of mechanisms through which outside 
investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders” or Shleifer & Vishny (1997) 
definition based on “ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment”. 
The objective of this research is to explain how corporate governance mechanisms contribute 
to shareholder protection and therefore to the increase of their wealth in the firm’s equity. 
Therefore, and taking into account the previous definitions, we adopt the following one: 
“Corporate governance is the set of mechanisms that are at reach of shareholders and can be 
used to protect their wealth”. 
This definition firstly implies that protection of minority shareholders will be at the core of the 
analysis, but considering threats from both managers and controlling shareholders. Rent 
extraction from shareholders’ wealth may be caused by a block shareholder if the conflict is 
between minority and controlling shareholders. In countries where ownership structure of firms 
is atomized the prevalent corporate governance potential conflict will take place between 
shareholders and managers, while in those countries where the capital structure is more 
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concentrated, the prevalent conflict will take place between minority and controlling 
shareholders. In any case, corporate governance deals with the protection of shareholders. 
Secondly, the expression “at reach of shareholders” is used to point out that the analysis will be 
focused on the choice of mechanisms over which shareholders can decide –i.e. to select a high 
proportion of independent directors- versus others over which shareholders have no power –i.e. 
the legal system-. In this study we are concerned with mechanisms at reach of shareholders, 
and we will explore how other factors outside their reach moderate the influence of the main 
mechanisms on investor protection. 
This study places shareholder at the center of the analysis. Shareholders directly participate in 
the firm decision making at the annual or extraordinary meetings, delegating the strategic 
decisions to the board of directors, which in turn delegate the daily operations of the firm to the 
CEO and the rest of the management team. Corporate governance deals with the functioning of 
both shareholder meetings and the board of directors. Board of directors meet frequently and 
adopt very important decisions, with the shareholder meeting ratifying–or vetoing- the 
proposals of the board of directors. Our study will focus on both the ownership structure of the 
firm and the functioning of the board of directors, an essential institution in which shareholders 
delegate strategic decision making. As mentioned before, the board of directors is comprised 
of (1) executive directors or “insiders” of the firm that belong to the top management team, and 
(2) outside directors, either independent directors or “proprietary directors” representing a 
block-holder or relevant shareholder. 
 
We will review now four theoretical streams of management theory –agency, resource 
dependence, stewardship and institutional theory- that advocate for different roles for the 
members of the board of directors.  
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2.1 Agency theory 
Under the agency theory, the firm is described as a set of contracts among factor of productions 
–labor, capital- and customers. These contracts will involve property rights Demsetz (1967), 
whose definition will be determinant for the way in which costs and rewards are allocated to 
the participants in the firm.  
Jensen & Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more 
persons –“principals”- engage another person –“agent”- to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent and described three 
kinds of agency costs: those derived from the design of contracts and monitoring expenditures 
by the principal; bonding expenditures by the agent and residual costs, since in spite of 
monitoring and bonding expenditures, it is not possible to perfectly match the principal’s 
interest and the agent’s actions. Residual costs are the value of the reduction in principal’s 
welfare due to this mismatch. 
To understand the implications of the agency relationship on corporate governance, it is useful 
to identify who is responsible for each step of the decision making process at the firm. Fama & 
Jensen (1983b) characterize the decision process at the firm in four steps: initiation -proposals 
for resource utilization and contracts design-, ratification -choice of initiative to be 
implemented-, implementation of the ratified decisions and monitoring -performance 
evaluation and implementation of rewards-. These authors characterized “decision 
management” as comprising the initiation and implementation steps, usually undertaken by the 
same person: the agents or managers of the firm; while the decision control function comprises 
the ratification and monitoring steps, undertaken by the principal, or the people designated (i.e. 
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the Board of Directors). Assuming both the agency problem and the tendency of managers not 
to maximize the wealth of shareholders, it is essential to keep daily decision-making –“decision 
management”- apart from the control of such decision-making -decision control. Fama & 
Jensen (1983b) explained the survival of firms where ownership and control were apart: in these 
companies the agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of their decisions and 
it is particularly important that mechanisms are put in place to prevent agents from damaging 
the principals’ wealth. 
Imperfect information to monitor managers makes difficult enforcing limits to management 
discretion. Also, if shareholders own a diversified portfolio, they will not have the incentive to 
invest considerable resources to the monitoring of the stakes in each company, facing the free 
rider problem, and suffering a tendency to sell rather than to struggle for control (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
Shareholders, providers of capital -“principals”-, need the expertise of managers to produce a 
returns on their funds and managers –“agents”- need providers of funds since they can not 
finance the project by themselves. Jensen & Meckling (1976) warned about the residual costs, 
the reduction in principal’s welfare due to the mismatch between the principal interest and the 
agent’s actions. The agency problem arises in front of the uncertainty that shareholders face: 
will their funds be expropriated or wasted by managers? Shareholders will maximize dividends 
and stock prices while managers will prefer growth: empire building will bring them higher 
salaries and prestige. Both parties will need to engage in a contract that regulates how the funds 
are used and how profits are shared. Since not all possible circumstances can be foreseen, 
“residual rights of control” will have to be allocated (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997):744. Although 
the principal will set limits to the agents’ discretion to allocate funds in unforeseen 
circumstances, managers will end up with significant discretion for self-interested behavior, 
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since principals will often lack information or expertise to decide in unexpected situations, the 
very reason why agents are hired (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
In practice, the agents -managers- may divert corporate assets by selling assets to themselves –
or to companies controlled by them- at favorable prices, by above market salaries or stock 
options or through outright theft. The conflict of interest may not imply diverting corporate 
assets, but simply using them to pursue investment strategies that yield them personal benefits 
of control, such as growth or diversification -“empire building”- at  the expense of the 
principal’s interest -risk-bearing shareholder- (La-Porta et al., 2000a). 
So if the agents can behave opportunistically, what can be done to ensure that they would act 
in the best interest of the principal? From the perspective of the principal, shareholders may set 
up adequate incentives for the agent and monitor agent’s behavior and the agent. And the agents 
may also be required to spend resources to guarantee that the principal will be compensated 
should his interest be harmed by the agent. These mechanisms will be the essence of corporate 
governance: since conflicts of interest arise from the separation of ownership and control, and 
there are unavoidable costs to mitigate the agency problem that end up reducing the value of 
the firm, “how do entrepreneurs, shareholders, and managers minimize the loss of value that 
results from the separation of ownership and control?” (Denis & McConnell, 2003). The answer 
to this question comes close to the definition of corporate governance. Corporate governance 
mechanisms provide shareholders some assurance that managers will work towards outcomes 
that are in the shareholders' interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Since the control of managers is assigned to the Board of Directors, which acts on behalf of 
shareholders, directors have an agency role, that is, “a governance function in which they serve 
shareholders by ratifying the decision of managers and monitoring the implementation of those 
decisions”. When managers are not efficient, directors will replace them to improve 
performance. So non-executive directors will be less biased and better prepared to judge 
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manager’s performance and protect shareholders (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). 
Directors also play a fundamental role in mitigating the agency problem by requiring the firm 
to increase its level of transparency, therefore reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. 
Accurate financial and risk information reduces agency costs and is therefore key for 
shareholders, enabling them to assess a company’s risk profile, estimate its value and make 
accurate investment decisions. In this vein risk information is reallocated between insiders -
management- and outsiders -shareholders-, being voluntary disclosure -“transparency”-  a 
corporate governance mechanism to address agency problems (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015). 
The control of managers proposed by the agency theory is consistent with limiting CEO power 
or “residual rights of control” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance literature has 
also explored the power relationship between CEOs and boards of directors (Daily & Johnson, 
1997; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Kieschnick & Moussawi, 2018; Miyajima, Ogawa, & 
Saito, 2018; Mizruchi, 1983) and CEO succession processes (Cannella & Shen, 2001; Monks 
& Minow, 1991; Shen & Cannella, 2002; Wade, Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990).  
Regarding CEOs and board of directors, Mizruchi (1983) proposes that the board of director 
has a supervising role over management, not the other way round. That is, it is necessary to 
differentiate the roles of each one according to the the strategic/operational dimension of 
decisions: while managers are in charge of day-to-day operations, directors focus in the long-
run policy monitoring, that varies with performance of the firm, and includes hiring and firing 
the CEO. Daily & Johnson (1997) have found a lagged and reciprocal relationship between 
CEO power and firm performance. It also seems that CEOs need a track record of financial 
success in the running of their company before they gain the necessary prestige to be invited to 
other boards, but once they join other boards, they establish professional relationships that 
enhance their own firms’ financial performance, in a sort of virtuous circle. A higher level of 
firm performance lead to lower proportion of independent directors in the following year and 
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even that lower proportions of independent directors correlate negatively with firm performance 
in the following years. These findings seem contradictory with the idea that independent 
directors are necessary to control managers’ power and protect shareholders, but it is well worth 
mentioning that the lack of a homogenous definition of “independent director” may be the 
reason for the apparent contradiction. For a start, if the independent director is appointed during 
the CEO mandate, she might have been chosen because of her relationship with the CEO in the 
first place, limiting her ability to independently protect shareholder’s interests. Wade et 
al.(1990) differentiated between independent and interdependent directors: while the formers 
are outside directors appointed prior to the current CEO’s appointment, interdependent 
directors are inside directors or outside directors appointed by the current CEO. 
Compensation is useful to measure CEO power within the firm. Daily & Johnson (1997) 
provide evidence that increases in CEO compensation, relative to the executives, are often 
found regardless of firm performance in the previous years. Rather than increasing 
compensation as a reward for past performance, compensation is raised ex-ante trusting the 
CEO to foster performance later on, which increases her power. Educational prestige of CEOs 
also plays a relevant role in their power stance. An elite educational background lead to 
significant discretion been granted to the CEO, who may abuse this extra power and harm 
shareholder value. Wade et al. (1990) studied whether the granting of golden parachutes to 
CEOs is the result of economically rational process or determined by social influence of CEO. 
The show that CEOs who serve on many outside boards, and therefore are likely to have a better 
social reputation and be more familiar with golden parachutes, are more likely to have a golden 
parachute, and also that CEOs with a higher tenure relative to the board are more likely to 
receive this kind of contingent compensation. 
Regarding the CEO succession process, and the role of CEO power on it, Cannella & Shen 
(2001) studied the factors influencing the outcomes associated with their apparent tenure -
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promotion to CEO or exit from the firm- and found a negative association between CEO power 
and promotion of the heir apparent, and also that CEO power increases the likelihood of exit 
for the heir apparent when firm performance is above average. Also, Shen & Cannella (2002) 
conducts a times series analysis of the antecedents of CEO dismissal followed by inside 
succession, finding that higher risk of dismissal for outsider CEOs is a result of them lacking 
social networks and power bases within their new firm. They also provide evidence that CEOs 
are in weak positions and are at high risk of power contests in the early years of their tenure. 
Aguilera & Jackson (2003) point out several limitations of using Agency Theory to explain 
corporate governance, in the absence of the institutional framework, such as the existence of 
different stakeholders within the principal-agent relationship –i.e. banks, institutional investors, 
families that pursue different interests- or the several interdependencies among stakeholders 
that are ignored –i.e. employee role in board of directors, interfirm ownership-.  
Another limitation of the Agency Theory is that it does not explore other roles for the member 
of the board of directors different from monitoring and does not benefit form the contributions 
of psychology and sociology to achieve a more complete understanding of managers’ 
motivations. 
In summary the agency theory has played a seminal role in the development of corporate 
governance literature. As a mainly economic perspective, it focuses on the monitoring role of 
directors, assuming the need to control managers given the misalignment between shareholders 
and managers. Corporate governance mechanisms that minimize agency costs will be 
appropriate under this perspective –i.e. independent boards with a majority of outside directors 
or the CEO position not occupied by the chair of the board, as is the case of “executive 
chairmen” or “dual CEOs”- (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014). Agency theory is, in our 
view, the most powerful theory to approach corporate governance analysis. 
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Tables 1 and 2 summarize the main review and empirical studies that deal with corporate 
governance issues from an agency theory perspective. 
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Table 1. Corporate governance and agency theory literature: review papers 
Authors Issue Main conclusions 
Eisenhardt 
(1989) 
 
What are the contributions of 
agency theory, both positivist 
and principal-agent research? 
 
• Positivist researchers: situations in which principal and agent have conflicting goals at large, public corporations 
Governance mechanisms: outcome-based contracts effective in curbing agent opportunism and information system curb 
agent opportunism 
• Principal-agent research: general theory, set of assumptions and mathematical proof. Theory applied to employer-
employee, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier, etc. Focus: determining the optimal contract, behavior versus outcome. Key 
variables: information systems, outcome uncertainty, risk aversion, goal conflict, task programmability, outcome 
measurability, length of agency relationship 
Shleifer & 
Vishny (1997) 
 
 
International corporate 
governance review paper with 
special attention to legal 
protection of investors and 
ownership concentration 
• Concentrated ownership: good to control management but potential exploitation of minorities: importance of legal 
protection 
• Japan/Germany:  permanent large shareholders and banks discourage small investors 
• USA: because of bankruptcy protection, creditors have relatively fewer rights than do creditors in Germany and Japan 
• Japan falls between the United States and Germany in the degree of protection of both shareholder and creditor rights 
• Rest of the world: legal protection of investors is lower, firms remain family-controlled and have difficulty raising outside 
funds 
La-Porta et al. 
(2000b) 
 
 
Is there a common explanation 
for differences among corporate 
governance in countries? 
• Even among countries with well functioning judiciaries, those with laws and regulations more protective of investors have 
better developed capital markets 
• Common law countries have the strongest protection of outside investors (shareholders and creditors), German civil law 
and Scandinavian countries intermidate and French civil law countries the weakest 
• The vague fiduciary duty principles of the common law are more protective of investors than the bright line rules of the 
civil law 
• Civil law is associated with greater government intervention in economic activity and weaker protection of private 
property than common law 
• When investor rights are poorly protected and expropriation is feasible on a substantial scale, control acquires enormous 
value because it gives the insiders the opportunity to expropriate efficiently 
Bushman & 
Smith (2001) 
 
Role of publicly reported 
financial accounting 
information in corporate 
governance 
• Use of externally reported financial accounting in control mechanisms that promote corporate governance 
• Important role of financial accounting in managerial incentive contracts, but also relevant for takeovers, proxy contests, 
shareholder litigations, debt contracts and audit function 
• Governance use of financial accounting affects allocation of resources in an economy: discipline mangers to direct 
resources towards good projects and reduces information asymmetries 
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Table 1. Corporate governance and agency theory literature: review papers (continued) 
Authors Issue Main conclusions 
Daily et al. (2003) 
 
 
Corporate governance literature 
summary  
• Theories: agency, resource dependence, stewardship and power theories 
• Practice: shareholder activism (outside directors, non duality, age and term limits for directors, contingent forms of pay 
for executives) 
• Scant evidence that control over executives and independence of oversight have been productive from a shareholder-
oriented perspective 
• Challenge for directors is to build and maintain trust in their relationships with executives, but also to maintain some 
distance so that effective monitoring can be achieved 
• Board independence is related to firm performance, as measured by the incidence of bankruptcy filing 
Denis & McConnell 
(2003) 
 
Survey of two generations of 
corporate governance around 
the world 
• Significant differences across countries in the degree of investor protection: countries with low investor protection have 
higher concentration of equity ownership and a lack of significant public equity market 
• Laws in common law countries provide the strongest degree of protection for shareholders, while the laws in French 
civil law countries provide the least protection. Enforcement of the laws is stronger in the German and Scandinavian law 
countries than in the common law countries, with the weakest enforcement observed in French civil law countries 
• Two ways to extract value through private benefits of control: tunneling- transfer of assets/profits from company to 
controlling shareholder as in pyramid ownership structures- and choosing managers 
Young Peng, 
Ahlstrom, Bruton, 
& Jiang (2008) 
 
 
Corporate governance in 
emerging economies 
 
 
 
• Corporate governance in emerging countries, rather than principal-agent conflict, is a controlling versus minority 
shareholder conflict  
• Informal institutions (relational ties, business groups, family connections, and government contacts) have greater role in 
shaping corporate governance 
• Firms may rely more heavily on dominant ownership for corporate governance reasons.  External control mechanisms 
(product, labor and takeover markets) are corrupted or ineffective and thus less effective in governing top managers than 
internal control mechanisms 
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Table 2. Corporate governance empirical papers based on agency theory  
Authors/Sample Research question Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Research findings 
(Wade et al., 1990) 
 
Sample of 89 firms, representing 
nine industries, from Business 
Week's (May 6, 1985) annual 
survey of executive compensation 
for 1984 
Whether the granting 
of golden parachutes 
to CEOs is the result 
of economically-
rational process or 
determined by social 
influence of CEO 
Golden 
parachute 
• Firm size 
• Concentration of ownership 
• Board size 
• % outside directors appointed after 
CEO 
• Board tenure of CEO 
• CEO relative board tenure 
• Number of boards CEO serves on 
Firms market-to-book ratio 
• Both economic and social influence perspectives have 
merit and the importance of each may depend on the 
ownership structure of the firm 
• Larger firms less likely to become takeover targets; 
hence, there is less need to use golden parachutes to 
align shareholder and management interest. 
• Negative association between golden parachutes and 
takeover risk as indexed by EXCESS (firm's total market 
value minus book value of its assets) 
• CEOs who serve on many outside boards, and therefore 
are likely to have a better social reputation and be more 
familiar with golden parachutes, are more likely to have 
a golden parachute 
• CEOs with a higher tenure relative to the board are more 
likely to receive a golden parachute 
Daily & Dalton (1994) 
 
57 bankrupt firms and 57 
surviving firms, 1972-1982, Dun 
and Bradstreet, Securities and 
Exchange Commission 
What is the 
relationship between 
governance structure 
and corporate 
bankruptcy? 
Corporate 
bankruptcy 
• Proportion of affiliated directors 
(insiders or blockholders) 
• CEO duality 
• There is a positive relationship between governance 
structure and bankruptcy 
• Bankrupt firms have a greater incidence of joint CEO-
board chairperson structure than survivor firms 
• Bankrupt firms will have higher proportions of affiliated 
directors than survivor firms 
• The interaction between CEO-board chairperson 
structure and the proportion of affiliated directors will 
distinguish bankrupt from survivor firms 
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Table 2. Corporate governance empirical papers based on agency theory (continued) 
Authors/Sample Research question Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Research findings 
Finkelstein & D’Aveni (1994) 
 
All public firms in printing and 
publishing, chemicals, or 
computers according to Ward's 
Directory (1984- 1986) 
What is the 
relationship between 
board of directors and 
CEO duality 
CEO duality Board vigilance 
• Proportion of outside directors 
• Proportion of firm shares owned by 
outside board members 
Moderator variables: 
• Informal CEO power 
• Firm performance 
• The association between board vigilance and CEO 
duality changes with circumstances. When CEOs have 
strong informal power or when firm performance is 
good, the risk of CEO entrenchment increases, making 
duality less desirable. 
• When other influences are held constant, it appears that 
vigilant boards are more concerned with unity of 
command than with entrenchment avoidance 
Daily & Johnson (1997) 
 
100 randomly selected Fortune 
500 firms, 1987-1990 
What is the nature of 
the relationship 
between CEOs’ 
power and firm 
financial 
performance? 
Firm financial 
performance 
• Structural power 
• Ownership power 
• Prestige power 
• Expert power 
• Lagged and reciprocal nature of the relationship between 
CEO power and firm performance 
• Higher levels of performance lead to greater number of 
corporate directorships for the CEO in the subsequent 
year 
• CEO’s service on other corporate boards enhances their 
own firm’s financial performance 
• Higher levels of firm performance lead to lower 
proportions of independent directors in the following 
year 
• Higher levels of relative compensation led to higher firm 
performance in subsequent years 
• Educational prestige was associated with lower market 
returns 
 
  
 41 
Table 2. Corporate governance empirical papers based on agency theory (continued) 
Authors/Sample Research question Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Research findings 
Cannella & Shen (2001) 
 
Data from 168 large U.S. 
manufactures, publicly traded, 
COMPUSTAT, 1986-1991 
What are the factors 
that affect the 
alternate outcomes 
associated with heir 
apparent tenure -
promotion to CEO 
or exit from the 
firm-? 
Status of the 
heir apparent: 
promote of to 
CEO, exit from 
firm or no 
change 
• Heir apparent power 
• Incumbent CEO power 
• Outside director power 
• Firm performance 
• Negative association between CEO power and 
promotion 
• CEO power increases likelihood of exit when 
performance is above average 
• Outside director power decreased the likelihood of exit 
when performance is high but increase it when it is low 
• An heir apparent with longer company tenure is less 
likely to exit  
Shen & Cannella (2002) 
 
Random sample of 387 firms 
reporting at least $200 million sales. 
Data for 1988-1997: annual reports, 
Dun&Bradsteet and Dow Jones  
What factors drive 
CEO dismissal 
when followed by 
inside succession? 
CEO dismissal 
followed by 
inside 
succession 
• CEO origin 
• CEO tenure 
• Proportion of non-CEO inside 
directors 
• Non-CEO executive ownership 
• Both proportion of non-CEO inside directors and Non-
CEO executive ownership positively impact CEO 
dismissal followed by inside succession 
• Senior executives are potential power contenders and 
relevant for CEO dismissal followed by inside 
succession 
• Higher risk of dismissal for outsider CEOs is a result 
of their lacking social net-works and power bases 
within their new firm 
• CEOs are in weak positions and are at high risk of 
power contests in the early years of their tenure 
Elshandidy & Neri (2015) 
 
1,890 annual reports (from 290 
British non-financial firms and 88 
Italian non-financial firms) 
Measure  influence 
of risk disclosure 
practices in the UK 
and Italy on 
corporate 
governance and  
market liquidity 
 
Risk disclosure Corporate governance measures 
• board size 
• non executive directors 
• independent non executive 
directors 
• CEO duality 
• Dividend yield 
• Concentrated ownership  
• Audit quality 
• Governance (incentives) factors influence UK firms’ 
decision to reveal or conceal voluntary (mandatory) 
risk information. Contrary to those findings, incentive 
(governance) factors influence Italian firms’ decision 
to reveal voluntary (mandatory) information in the 
narrative sections of their annual reports. 
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2.2 Resource dependence theory 
Besides the governance function of the board of directors –controlling managers and ensuring 
that corporate action is aligned with shareholders’ interests-, the board has an institutional role: 
they serve as a link with the external environment, contributing to resource acquisition. 
Members of the board of directors allocate their attention to various functions such as resource 
provision, environmental scanning, opportunity seeking, and management monitoring (Tuggle, 
Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010). In the Resource Dependence Theory, several factors are a 
source of uncertainty and external dependencies that directors can help to mitigate –ie: 
availability of capital, regulatory environment, new technologies, etc.- (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Firms are owned by shareholders who invest capital to get a return on it, and that means 
assuming risks and uncertainty about resource acquisition and the subsequent profitability of 
investments. Directors help the firm coping with shareholders’ uncertainty by contributing their 
industry and functional expertise, networking, legitimacy, access to suppliers, buyers, public 
policy decision makers and social groups, therefore increasing survival likelihood (Gales & 
Kesner, 1994; Singh, House, & Tucker, 1986).  
Directors have been classified into two broad categories from a legal point of view, as 
executives versus external, being the later either independent or block holder directors 
representing a relevant shareholder. From the point of view of the resource dependence theory, 
Hillman et al. (2000) propose four kind of directors, according to the main role assigned to 
each: 
1) Insiders: directors who are or were managers or owners of the firm. The reason for 
appointing someone as an “insider” director is the privileged view that she has on both 
the firm and the sector in which it operates.  
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2) Business experts: directors appointed on the basis of their expertise in other firms or 
organization, which is valuable for operations design, providing an alternative point of 
view –how other firms deal with similar issues- to that of the executives of the company. 
Business experts may also contribute to the firm strategy design drawing from their 
knowledge of the sector and comparable companies, and this is a key element to ensure 
the competitive position of the firm 
3) Support specialists: directors with a specialized expertise useful for the senior 
management, for example in the areas of capital markets, law or insurance. They are 
different from business experts since they do not have general management experience, 
they may have an academic or institutional background. 
4) Community influentials: directors with experience relevant to the firm’s environment 
beyond competitor firms and suppliers. These directors have knowledge or influence on 
non-business organizations, such as the government, the parliament, the university and 
various social organizations, and this knowledge is valuable since these groups impact 
or are impacted by the firm operations. Their expertise might prevent the firm from 
inadvertently taking decisions negatively affecting other interest groups, such as 
environmental groups, trade unions, etc. 
While agency theory prescribed independent boards dominated by external directors, the 
resource dependence theory advocates for boards with a balanced representation of different 
kind of directors, who provide resources and information to the firm, thereby reducing 
environmental dependency and improving the effectiveness of strategic choices inside the firm. 
Moreover, the access to valuable resources increases legitimacy by enhancing the reputation 
and credibility of their firms. The extent to which directors benefit the firm depends on whether 
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their inclusion provides access to valued resources and information, reduces environmental 
dependency, or aids in establishing legitimacy (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Daily & Schwenk, 1996; 
Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992). 
According to Pfeffer & Salancik (1978:167), boards are “vehicles for co-opting important 
external organizations” –ie: a banking executive is appointed as member of the board in order 
to have a good relationship with banks - and they can benefit the firm in the following ways: 
(1) provision of specific resources, such as expertise and advice from individuals with 
experience in a variety of strategic areas; (2) channels for communicating information between 
external organizations and the firm; (3) aids in obtaining commitments or support from 
important elements outside the firm; and (4) legitimacy. Pfeffer (1972) considers the board of 
directors a “vehicle for dealing with problems of external interdependence and uncertainty, 
resulting from its exchange of resources with important external organizations”, and that board 
size and composition are shown to be “systematically related to factors measuring the 
organization’s requirements for coopting sectors of the environment”. When firms fail to use 
boards to manage their environments, they pay a penalty in terms of lower performance (Pillai 
& Al-Malkawi, 2018). This cooptation is an alternative to absorbing external organizations and 
dealing with interdependence through mergers or long-term contracts. Cooptation uses the 
board of directors by incorporating to it representatives of important external organizations with 
which the firm has interdependences. Cooptation will be particularly useful with large 
organizations that are difficult to absorb, as well as other organizations where absorptions is 
not feasible, such as financial institutions and political bodies. 
Boards increase their size and the diversity of its members as a response to resource 
dependencies. Also larger boards might improve corporate governance by increasing the 
difficulty for the CEO to dominate the board of directors. In the same vein, Dalton, Daily, 
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Johnson, & Ellstrand (1999) meta-analyzed 27 studies that dealt with the relationship between 
board size and firm performance, finding a non-zero, positive relationship, particularly in the 
case of smaller firms, consistent with the idea that a higher number of directors allow the 
company to benefit from the local expertise of executive directors and linkages of outside 
directors. 
The resource dependence theory emphasizes the need of the firm for environmental linkage, 
which will vary according to the kinds of dependence that the firm faces (Dinh & Calabrò, 
2019). Whatever the dependences, the firm will have to afford transaction costs to gather the 
needed resources. In the case of a firm operating in a regulated sector, having outside directors 
with a public sector background will surely reduce transaction costs by gaining knowledge of 
the procedures to comply with the regulations, the right contacts to whom each issue must be 
addressed and even to gain influence on the drafting of the regulations that affect the firm. So 
besides facilitating the firm access to resources, directors also reduce transaction costs thanks 
to their networking with the institutions with which the firm interacts (Williamson, 1984). 
Director interlocks also have an important role in information dissemination across firms 
(Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). 
Empirical research Meyer (1982); Smith & Grimm (1987) has proved that changes in the 
environment of the firm, such as shifts in regulatory or technological environment, cause 
strategic changes in the firm. But changes will not be limited to the inside of the corporation: 
the new environment will require new linkages which imply a re-configuration for the board of 
directors, since its members are the main link with the external environment. Corporate boards 
reflect the firm’s environment and directors should be chosen considering their capacity to 
contribute to the provision of strategic resources to the firm. In this vein the board of director 
will be able to contribute to the strategic change and reduce the uncertainty faced by firm under 
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the new environment (Albuquerque, Brandão-Marques, Ferreira, & Matos, 2018; Hillman et 
al., 2000). 
In summary, the resource dependence model offers a much more eclectic view for the role of a 
member of the board of directors. While under agency theory, this role was mainly monitoring, 
resource dependence identifies several roles, and does not focus on controlling managers. All 
directors are valuable as long as they contribute to obtain resources and reduce environmental 
uncertainties. Executive directors’ main role is not to control managers, but to provide their 
privileged view on both the firm and the sector in which it operates. The board of directors, 
rather than an instrument of control, is an instrument of contribution to the firms’ operations. 
A board composition with a majority of external board directors will be appropriate –to provide 
the environmental linkages advocated by this theory-, but no preference for a particular 
leadership structure –CEO duality- is clearly derived from the theory. The resource dependence 
model contributes to the analysis of board of directors by identifying enriching roles for outside 
directors but does not address the main problem of corporate governance: the protection of the 
minority shareholder. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the main conclusions of several theoretical, 
review and empirical papers that deal with corporate governance from a resource dependence 
theory perspective 
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Table 3. Corporate governance and resource dependence theory literature 
Authors Topic Main conclusions 
Williamson (1984) 
(theoretical paper) 
General essay on 
corporate 
governance 
• Corporate governance involves all constituencies (labor, owners, suppliers, customers, the community, and management) 
but representation on the board of directors should be strictly limited 
• Boards reduce transaction costs associated with environmental interdependency 
• The board of directors should be regarded principally as a governance instrument of the shareholders  
Daily & Schwenk (1996) Under which 
conditions 
alternative 
“governance 
structures” (top 
management 
teams-CEOs-board 
of directors) 
develop 
• CEO dominance and board dominance models will be associated with greater performance than alternative governance 
models 
• Efficacy of dominant or balanced structure depends on “attendant conditions”: ownership concentration, portfolio exposure 
and resource dependence and information requirements 
• Homogenous top management teams are superior under conditions of modest portfolios, low globalization and low 
information requirements 
Dalton et al. (1999) 
(meta-analysis) 
Relationship 
between board size 
and firm 
performance 
• Non-zero, positive relationship. Particularly for smaller firms. 
• Larger boards can leverage all roles of directors: inside directors (offering local expertise, training and succession), 
affiliated directors (resource dependence links) and other outside directors (independence, monitoring role) 
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Table 4. Corporate governance empirical papers based on resource dependence theory 
Authors and sample Research question Dependent variable Independent variables Research findings 
Singh et al. (1986) 
389 voluntary social 
service organizations in 
Toronto, Canada, during 
1970-1980.  
What is the impact 
of organizational 
change in their 
survival? 
Organization death rate • CEO change 
• Service area change 
• Goal change 
• Location change 
• Structural change 
• Organizational change processes more relevant in 
population change for institutional organizations than 
for technical organizations 
• Impact of organizational changes depends on stage of 
organizational life cycle at the time of change 
• Core organizational changes best described by an 
ecological view and more disruptive, whereas 
peripheral organizational changes best described by an 
adaptation view and lowered death hazard 
Smith & Grimm (1987) 
27 railroad companies’ 
strategies before and after 
deregulation (54 
observations) 
 
What are the 
effects of 
deregulation on 
strategic 
management in the 
railroad industry? 
Return on investment / 
capitalization / equity 
Strategy move: 
• Unfocussed follower to 
contingency 
• Contingency to leadership 
• Unfocused follower to 
innovation 
• Quality differentiation to 
contingency 
• Contingency to unfocused 
follower 
• Most firms changed their strategies in response to 
environmental variation, and those that did change 
their strategies outperformed those that did not 
• Among the strategic changes, those involving 
innovation and contingency strategies were found to 
be the most profitable 
Hambrick & D’Aveni 
(1992) 
57 firms filing either 
Chapter X or XI 
bankruptcy petitions 
during 1972-1982. For 
each bankrupt, a matched 
survivor. 
What is the 
relationship 
between top 
management team 
of large 
corporations and 
bankruptcy? 
Bankruptcy • Team size 
• Outside board members 
• Functional expertise 
• Team compensation 
• Tenure in the firm 
• Tenure heterogeneity 
• CEO dominance 
• Failing firms tend to show significant divergence -
relative to survivors- in the composition of their top 
management teams, specially over the last five years of 
the bankrupts' lives 
• Team deterioration aggravates corporate decline, either 
through strategic errors or stakeholders' dissatisfaction 
with the visibly diminished team 
• Corporate decline brings about team deterioration, 
through a combination of voluntary departures, 
scapegoating, and limited resources for attracting 
executive talent 
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Table 4. Corporate governance empirical papers based on resource dependence theory (continued) 
Authors and sample Research 
question 
Dependent variable Independent variables Research findings 
Gales & Kesner (1994) 
Sample of 279 bankrupt 
firms form Funk and Scott’s 
Index of Corporate Change 
1978-1985 and non-
bankrupt firms from Ward’s 
Directory 
What is the impact 
of boards in 
bankruptcy? 
Firm’s survival  • Size of board of directors 
• Proportion of outside directors 
• Boards that eventually filed for bankruptcy are 
smaller and have fewer outsiders than non 
bankrupt counterparts, in line with the resource 
dependence theory 
• After bankruptcy, boards have fewer outside 
directors, since the bankruptcy court takes on 
the monitoring role of outsiders, in line with the 
agency theory 
Hillman et al. (2000) 
 
557 directors from 14 
airlines during 1968-1988, 
annual reports, proxy 
statements, 10K reports, 
Standard & Poors Register 
of Corporations. 
What is the 
relationship 
between board 
composition and 
changes in the 
firm’s 
environment? 
Board replacements Regulated versus unregulated environment • As environments change, the composition of 
boards will change to reflect the shift in 
resource needs confronting the firm  
• From a regulated to a deregulated environment, 
firms tend to strategically alter the composition 
of their boards 
• During regulation board replacements were 
more likely from the insider and support 
specialist category, while during deregulation 
board replacements were more likely to come 
from the business expert and community 
influential categories 
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2.3 Stewardship theory  
The stewardship theory undertakes an organizational psychology and sociological perspective, 
having the concept of authority at its core. As a complement to the agency theory, that focuses 
on the need to control managers, the stewardship theory considers that managers are also 
motivated by non-financial factors (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Stewardship theory considers 
that the model of human motivation underpinning agency theory is narrow, characterizes 
managers in a unnecessarily negative way and suffers from an individualist bias, in detriment 
to the role played by team coordination (Donaldson, 1990). While the model of “homo-
economicus” used by the agency theory manages opportunistic employees, the model of man 
used by the stewardship theory is trustworthy. While the former theory deals with monitor and 
control, the later deals with facilitating and empowering. 
The need to achieve motivates managers, who obtain satisfaction by successfully performing a 
challenging work and by gaining recognition from peers and bosses. According to stewardship 
theory, there is no conflict of interest between managers and owners: managers are stewards 
that are aligned with the objectives of their principals Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson (1997), 
so when designing the structure of corporate governance, coordination among team players is 
a key consideration –in contrast with the individualistic approach of the agency theory-. Since 
managers are stewards that act in the best interest of owners, the optimal organizational design 
should empower them and increase their autonomy (Donaldson, 1990). 
The stewardship  theory is based on the model of man that McGregor (1957) described in his 
“Theory Y”: management is responsible for organizing resources, people are not by nature 
passive:  in an analogue way to Say’s Law in economics, where supply creates its own demand, 
employees may be idle not because of lack of interest, but because of lack of directions from 
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management. The role of management is to arrange conditions so that employees and firms 
incentives are aligned, employees pursue their interest and simultaneously contribute to the 
firm’s goals, in contrast with “Theory X”, where management needs to closely organize and 
monitor employees, or else they would shirk their responsibilities. From the Stewardship 
Theory, manager’s incentives converge with those of the corporation, so that self-esteem is 
aligned with corporate prestige. Future employment in the firm is a strong motivator. Managers 
want to do a good job, to be good stewards of corporate assets, so there is no intrinsic 
motivational problem (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
The degree of power concentration –“leadership structure”- facilitates managers to execute their 
plans and is very relevant for manager’s and firm’s performance. If the CEO has complete 
authority over the firm, rather than being controlled by the board of directors, and her role is 
clear and free from interferences, CEO effectiveness will be higher. CEO duality, by 
concentrating in the same person the roles of top manager and chairman of the board, means a 
positive empowerment that results in better firm performance. In contrast with the Agency 
Theory, this approach consider that the CEO is not driven by financial incentives such as long-
term compensation but to his natural motivation to do a good job. Donaldson & Davis (1991) 
found that, contrary to Agency Theory expectations, CEO duality is associated with higher 
returns to shareholders rather than an independent chair of the corporate board. Also, 
concentration of power means concentration of responsibility for possible failures, so 
empowered managers will have their reputation at stake, on top of legal liabilities, increasing 
their accountability and incentives to perform satisfactorily. 
Although the Stewardship Theory has been considered by several authors opposed to the 
Agency Theory, both theories can be compatible. Even a key author for the development of the 
Agency Theory, such as Fama (1980:292), posits that “the manager of a firm, like the coach of 
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any team, may not suffer any immediate gain or loss in current wages from the current 
performance of his team, but the success or failure of the team impacts his future wages, and 
this gives the manager a stake in the success of the team”. Another example of compatibility is 
offered by Donaldson (1990) with takeover situations, where the stewardship approach will 
argue that managers perceive that not only they are threatened, but the very same corporation 
that can be restructured or loaded with debt, and that a new management team brought by the 
corporate raiders provide less expertise that incumbents have, so management opposition to the 
takeover does not necessarily imply an opportunistic behavior by management but an honest 
one. “Under conditions where the existing coalition between managers and owners is called 
into question, such as by a takeover threat, the interests of each party start to diverge; this is 
when agency theory may prove correct” (Donaldson, 1990:377). Davis et al. (1997) reconcile 
the Stewardship and the Agency Theory with a contingent model made up of psychological and 
situational factors. Regarding the former category, the people more likely to become stewards 
are those who are motivated by higher order needs, who have high identification with the 
organization and who are more likely to use personal power as a basis for influencing others. 
With respect to situational factors, people more likely to become stewards are those who are in 
an involvement-oriented -versus control-oriented- situation, who are in a collectivist culture 
and those who are in a low power distance culture –low acceptance that less powerful members 
will be dependent on more powerful members-. If both manager and principal adopt a 
stewardship relationship, firm performance is maximized; if a mutual agency relationship 
exists, firm costs are minimized and “if a mixed-motive choice exists, the party choosing 
stewardship is betrayed and the party choosing activity is opportunistic” (Shi, Connelly, & 
Hoskisson, 2017). 
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In summary, stewardship theory proposes an opposite view for managers than the agency theory 
does. Enriched by psychology and sociology, this theory relies not only to economic arguments 
for manager’s incentives converging with those of the corporation–prestige and future 
employment- but to the very nature of man: executives are good stewards of corporate assets 
with a natural motivation to do a good job. CEO duality will be advocated by this theory, since 
it empowers the CEO and increases effectiveness, and without the focus on monitoring, no need 
for a majority of outside directors is derived from stewardship theory, that actually values the 
presence of inside director in the board, who far from compromising the board’s effectiveness, 
add significant experience, facilitates contrasting of points of view with management and also 
provides extra motivation for the executives of the company.  The stewardship theory 
contributes with an alternative model of man, but fails to offer an explanation for the abundant 
frauds and corporate scandals of the last decades. Table 5 summarizes the main conclusions of 
several theoretical and review papers that deal with corporate governance from the perspective 
of the Stewardship Theory. 
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Table 5. Corporate governance papers based on stewardship theory 
 
Authors Topic Main conclusions 
Donaldson (1990) 
(theoretical paper) 
Organizational economics 
and management theory 
 
• Organizational economics -based on agency theory-: managers shirk, deceitful, individualistic actors.  
Opportunistic behavior needs to be curbed by monitoring, incentives, promotions, negative sanctions. 
• Management theory based on stewardship theory. Managers are team players, the optimal structure is 
one that authorizes them to act, given that they will do it in the interest of owners 
• Stewardship theory may prove correct as long as the coalition between managers and owners persists. 
Under other conditions –i.e. takeover threat-, interests of each party start to diverge; this is when agency 
theory may prove correct 
Davis et al. (1997) 
(review paper) 
Stewardship theory of 
management  
• Managers are more likely to become stewards for: 
o Psychological factors: those motivated by higher order needs, who have high identification with the 
organization and who are more likely to use personal power as a basis for influencing others 
o Situational factors: those who are in an involvement-oriented -versus control-oriented- situation, who 
are in a collectivist culture and those who are in a low power distance culture –low acceptance that 
less powerful members will be dependent on more powerful members-  
• If a mutual stewardship relationship exists, firm performance is maximized, if a mutual agency 
relationship exists, firm costs are minimized and if a mixed-motive choice exists, the party choosing 
stewardship is betrayed and the party choosing activity is opportunistic 
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2.4 Institutional Theory 
We firstly describe the origins of the Institutional Theory to focus later on its application to 
corporate governance. Institutions have been said to be “humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property 
rights)” (North, 1990:97). Institutions vary across countries and across time, therefore it is essential 
to analyze them to understand how they influence corporate governance: how the relationship 
between parties with a stake in the firm is affected. Roe (1994) explained how public mistrust of 
large corporations as well as interest group politics influenced on the fragmentation of financial 
institutions, dispersed ownership and stock-market finance in the United States, in contrast to bank-
based forms of finance and corporate control in Germany and Japan. 
The study of institutions and their influence on firms has reached a multidisciplinary approach. 
From a sociology perspective, the origins of institutions have been studied, taking into account 
culture, as a set of informal institutions –i.e. culture influences corporate law, impacting related 
party transaction regulation; Japanese executives focus on service to society and employees; U.S. 
executives focus on shareholder value creation, with the other stakeholders being secondary, 
German executives emphasize balancing the interests of employees and shareholders (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2010)-. Other disciplines that have contributed to the development of Institutional Theory 
are: Political Science –studying the character and evolutions of institutional structures-, economics 
–that focuses on the constrains that institutions place on individual choices- and even psychology, 
where rules, leadership and even trust are analyzed to explain the individual willingness to forego 
self-interest (Zucker, 1987).  
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Let us briefly review the main literature developed over time on Institutional Theory. The 
institutional environment includes state legislation, rules, contracts, social norms, government 
administration, professional associations and codes. Overbeek, Apeldoorn, & Nolke (2007) points 
out the tendency of states to delegate power to private agencies in the fields of accounting and 
audit process as well as in the case of corporate governance. Under an institutional view, corporate 
governance is defined as “the whole set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that 
determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how control is exercised, 
and how the risk and returns from the activities they undertake is allocated” (Blair, 1995:3). 
This view of corporate governance as a set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements 
constitutes an environment that heavily influences the firm activity. Selznick, who first described 
the impact of the institutional environment, defined the term cooptation as “the process of 
absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as 
a means of averting threats to its stability or existence […] Cooptation tells us something about the 
process by which an institutional environment impinges itself upon an organization and effects 
changes in its leadership and policy” (Selznick, 1948:34). Not only the Institutional Theory uses 
this term, cooptation, the Resource Dependence Theory, concerned with the provision of 
environmental linkages, also use the “cooptation” concept. Another link with the resource 
dependence theory is that, institutionalization means compliance with laws and regulations, and 
lack of it may bring disruption in funding (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). From a sociological point 
of view, Parsons (1956) analyzed the role that institutionalized systems played in legitimizing 
organizations’ goals and mechanisms used to interact with society: (1) procurement of resources 
(2) decision making and (3) the institutional structure which integrates the organization with others 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) described how formal organizational structures arise as a reflection of 
rationalized institutional rules inside firms, that function as myths which firms incorporate, gaining 
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legitimacy, resources stability, and enhanced survival prospects. The use of these organizational 
structures that are legitimated by the environment makes economic sense because it implies 
responsible management, pleases external stakeholders -shareholders, clients, suppliers and the 
state- and avoids potential claims of negligence if something goes wrong.  States play an important 
role through legislative and judicial authorities, by regulating several sectors –i.e. education, 
energy, transportation or healthcare- and granting licenses necessary to practice occupations. But 
firms’ corporate governance does not adapt to their institutional contexts in a simple passive way, 
they also play active roles in shaping these contexts. This process may have adverse effects on 
operating or economic efficiency and it is possible to differentiate between organizations that are 
under strong output controls and institutionalized organizations that depend on confidence and 
stability achieved by isomorphism with institutional rules. Attempts to control and coordinate 
activities in institutionalized organizations lead to loss of legitimacy, so elements of the 
organization structure are decoupled from activities and from each other -hospitals treat, not cure; 
schools produce students, not learning-. The more an organization’s structure is derived from 
institutionalized myths, the more it relies on confidence, satisfaction, and good faith.  
Institutional structures derive from imitation of similar organizations or from structures embedded 
in the organization, by routines that improve organizational performance. If an innovation affects 
reputation and legitimacy, it is more likely to be adopted by the organization with uncritical 
acceptance (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). 
Institutionalization brings stability, resistance to change and low organizational failure. But the 
institutional environment does not interpenetrate every organization in the same degree. Zucker 
(1987) offers three complementary explanations for this asymmetric influence of the institutional 
environment: (1) internal goals and values – the more widely shared they are, the less likely it is 
to change them- (2) legitimacy of external control -organizations try to shape the institutional 
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environment to legitimate their activities and obtain societal resources- and (3) power of the 
organization -“firms, with greater power than public organizations, use boundary units, 
contracting, or incorporating parts of the environment in internal hierarchies as means of reducing 
the effects on task performance of such environmental forces as suppliers and regulatory agencies” 
(Zucker, 1987):451. Lastly, if the firm performance is low, its shareholder will be more interested 
in outside interference.  
As the process of organizational rationalization moves from the competitive marketplace to the 
state and the professions, organizations become more homogeneous through what Dimaggio & 
Powell (1983) names institutional isomorphism. Organizations compete not just for resources and 
customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy. Dimaggio & Powell (1983) describe 
three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change: (1) coercive isomorphism, from political 
influence and legitimacy (2) mimetic isomorphism, as a response to uncertainty and (3) normative 
isomorphism, from professionalization; and four predictors of this process: (1) degree of 
dependence on other organizations (2) degree of goal ambiguity of the organizations (3) degree of 
reliance on academic credentials and (4) degree of participation on trade and professional 
associations. Institutional definition or ”structuration” involves an increase in the information load 
with which organization must contend as well as in the interaction among organizations in the 
field, the emergence of inter-organizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition and 
mutual awareness among participants that they are involved in a common enterprise.  
Eisenhardt (1988) makes an interesting comparison between the Institutional and the Agency 
Theory. In contrast with the agency theory, within institutional theory practices arise from 
imitation –from organization of information and risk bearing costs in agency theory-, the basis of 
organization is legitimacy -versus efficiency in agency theory-, people are viewed as legitimacy 
seeking -versus self interested rationalists in agency theory-, technology moderates the impact of 
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institutional factors -versus organizations that should fit technology in agency theory- and 
legislation, traditions, social and political beliefs are independent variables in the institutional 
theory -versus outcome uncertainty, span of control and programmability in agency theory-. 
Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, & Very (2007) suggest an embeddedness framework for governance: while 
agency theory depicts social life as a “series of contracts between voiceless and neutral 
individuals”, other social and cultural influences that are part of the “institutional environment” 
affect the firm’s governance practices. Managers’ propensity to act opportunistically and bounded 
rationality of principals change over time and firms continuously try more effective monitoring 
and incentive mechanisms. A firm’s corporate governance is therefore influenced by the co-
evolution of principals and managers’ beliefs. 
Friedland & Alford (1991) offered another approach to institutional analysis which posited 
institutional logics as defining the content and meaning of institutions. Society is analyzed in three 
nested levels: individuals, organizations and institutions. Institutions –capitalist market, 
bureaucratic state, democracy, family, religion- shape individuals and organizational interests. 
Because they are potentially contradictory, they offer different logics available to individuals and 
organizations, which transform the institutional relations of society by exploiting these 
contradictions. Institutions set the limits of rationality but individuals and organizations try to use 
institutional order to their own advantage. Sometimes rules and symbols are internalized and result 
in conformity, while in other occasions they are manipulated by different institutional logics to 
serve their purposes. 
Institutions are conventionally understood as supraorganizational patterns of organizing social life 
rooted in shared norms (Friedland & Alford, 1991):242. But that definition underlines the exterior 
normative, leaving aside the interior order, that is why the authors propose a new approach that 
takes into account the relationship between symbol –the theoretical rules- and the practice executed 
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by each organization. Society is constituted through multiple institutional logics […] 
Organizational behavior vary institutionally (Friedland & Alford, 1991:243). Organizations tend 
to be homogenous regardless of efficiency criteria, they adopt the appropriate forms as a way to 
access resources from other organizations which consider them to be legitimate. 
Codes of corporate governance are a good example of the diffusion process described by the 
institutional theory. As markets develop, organizations must manage boundary-spanning 
interdependencies, the need for coordination increases and organizations adopt formal structures. 
This process is also driven by the penetration of political centers and rationalized myths that 
function as institutional rules through the educational system, social prestige, professions, 
programs, technologies, the courts, the law, stock market regulations, etc. Why do these formal 
structures diffuse? They do so because environments create boundary-spanning exigencies for 
organizations, and incorporating structural elements isomorphic with the environment help 
organizations to manage such interdependencies. Besides the traditional corporate governance 
mechanisms such as compensation, control by the board of directors or the market for corporate 
control, other factors influencing shareholding protection are ownership structure, the takeover 
market and the institutional framework. Codes of corporate governance belong, together with the 
legal system, to the institutional framework. Actually they complement the legal system, acting as 
a substitute for deficiencies in the protection of minority shareholders. Radical reform of the legal 
system is difficult but the adoption of codes is an affordable way to mitigate the legal system 
imperfections. Hard laws and soft regulations –as codes of good governance- are complementary. 
There is also a relevant interaction between hard and soft law: judges use the principles of codes 
as yardsticks to measure the specific conduct of directors and often part of soft law gets 
incorporated into corporate law (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). Most codes have recommendations on 
(1) balance between executive and non-executive directors ; (2) division  of responsibility between 
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the chairman and the chief executive officer; (3) information reported to the board; (4) procedures 
for appointment of new directors; (5) internal controls.  
Corporate governance codes have very different roles across countries. There are significant 
differences across countries in the degree of investor protection. La-Porta et al (1998) assign 49 
countries to four groups: common law countries, French civil law countries, German civil law 
countries, and Scandinavian civil law countries, and find that the laws in common law countries 
provide the strongest degree of protection for shareholders, while the laws in French civil law 
countries provide the least protection. While in common law countries judges can apply 
governance codes directly, it is not the case in civil law countries, leading to the risk of cosmetic 
adoption, since they can not be legally enforced. Cuervo (2002) compares the development of 
codes in the Anglo-Saxon and European countries: while in the former countries the reduction in 
the takeover movement in the 1990s contributed to an increase in institutional shareholder activism 
and demands for compliance with codes, in continental Europe they have been adopted to 
compensate for the lack of goof functioning takeover market. Both efficiency needs and 
legitimation pressures explain the diffusion of codes: efficiency needs in terms of shareholder 
protection and legitimation pressures in terms of liberalization, globalization and the presence of 
foreign institutional investors. 
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Table 6: Institutional framework and corporate governance 
 Common law countries Civil law countries 
Ownership structure Disperse Concentrated 
Main source of finance Institutional investors Banks and families 
Shareholder protection Very high Depends on country 
Managers incentives Broadly aligned  Aligned with core 
shareholders 
Board composition Independent directors are 
majorities 
Outside-proprietary and 
outside-independ majority. 
Source: prepared by the author 
 
Cuervo (2002) proposes that, for countries characterized by a large shareholder-oriented system, 
such as civil law countries, it is necessary to expand formal market control mechanisms to 
compensate for deficiencies in the legal system, rather than developing codes of good governance. 
In a similar vein, Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) analyzed a sample of 49 countries and found 
that codes of good governance are more likely to occur when a country lacks strong shareholder 
protection rights –as in the case of civil law countries-, when there is high government 
liberalization and a strong presence by foreign institutional investors and in countries with 
common-law legal system, more willing to continue improving their systems and to develop codes. 
Regarding the authors of the codes, they found that codes developed by governments and stock 
markets, and to some extent investors, have the strongest enforceability, in contrast to codes 
developed by professional associations, director associations, and management associations, since 
many of them are voluntary. 
Codes may be similar across countries because of the influence of institutional investors and the 
recommendation of international organizations OECD (2004), but sometimes implementation of 
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codes is made with scant consideration for country characteristics. The Russian code, published in 
2002, does not address some of the most serious problems affecting Russia, which is attributed by 
Roberts (2004) to a public relations exercise with foreign investors. As Cuervo (2002) points out, 
for a code of good governance to be effective it must capture the socio-political and economic 
environment in which firms operate. Hermes, Postma, & Zivkov (2007) compared the codes of 
seven Easter European countries and found that on average they only cover around 50% of the 
recommendations published by the European Commission in 2003, a sign of the relevance of the 
institutional framework of each county: different regulatory system and business culture make a 
difference (Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li, & Shao, 2017). Yoshikawa, Tsui, & McGuire (2007) 
showed that the majority of Japanese firms opted to preserve their traditional corporate governance 
system and that an increasing number of firms adapted the Anglo-American model to fit their own 
contexts. The authors highlight the value of adapting international standards stating that “creative 
imitation, which involves the modification and recontextualization of context-dependent norms 
and practices to fit the local context, is itself innovative” Yoshikawa, Tsui, & McGuire (2007): 
976), in line with the idea of decoupling, as coexistence of institutional continuity and change 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Zattoni & Cuomo (2008) investigated whether the diffusion of codes of good governance in civil 
law countries is due to an honest intent to improve the efficiency of corporate governance or to 
“legitimize” the corporate governance practices of domestic companies in the global financial 
market, finding that the legitimation hypothesis prevails, in a consistent way with the symbolic 
perspective on corporate governance: diffusing practices are modified by adopters. They also 
found that civil law countries adopt codes later, issue a lower number of codes, and state more 
ambiguous and lenient recommendations. 
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But the Institutional Theory goes beyond hard law –civil vs common law systems- and soft law –
codes of governance-. The institutional environment is also concerned with the social and cultural 
systems. Institutional theory emphasizes that organizations, organizational fields, and nations are 
more than a means to produce goods and services—they are also social and cultural systems. Judge, 
Douglas, & Kutan (2008) used institutional theory in their analysis of data from 50 countries 
between 1997 and 2005 to understand what the country-level predictors of corporate governance 
legitimacy might be. They found three institutional predictors of corporate governance legitimacy: 
(a) the greater the extent of law and order, (b) the more the culture emphasized global 
competitiveness, and (c) the less the prevalence of corruption, the higher the corporate governance 
legitimacy within a nation.   
In civil law countries, and to a higher extent in emerging countries Ciftci, Tatoglu, Wood, 
Demirbag, & Zaim (2019), the corporate environment is characterized by a highly concentrated 
ownership structure that heavily influences corporate governance. While the agency problem –
where agents are managers and principals are shareholders– is the framework for the first 
generation of corporate governance research –dealing with disperse ownership structures in the 
U.S. and U.K.-, there is a different conflict of interest that arises in emerging countries, where 
concentrated ownership is prevalent due to institutional difficulties to control these agents. In these 
countries, where the market for corporate control and securities laws do not contribute significantly 
to the control of agents, powerful controlling shareholders ensure that the agents act in the best 
interest of their principals. These shareholders are also called “blockholders”, and are potentially 
able to influence the management of the firm due to the volume of their investment. So the conflict 
between agents and principals is mitigated by a concentrated ownership structure, since 
blockholders may be represented at the board of directors or exercise their voting power at the 
shareholders meeting, but a new conflict of interest arises between controlling shareholders and 
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minority shareholders –the “principal-principal” conflict-. This may happen because of legal 
frameworks that allow to deviate from the one share one vote principle –i.e. dual-class shares Lund 
(2019)- or to extract rents from the firm through related party transactions. This very different 
institutional setting, typical of emerging economies, requires different mechanisms to ensure that 
minority shareholders are not exploited, this time by controlling shareholders, rather than by the 
firm’s management (Young et al., 2008). In these countries formal institutions -either absent or 
inefficient- are substituted by relational ties, business groups, family connections, and government 
contacts (Young et al., 2008):198). The relevance of the institutional theory for emerging countries 
expands well beyond corporate governance: it is also the dominant theory to explain management 
in these countries (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskinsson, & Peng, 2005). 
In summary the Institutional Theory has a dominant sociological and political perspective, and  
emphasizes that organizations and nations are more than means to produce goods and services—
they are also social and cultural systems (Judge et al., 2008). As a consequence, organizations and 
their managers not only compete for resources but also seek for legitimacy. Therefore it is 
necessary to study the forces within the institutional environment that guide or constrain legitimacy 
seeking. These constraints and forces converge to create isomorphism, or similarity of structure 
within institutional environments, as described by (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). In the case of 
corporate governance, companies have adopted voluntary recommendations regarding the 
functioning of their shareholder meetings and board of directors looking for legitimacy, but we 
wonder to which extent these measures respond to genuine will to protect shareholders or to what 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) called “myth and ceremony”. The institutional theory complements the 
principal-agent model in corporate governance with an external perspective that takes into account 
the legal, social and cultural factors that have an impact on the firm. It will not be possible to define 
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the set of mechanisms that are optimal from a corporate governance point of view without taking 
into account the institutional environment of the firm.   
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Table 7: Summary of Corporate Governance Theories 
 Agency Theory Resource dependence Theory Stewardship Theory Institutional Theory 
Main assumption Need to control managers given 
misalignment with shareholders 
Shareholders assume risks: high uncertainty 
about resource acquisition and the subsequent 
profitability of investments 
Managers are good stewards 
of corporate assets with a 
natural motivation to do a 
good job 
Organizations and their managers not 
only compete for resources but also 
seek for legitimacy 
Directors’ role Monitoring Link with the external environment, contributing 
to resource acquisition 
Provide industry/firm 
experience, facilitate 
contrasting of points of view 
with management and 
provides extra motivation for 
executives 
Monitoring 
Resource acquisition 
 
Main authors Shleifer & Vishny (1997) 
La-Porta et al. (2000b) 
 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) 
Williamson (1984) 
 
Donaldson & Davis (1991) 
Davis et al. (1997) 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) 
Dimaggio & Powell (1983) 
Judge et al. (2008) 
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Chapter 3. Corporate governance and foreign investment 
3.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance has been broadly defined as the study of power and influence over 
decision making within the corporation and its study has been approached from different fields 
such as business, law, political science and sociology (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). From a 
business point of view, corporate governance is a set of mechanisms through which 
shareholders protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders (La-Porta et al., 2000b). 
Therefore, two actors are at the center of corporate governance: insiders and shareholders. Who 
are the insiders? Managers who control the daily operations of the firm and may abuse their 
power to the detriment of minority shareholders. Relevant shareholders that are members of the 
board are also insiders and may influence the firm to extract rents from it, again to the detriment 
of minority shareholders.  In order to mitigate this risk of minority shareholders’ exploitation, 
firms implement internal corporate governance mechanisms, deciding on board of directors’ 
composition and managerial compensation, while external mechanisms such as the legal and 
regulatory environment, are out of firms’ reach (Arranz, 2015). The second kind of actors are 
all sort of investors, individuals and institutions, local and foreign ones.  
Institutional investors channel the funds of individuals through pension and mutual funds. 
Specifically, foreign institutional investors have become very significant as foreign portfolio 
flows have increased in the world economy, particularly for countries in which domestic 
sources of finance are limited. Since the inflow of capital fosters firms’ competitiveness, many 
governments have liberalized their capital accounts (Alonso, 2015).  
While restricted capital markets discourage international investment, open capital markets 
contribute to efficient risk-sharing, lower cost of capital and increase corporate valuations 
(Chua, Eun, & Lai, 2007).  Information asymmetries between shareholders and the firm’s 
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insiders hamper investment in listed companies but in the case of foreign capital, an additional 
home bias effect limits even further investment (Baik, Kang, Kim, & Lee, 2013). Although 
rational investors would diversify their assets holding a world market portfolio, in practice there 
are information asymmetries between domestic firms and international investors that may 
underweight foreign assets (Lewis, 1999).  
Investors are more familiar with firms of their own nationality, that represent lower risks in 
terms of physical access for meetings with the management team, foreign currency risk, 
different accounting standards, cultural values and different legal systems -take over legislation, 
shareholder rights, voting procedures regarding compensation or related-party transactions etc. 
Investors may use foreign direct investment (FDI) to compensate for these risks, since FDI 
means holding control of the company and its management team. But that is not the case of 
pension and mutual funds, which build their diversified portfolios by acquiring stock of listed 
companies, without holding control of the companies where they invest, and therefore they need 
to overcome the asymmetries of information and distrust of managers that agency theory 
predicts (Fama & Jensen, 1983b).  In other words, institutional investors face two challenges 
when they decide to invest in a publicly traded foreign company: the potential opportunism 
described by the agency theory and the foreign location of the company, due to the home bias 
effect.  
Portfolio foreign capital may come close to FDI in terms of investor engagement and activism 
due to the incentives associated to the size of the equity stakes acquired and to investors’ 
monitoring capabilities (Kim, Sung, & Wei, 2017). This leads firms to implement 
internationally accepted corporate governance practices to attract foreign capital (Chizema & 
Buck, 2006; Miletkov, Poulsen, & Babajide, 2014). Implementing these practices has its costs, 
but attracting foreign capital may also entail the reputational benefits associated to foreign 
institutional investors, in contrast with local investors, often perceived as less sophisticated and 
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less-independent, holding ties with  the firm (Zou, Tang, & Li, 2016). The majority of the 
literature on foreign capital attraction has not examined voluntarily adopted corporate 
governance mechanisms but exogenous factors that are not at firms’ reach, or have focused on 
investors’ preferences in terms of companies’ financials Aggarwal, Klapper, & Wysocki 
(2005); Baik et al. (2013); Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001) or capital structure (Kim, Sung, & 
Wei, 2011; Leuz, Lins, & Warnock, 2009; Lins & Warnock, 2004). This paper will test the 
relationship between the voluntary adoption of corporate governance code recommendations 
and foreign capital attraction. This paper will contribute with the development of a theoretical 
framework that incorporates the home bias Lewis (1999) into the Agency Theory Fama & 
Jensen (1983a); Jensen & Meckling, (1976) to identify corporate governance mechanisms at 
firms’ reach that may attract foreign capital, following (Abdul-Wahab, How, & Verhoeven, 
2007; Goncharov, Werner, & Zimmermann, 2006). We will additionally analyze the 
moderating effect on the relationship between corporate governance code adoption and foreign 
capital attraction of two variables: the international diversity at the board of directors and the 
presence of a controlling shareholder. International diversity may affect the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms to attract foreign capital. Since Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
highlighted the need of board independence to control managers, corporate governance 
literature has elaborated first on board composition –inside versus outside directors  Dalton et 
al. (1998), later on board demographics such as gender Campa & Zijlmans (2019), age, race 
and ethnicity Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader (2003) and recently on foreign nationality (Hahn & 
Lasfer, 2016; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2012). Foreign directors are for example not included yet 
among the 64 recommendations of the Good Governance Code of listed companies issued by 
the stock market supervisor in Spain in 2015. But both the home bias effect and the potential 
opportunism by managers may be less of a threat for foreign investors if the board of directors 
has an international composition. Foreign directors bring not only the enhanced independence 
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that may be attributed to them, but also prestige and international skills. The management team 
will be used to report to the board in an international way, and therefore will find it easy to 
communicate with international investors, helping them overcome the home bias. We will 
contribute examining the relationship between foreign directors and the participation of foreign 
capital in capital market transactions. The presence of a controlling shareholder poses a 
potential “principal-principal” conflict, which requires mechanisms to ensure that investors are 
not exploited, this time by controlling shareholders, rather than by the management (Young et 
al., 2008).  
Therefore, we will analyze the moderating effect that the presence of a controlling shareholder 
means for the relationship between corporate governance and the probability of attracting 
foreign capital. Lastly, we contribute by designing corporate governance indexes after a 
thorough analysis of the recommendations included in the three Spanish Codes of Good 
Governance that have been in force during the last eight years. Annual filings of corporate 
governance allow us to benefit from data whose consistency has been revised by the stock 
market supervisor. We find evidence of a positive relationship between the degree of code 
adoption at the firm level and the volume of foreign funds attracted by the firm. With the support 
of factor analysis, we select and weight 16 recommendations whose adoption increase the 
probability of attracting foreign capital. We also find that the presence of a high proportion of 
foreign directors is a strong incentive for foreign investors to participate in capital market 
transactions. 
3.2 Home bias, information asymmetries and opportunism faced by foreign investors 
Different definitions of corporate governance point to a common goal: to protect investors. In 
this vein corporate governance is said to deal with “ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment" (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). Corporate governance is also defined as a set of mechanisms through which outside 
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investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders” La-Porta et al. (2000b) or 
“is set to prevent that groups with more bargaining power extract rents from groups with less 
bargaining power in the case of an incomplete contract” (Arranz, 2015):96. But who are these 
insiders and why should they threaten investors? Both managers and relevant shareholders that 
are members of the board of directors can exert a direct influence on the company and divert 
assets to themselves through a practice called “tunneling” (Johnson, La-Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). Shareholders reasonable fear that they will be in the dark about such 
a practice, that insiders will take advantage of the informational edge that they enjoy. Most 
definitions of corporate governance share two assumptions: the existence of relevant 
information asymmetries between insiders and minority shareholders and the potential for 
opportunistic behavior on the part of insiders, that is, managers and relevant shareholders 
represented at the board. As predicted by the agency theory, the separation of ownership and 
control, along with the informational disadvantage of shareholders versus managers, pose a risk 
for shareholders: will their funds be expropriated or wasted by managers, who hold inside 
information and far more data? (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On top of 
the information asymmetry, and connected to it, there is a divergence between agent’s and 
principal’s interests: shareholders will maximize dividends and stock prices while managers 
will prefer growth: empire building will bring them higher salaries and prestige. Although the 
principal will set limits to the agents’ discretion to allocate funds, managers will end up with 
significant discretion for self-interested behavior, since principals will often lack information 
or expertise to decide in unexpected situations, the very reason why agents are hired (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). Since managers are holders of inside information and might abuse it to their 
own advantage, corporate governance may contribute by setting up mechanisms that reduce the 
potential for opportunistic behavior. In the case of foreign investors, information symmetries 
are more pronounced Choe, Kho, & Stulz (2005); Kang & Kim (2010); Zou et al. (2016), 
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therefore foreign capital will particularly require the existence of corporate governance 
mechanisms prior to its entry into the company’s capital. Firms reaching out for foreign capital 
face an additional burden: the home bias effect (Ahearne, Griever, & Warnock, 2004; Kho, 
Stulz, & Warnock, 2009; Lewis, 1999). Investors do not properly hedge risks across countries, 
they tend to hold too little of their wealth in foreign assets in comparison with what would 
derive from a rational diversification, consistent with which the proportion of foreign assets in 
investors’ portfolio would equal the proportion of existing foreign stocks (Levy & Sarnat, 1970; 
Markowitz, 1952). This home bias effect exists even at the domestic level: within the same 
county, fund managers have a strong preference for local stocks, being geographic proximity a 
relevant factor for stock selection (Kang & Kim, 2008). Investors near a firm have an 
information advantage, possibly due to easier access to information about the firm through 
informal talks with management and visits to the company facilities. Proximity is relevant not 
only for stock selection, but also for the degree of involvement in corporate governance after 
investing –e.g. presence in the board of directors or replacing of management- Although there 
is evidence that the home bias effect reduces the investment on foreign assets below the levels 
that rational diversification would dictate- Ahearne et al. (2004); Kho et al. (2009), controversy 
still exists about the theoretical explanations for domestic investors not acquiring more foreign 
assets (Lewis, 1999). The information asymmetries between foreign and domestic investors 
are, together with  barriers to international investments and optimism of domestic investors 
toward home assets, among the reasons identified by Ahearne et al. (2004) to understand the 
home bias effect. A sensitive example of these information asymmetries can be found in the 
heterogenous quality of financial information across countries. A firm with a US listing will 
produce higher quality financial information and reduce information costs, since it will adopt 
US accounting standards, disclosure requirements and regulatory environment. The proportion 
of firms with a public US listing -as a proxy for the reduction in information asymmetries in a 
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country- strongly influences the country’s ability to attract US investors (Aggarwal et al., 2005). 
Also, firms’ ownership structure affects the home bias effect: in countries with high capital 
concentration, the home bias tends to be stronger, since a high proportion of shares is held by 
domestic relevant shareholders. Therefore, foreigners tend to invest in firms with a disperse 
capital structure which in turn avoids the risk of expropriation of assets by controlling 
shareholders. In countries with a high presence of significant shareholders, investor protection 
is more effective than the removal of barriers to international trade to attract foreign investors 
(Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 2003). Foreign investors will also avoid 
companies with an ownership structure where there is a divergence between ownership and 
control rights –companies with dual-class shares, pyramid shareholding structures or cross 
shareholdings-, since a controlling stake can be achieved regardless of the ownership structure 
(Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Kim et al., 2011). By assuming that unknown stocks 
are riskier Merton (1987), information asymmetries would reduce foreign investment: investors 
would buy stocks from the same country because they know domestic firms better than 
international ones. Investors might perceive that foreign stocks will be expensive and difficult 
to monitor and this leads investors to underweight foreign stocks, buying instead some inferior 
local stocks (Baik et al., 2013; Bell, Filatotchev, & Rasheed, 2012; Zaheer, 1995). Foreign 
investors are less informed than domestic investors about domestic firms in the host country 
and must bear extra costs to compensate for this asymmetry -e.g. collection of information, 
travel expenses, etc.-.  
The extent of this asymmetry depends on the physical distance between the investor and the 
firm, the track record investing in the host country, the difference in shareholder protection and 
the existence of language and cultural differences (Kang & Kim, 2010). Firm’s degree of 
digitalization may mitigate the effect of physical and cultural distance on foreign investment 
attraction Nylén & Holmström (2015). Companies experience a transformation of their 
 75 
processes as a consequence of the digitization of the work environment Morabito (2014). 
Digital technologies not only foster product and service innovation but bring closer foreign 
investors and firms that may be far away both in physical and cultural terms. 
The extra-monitoring costs caused by the information asymmetry limits foreigners involvement 
in governance to companies where the benefits from their monitoring activities are expected to 
be large -i.e. targets can achieve high free cash flows –. Choe et al. (2005) and Zou et al. (2016) 
found that domestic institutional investors have an edge in stock picking skills over foreigners. 
The authors identify several preferences of foreign institutional investors that point to the 
information asymmetry they suffer: they tend to hold firms with longer history, bigger size, 
lower leverage, greater accounting transparency and cross-listed in the US (Zou et al., 2016).  
Foreign investors reaching out to international capital markets need to overcome higher 
information asymmetries and monitoring costs Hou & Lee (2014); Leuz, Lins, & Warnock, 
(2010), compounded by the existence of language and cultural differences (Kang & Kim, 2010). 
Companies seeking foreign capital need to overcome information asymmetries by adapting to 
broadly accepted corporate governance practices across countries Chizema & Buck, 2006; 
Miletkov et al. (2014), such as board independence, transparency and cooperation with financial 
analysts. Both board independence, that ensures control on behalf of finance providers Miletkov 
et al. (2014); Neupane & Neupane (2017); Suchard (2009), and transparency Aggarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, & Matos (2011); Aggarwal et al. (2005); Broberg, Tagesson, & Collin (2010); Bushee 
& Noe (2000); Ferreira & Matos (2008), are particularly relevant in companies with dispersed 
shareholders and exposed towards foreign investors. The importance of information 
asymmetries for foreign investors is shown by the strong relationship found between 
transparency and exposure to the international capital market (Deeg & Perez, 2000; Gray, 
Meek, & Roberts, 1995; Holm & Schøler, 2010; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003).  
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Transparency is also improved by the breadth of financial analysts’ coverage. The higher the 
number of analysts that follow a company, the smaller the relevance investor assign to the 
firm’s corporate governance mechanisms (Chung & Zhang, 2011). This is not only because 
analysts help reduce information asymmetries by devoting time and resources to interviewing 
managers and analyzing financial information, but also because analysts take into account for 
their investment recommendations firm’s corporate governance mechanisms (Gillan & Starks, 
2003). We would therefore expect investors to pay less attention to the corporate governance 
of a company covered by many analysts, since this means higher firm transparency. In a 
nutshell, the agency problem is compounded by the home bias effect in the case of foreign 
investors, who will prefer to invest within their own countries rather than carrying out the 
necessary and expensive monitoring process associated not only with a minority stake at a 
public company -agency problem- but with a company headquartered abroad –home bias effect-
. In this context, corporate governance mechanisms come as an alternative to expensive and 
time-consuming monitoring that foreign investors face. Physical and cultural distance, extra 
costs related to traveling, difficulty to meet and access the management team and the difference 
in shareholder protection increase the risk of opportunistic behavior.  
Kang & Kim (2010) argue that foreign investors are less informed than domestic investors 
about domestic firms in the host country and must bear extra costs to compensate for this 
asymmetry -e.g. collection of information, travel expenses, etc.-. The extent of this asymmetry 
depends on the physical distance between the investor and the firm and the track record 
investing in the host country. If a firm has in place corporate governance mechanisms, foreign 
investors have an incentive to overcome the home bias, since corporate governance mechanisms 
reduce the enlarged information asymmetries and potential for opportunism that they face. 
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3.3 Codes of corporate governance adoption and cross border fundraising 
Codes of good governance are a “set of best practice recommendations regarding the behavior 
and structure of the board of directors of a firm. They have been designed to address 
deficiencies in the corporate governance system by recommending a comprehensive set of 
norms on the role and composition of the board of directors, relationships with shareholders 
and top management, auditing and information disclosure, and the selection, remuneration, and 
dismissal of directors and top managers” (Cuervo-Cazurra & Aguilera, 2004:419-420). These 
corporate governance codes are “soft law” and companies are only obliged to report whether 
they decide to follow each of the recommendations, increasing their accountability to 
shareholders.  Research on codes of corporate governance has shown codes are a complement 
to national laws and regulations. Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) undertook a study of 49 
countries, founding that codes of good governance are more likely to occur in countries without 
strong shareholder rights, with high government liberalization and with greater foreign 
investment exposure. In a similar way that exposure to foreign investment has been found 
connected to codes diffusion at the country level, it seems reasonable to expect a positive 
relationship between the degree of code adoption at the firm level and the volume of foreign 
funds attracted by the firm.  
Convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance has underpinned codes 
of corporate governance diffusion (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Since global investors 
face multiple laws and regulations in each of the countries where they invest, and codes are 
designed across countries towards convergence with the Anglo-Saxon model Drobetz & 
Momtaz (2019), codes offer international investors a standard measure of the quality of 
corporate governance of local companies. Companies must disclose the degree of compliance 
with the recommendations of the code, and the national stock market supervisor verifies that 
this reporting adheres to the code’s structure and definitions, facilitating monitoring for 
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international investors, who can easily verify the proportion of code recommendations that a 
company follows to gauge its overall corporate governance. As long as a firm follows a high 
percentage of the total number of code recommendations set up by the national supervisor, 
investors attracted to a foreign stock will count on an additional reason to buy it in spite of the 
home bias, overcoming the enlarged information asymmetries and potential opportunism they 
face. Codes share a standard body of recommendations appreciated by international 
institutional investors -i.e. board independence from management, procedures for director 
nomination and dismissal, executive compensation, relationships with shareholders and top 
management or auditing and information disclosure- but are also adjusted in each country to 
include specific recommendations suited to complement local laws and regulations -i.e. 
recommendations for companies’ bylaws regarding takeover provisions or disclosure of 
information and procedure to facilitate participation at the shareholders’ general meeting-.  
Therefore, firms adopting most of the recommendations included in a code mitigate the home 
bias that foreign investors face in a double way: firstly, by strongly signaling the adoption of 
internationally recognized corporate governance mechanisms. Compliance with a code of good 
governance works as a “quality seal” that can partially compensate for the challenges associated 
with investing abroad -access to management is more expensive, accounting standards may 
differ and trading is done at a disadvantage with local investors, who are more familiar with the 
company and do not suffer any cultural difference (Choe et al., 2005).  
Secondly, adopting these recommendations provides foreign investors with some assurance that 
the shortcomings of corporate bylaws and domestic regulations are compensated with 
provisions of the code designed with that goal -i.e. voting rights are not limited to prevent take 
overs.  Lastly, codes of good corporate governance are isomorphic cross-nationally (Dimaggio 
& Powell, 1983). Codes include recommendations that are widely shared across countries, and 
therefore their adoption bring legitimation Tolbert & Zucker (1983) to the local firms that need 
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to reassure foreign investors to overcome the home bias. This search of legitimation could 
impair codes compliance significance if they are approached with a box-ticking exercise, 
decoupled from a transformation in the firm’s corporate governance culture (Aguilera, 2005). 
Firms may overstate compliance with corporate governance codes under pressure to gain 
legitimacy, with lax interpretations of the recommendations contained in the codes -i.e. the 
classification of a director as “independent”-. The scrutiny of corporate governance reports by 
stock market supervisors and proxy advisors mitigates this risk. 
Most of the recommendations included in corporate governance codes deal with the board of 
directors, the committees set up by the board, and a variety of specific issues regarding 
directors’ selection, dedication and compensation. These three categories share two values: 
board independence -the capacity of the board to control managers- and transparency -the 
mechanisms aimed at reducing the information asymmetries between insiders and minority 
shareholders- We review board independence and transparency in turn. Board independence 
allows to effectively control management on behalf of investors. This corporate governance 
mechanism has been found to be positively associated with foreign investment (Miletkov et al., 
2014; Neupane & Neupane, 2017).  
While local investors may have business relations with the firms they invest in and be loyal to 
their managers, foreign investors are more independent and are used to challenging 
management and pushing for governance improvements Kim et al. (2017), making use of their 
superior monitoring skills (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Board independence ensures the effective 
control of management, which would not be possible with a significant presence of executives 
at the board. When investors are not represented at the board, the very existence of board 
directors responsible for setting the right incentives for managers, providing them with advice 
and monitoring their decisions is an essential corporate governance mechanism. When 
managers are not efficient, directors will replace them to improve performance. Management 
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control through an independent board will be particularly useful to compensate for the increased 
information asymmetries that foreign investors face (Holm & Schøler, 2010).   
Independence of the board from the firm’s managers can be reached through a majority of 
independent directors, less biased and better prepared to judge manager’s performance and 
protect shareholders (Hu, Yian, & Ziao, 2014; Lynall et al., 2003). But directors that represent 
shareholders with a significant stake - “proprietary directors” - can also effectively control 
managers: significant shareholders have invested large amounts of funds into the firm and have 
strong incentives to monitor and control management.  If a single investor is represented at the 
board with a controlling number of proprietary directors, he will control the management team 
and could eventually make decisions to the detriment of minority shareholders. But if a group 
of different shareholders are represented through proprietary directors at the board, they will 
control each other so that none of them abuses his position in detriment of minority 
shareholders. And all proprietary directors, together with independent directors, control 
management. In summary, board independence from the firm’s managers can be achieved 
through independent directors and proprietary directors that represent different investors. 
Foreign investors, with diversified portfolios that seldom allow them to appoint their own 
proprietary directors, will find independent boards as a powerful tool to control local 
management teams, instead of the more expensive and complex direct monitoring from abroad. 
The relevance of transparency for foreign investors is better understood when considering how 
the home bias compounds the agency problem. Foreign investors not only face information 
asymmetries with the managers of the companies where they invest, they are also at an 
informational disadvantage with local investors. The home bias increases the importance of the 
extent to which firms voluntarily disclose information (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015). The bigger 
is the information asymmetry, the higher will be the need for transparency, which makes 
transparency paramount for foreign investors. This kind of investors suffers not only cultural 
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or linguistic differences, but a simple physical distance that cause higher monitoring costs 
associated to different accounting standards, travel expenses for management meetings and visit 
to facilities. Among the information asymmetries faced by foreign investors are particularly 
relevant those owed to poor quality and low credibility of financial information in many 
countries (Ahearne et al., 2004). To compensate for this, firms may list themselves in the US 
by issuing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Alternatively, firms might increase their 
disclosure level beyond what is mandatory (Gyapong, Godfred, & Afrifa, 2018; Mallin & Ow-
Yong, 2012) . Increasing the level and quality of disclosure may attract foreign capital (Deeg 
& Perez, 2000; Gray et al., 1995; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). Higher quality disclosure is 
preferred by institutional investors as a way to offset monitoring costs (Bushee & Noe, 2000; 
Enache & Hussainey, 2019). 
Lastly, we must consider that institutional investors, particularly suited to do so, channel most 
foreign investment Zou et al. (2016), so drivers of institutional investment are also meaningful 
for understanding foreign investment. Institutional investors often hold large portfolios with a 
high number of stocks and relevant monitoring costs. A high degree of transparency not only 
reduces the costs associated to monitoring but is also useful for reducing the probability of 
fraud, a requirement of institutional investors with fiduciary responsibilities (Schmidt & 
Fahlenbrach, 2017). They also build large stakes in the company where they invest and a rapid 
sell off due to a corporate governance failure would cause large losses (Bushee, Carter, & 
Gerakos, 2014). Chung, Elder, & Kim (2010) find that corporate governance mechanisms 
improve stock market liquidity and lower trading costs, therefore facilitating the unwinding of 
large positions held by institutional investors. Based on the above arguments, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that follow corporate governance code recommendations increase their 
probability of attracting foreign capital  
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Codes of good governance have diffused internationally at a rapid pace, especially following 
the Cadbury Commission’s report in the United Kingdom (1992), with a general consensus for 
recommendations on board independence and transparency (Cuervo-Cazurra & Aguilera, 
2004). Other recommendations were considered at a later stage, such as board diversity in terms 
of gender, age, race and ethnicity Erhardt et al. (2003) and not until recently foreign nationality 
(Hahn & Lasfer, 2016; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2009). Although board diversity in terms of 
nationality is not a corporate governance recommendation across countries, the proportion of 
board members that come from countries different to the nation where firm is headquartered is 
related to the firm’s capacity to gain foreign investors’ confidence (Cumming, Filatotchev, 
Knill, Reeb, & Senbet, 2017). If the board has an international composition, the management 
team will be used to report to the board in an international way, and we can argue that 
management will find it easy to communicate with international investors, improving form’s 
ability to tap foreign capital.  
It has been argued that directors that are domiciled abroad have lower board attendance Masulis 
et al. (2012) and that firms where their proportion of international board members is high 
decrease their meeting frequency  (Hahn & Lasfer, 2016). Nevertheless, that is only true if 
foreign directors reside abroad and must travel internationally for each board session. On the 
other hand, it can be expected that foreign directors contribute to reduce information 
asymmetries associated with cultural and linguistic differences that contribute to the home bias 
experienced by foreign investors. The presence of foreign directors at the board helps bridging 
the cultural gap, even if those directors do not share the nationality of the investor, by improving 
decision making and reducing group-thinking, since foreign director have diverse educational, 
cultural and working experience. Also, the company will be forced to report to its board in an 
international way, so that it does not take a local to understand and approve the issues discussed. 
A board of directors opened to foreign directors’ signals endorsement by non-locals, 
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encouraging foreign investors. Foreign investors are more independent from the firm than local 
investors, and they use their superior monitoring skills to control management (Aggarwal et al., 
2011; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Van-der-Walt & Ingley, 2003). Foreign investors will 
value independent boards, as they allow to control local management teams, instead of the more 
expensive and complex direct monitoring from abroad. Also, foreign directors are less 
networked to the domestic business society, and they have lower probability of local 
interlocking directorships, being able to dedicate more time to monitor the company (Ruigrok, 
Peck, & Tacheva, 2007). Besides the potential benefits of foreign directors in terms of 
management control, we must also consider that directors also serve as a link with the external 
environment, contributing to resource acquisition. Directors allocate their attention to various 
functions such as resource provision, environmental scanning and opportunity seeking (Tuggle 
et al., 2010). Several factors are a source of uncertainty and external dependencies that directors 
can help to mitigate , such as availability of capital, regulatory environment and new 
technologies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Moreover, the access to valuable resources increases 
firm legitimacy by enhancing the reputation and credibility of their firms. The extent to which 
directors benefit the firm depends on whether their membership of the board provides access to 
valued resources and information, reduces environmental dependency, or aids in establishing 
legitimacy (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Daily & Schwenk, 1996; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992).  
From this perspective, foreign directors provide higher advisory capabilities that can contribute 
to increase the level of confidence of foreign investors, helping them overcome the home bias. 
Among these capabilities are knowledge of foreign markets Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen 
(2001), region specific expertise valuable for cross-border acquisitions Masulis et al. (2012) 
and a positive reputation in the international financial market (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). 
Since foreign investors usually come from developed economies, their reputation and financial 
skills will strongly contribute to improve the company quality of financial reporting, result in 
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better access to credit Koo & Maeng (2006) and it might contribute to increase the confidence 
that foreign investors require to participate in IPOs/capital increases conducted by the firm.  
Therefore, we establish the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of foreign directors at the firm’s board reinforces the positive 
relationships between adopting corporate governance code recommendations and the 
attraction of foreign capital  
The existence of controlling shareholders also influences the home bias experienced by foreign 
investors. Firms with controlling shareholders have a lower number of shares available for the 
entry of a foreign investor. Dahlquist et al. (2003) studied 51 countries and found that, on 
average, 32% of shares were not available for trading because of belonging to controlling 
shareholders, usually local investors. If an average country with 32% of shares under 
controlling shareholders represents for example 5% of the world stock market capitalization, 
the home bias would be over 6 times. Since a significant fraction of companies is held by local 
controlling shareholders, foreign investors will tend to invest in less closely held companies, 
with a more dispersed capital structure (Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Leuz et al., 2009). And even 
if enough capital is available –i.e. by the issuance of new shares at IPOs and capital increases - 
foreign investors still face the risk of expropriation of assets by local controlling shareholders. 
Controlling shareholder can effectively control management La-Porta et al. (1998), therefore 
mitigating the conflict between agents and principals.  But a new conflict of interest arises 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders –the “principal-principal” conflict 
(Young et al., 2008). An extreme case of this situation are family-controlled groups in emerging 
countries, where management is frequently a member of the controlling family Aguilera & 
Haxhi (2019)–or appointed by it-, who pursue significant private benefits of control (Peng & 
Jiang, 2010a). The expression “controlling shareholder” does not refer to a majority stake in 
the capital but to a number of shares that suffices to ensure control, with La-Porta, Lopez-de-
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silanes, & Shleifer (1999) and Faccio & Lang (2002) considering 20% of capital as the 
controlling threshold. A controlling shareholder with over 20% of capital will be represented at 
the board of directors therefore exerting a significant influence on the firm decision making, 
which increases the risk of the firm making business that benefits controlling shareholders.  
Companies may finance their expansion projects through capital increases underwritten by their 
controlling shareholders but when additional capital is needed it frequently comes from abroad 
(Cuomo, Zattoni, & Valentini, 2012). The presence of a controlling shareholder may be a 
deterrent for foreign investors, unless there is other relevant shareholder and both monitor each 
other Pagano & Roell (1998), and all of them effectively control managers on behalf of minority 
investors. We assume that monitoring the controlling shareholder does not require a stake as 
large and will follow La-Porta et al. (1999) to consider 10% stakes as sufficient for “controlling 
shareholders monitoring”. Companies adhering to a code of good governance or incorporating 
foreign directors to the board send a reassuring signal to foreign investors who will perceive 
these measures as an incentive to buy foreign stock in spite of the home bias. But this incentive 
will be impaired by the presence of a controlling shareholder that is not subsequently monitored 
by another relevant shareholder. Based on that, we establish the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: The presence of controlling shareholders reduces the positive relationships 
between adopting corporate governance code recommendations and the attraction of foreign 
capital  
Figure 1: Model proposed 
 
 86 
 
3.4 Data 
The aim of this research is to evaluate the relationship between corporate governance adoption 
and the attraction of foreign capital. More precisely, we try to understand how corporate 
governance affects the decision of foreign capital to participate in capital market transactions-. 
We have constructed a sample of capital market transactions where corporate governance is 
particularly relevant for foreign investors: capital increases and IPOs. We will analyze capital 
increases and initial public offerings (IPOs) since the new shares issued at these transactions 
finance new businesses or the expansion of the existing business to new markets, products or 
technologies. In contrast with the ordinary trading of shares in secondary markets, the 
acquisition of new shares issued in these transactions means fresh money being invested by the 
firm. Corporate governance is particularly relevant in these transactions: information 
asymmetries are higher since the company does not have a track record in the capital market –
in the case of IPOs- or assumes the risk associated to a new investment –in the case of capital 
increases-. As shown by Inci, Lee, & Suh (2009), there is a causality link between corporate 
governance and the profitability of capital investment, which confirms the relevance of 
corporate governance for these transactions. In these transactions information asymmetries are 
higher than those associated to the ordinary trading of existing shares in the market. These 
transactions involve the issuance of new shares to the market to finance new investment projects 
–in the case of capital increases- or to allow investors to participate in an IPO -which also imply 
a higher risk associated with a company without a track record in the capital market-. These 
characteristics of the IPOs make them especially suitable to the test our research since foreign 
investors face higher information asymmetries Choe et al. (2005); Kang & Kim (2010); Zou et 
al. (2016) and these transactions add an extra-layer of asymmetry, making corporate 
governance particularly useful to mitigate information asymmetries. More precisely, we have 
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used a sample of capital market transactions undertaken by public companies whose 
headquarters are at the same country, Spain. In this vein foreign investors’ firm choice will not 
be affected by the institutional frameworks of different countries and we will be able to identify 
corporate governance mechanisms at the reach of shareholders rather than external corporate 
governance factors such as the legal system and the strength of the institutional environment 
(Djankov, La-Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; Hail & Leuz, 2006; Jackson & Roe, 
2009; La-Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006)  
Data were obtained with the cooperation of the Spanish Stock Market Supervisor, who provided 
us with information on capital increases and initial public offerings conducted during the period 
2010-2017. The limited size of the Spanish equity capital market makes it necessary to gather 
data from several years, since a sample large enough cannot be constructed with the capital 
increases and IPOs of a single year. We have chosen the last 8 available years (2010-2017) so 
that enough data are gathered, and the last 3 corporate governance codes are represented in the 
sample. For the period 2010-2017, the number of listed companies in Spain ranged from 139 
(in the year 2017) to 153 (in the year 2010). Out of these firms, 96 conducted initial public 
offerings or capital increases in the 2010-2017 period, and after excluding financial companies 
due to their special accounting system and regulation, the final sample has 76 companies. 
As can be seen in table 8, 2012 is a special year during which the situation of the Spanish capital 
market was critical due to the financial assistance – “rescate”- requested by the Spanish 
government on June 2012. We have gathered data for the total of funds raised and the volume 
of funds provided by foreign investors for IPOs and capital increases -excluding those that do 
not involve funding, such as capital increases to pay dividends or to be distributed free of charge 
among shareholders-, totaling 401 transactions conducted during 2010-2017. Although our 
sample combines both capital increases and IPOs, other studies that have focused on IPOs have 
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used samples of comparable size: Neupane & Neupane (2017) and Suchard (2009) samples 
comprise 377 and  522 transactions respectively. 
 
Table 8: Transactions by year: total investment versus foreign participation 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Attracting foreign investors 
Abundant research have studied the home bias effect that make investors reluctant to invest 
abroad Ahearne et al. (2004); Kho et al. (2009) and the influence of country’s specific factors, 
such as the legal system, to attract foreign investors (Djankov et al., 2008; Hail and Leuz, 2006; 
Jackson and Roe, 2008; La-Porta et al., 2006). At the firm level, the extant literature has 
examined the relationship between corporate governance and foreign investment measuring the 
later with the percentage of total capital held by foreigners (Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001; 
Leuz et al., 2009; Lins & Warnock, 2004; Miletkov et al., 2014). This is a static approach which 
involves a limitation: we may find a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
foreign investment at a given point in time but we do not know if corporate governance was 
Number of 
transactions
Total 
investment 
(€ million)
Foreign investment 
(€ million) % foreign
2010 38 13,041 7,970 61%
2011 47 12,712 6,886 54%
2012 33 1,152 112 10%
2013 67 1,794 1,203 67%
2014 71 7,694 5,299 69%
2015 56 16,097 12,597 78%
2016 40 5,526 3,369 61%
2017 49 11,914 9,308 78%
Total 401 69,931 46,745 67%
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good before foreigners invested in the firm or if corporate governance improved after their entry  
(Broberg et al., 2010; Garner & Kim, 2013). The fact that we measure the state of corporate 
governance at the precise year when foreign investors decide whether to participate or not in 
capital market transactions allow us to better analyze causation between corporate governance 
and foreign investment. We measure our dependent variable with a binary variable that equals 
to “0” for those transactions which do not attract any foreign capital and “1” for those which 
succeed in attracting foreign capital in spite of the home bias and information asymmetries they 
face.  
Independent variable: Corporate Governance 
Our independent variables measure the corporate governance mechanisms that these companies 
had implemented prior to the initial public offerings and capital increases. Rather than focusing 
on certain corporate governance mechanisms, such as proportion of non-executive directors 
Neupane & Neupane (2017), CEO duality Bushee et al. (2014); Miletkov et al. (2014) or degree 
of transparency Broberg et al. (2010) we try to assess the overall compliance with the 
comprehensive set of recommendations included in corporate governance codes. This global 
approach to measuring corporate governance allows investors to gauge corporate governance 
in a comprehensive way and allows firms to understand the relevance of the whole set of 
corporate governance mechanisms at their reach so that they may discriminate for their 
implementation. We analyze compliance of every company to the provisions included in the 
corporate governance code, in line with (Ararat, Black, & Yurtoglu, 2017; Goncharov et al., 
2006) and benefiting from the standardized corporate governance reporting that all Spanish 
listed companies are obliged to file with the stock market supervisor.The Spanish corporate 
governance is measured by the Good Governance Code of Listed Companies has three different 
versions during our period of analysis: it comprises 58 voluntary recommendations during 
2010-2012 CNMV (2006), 53 during 2013-2014 CNMV (2015) and 64 during 2015-2017 
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CNMV (2015), according to the comply or explain principle. Therefore, companies decide 
whether to follow corporate governance recommendations but must provide an explanation 
when they decide not to follow a recommendation. Moreover, companies must disclose an 
annual corporate governance report in which they specify their degree of compliance with every 
recommendation of the code. The Spanish stock market supervisor reviews the reports to check 
that the definitions of the code have not been manipulated -i.e. criteria for independent 
directors- and ensure that, where a recommendation is not followed, an explanation has been 
provided so that investors can form their judgement. We have reviewed compliance for the 53-
64 recommendations -depending on each of the three codes- by each of the companies that 
conducted the 401 transactions in our sample and by the time those transactions were executed. 
More precisely, companies report to the stock market supervisor if they (1) comply with the 
recommendation, (2) explain why they decide not to comply or (3) partially comply. When a 
recommendation does not apply (i.e. recommendation regarding listed subsidiaries when the 
company does not have any listed subsidiary) the company does not even have to provide any 
information, so this is equivalent to compliance, since the company has avoided the potential 
problem that the recommendation was trying to mitigate. We have assigned a value of “1” for 
compliance, “0.5” for partial compliance and “0” for non-compliance.  Indexes in the extant 
literature are built on a previous selection of corporate governance items compiled by private 
vendors such as the Investor Responsibility Research center (IRRC) or ISS-RiskMetrics 
(Aggarwal et al., 2009; Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). 
While they are of great interest, in this research we designed corporate governance indicators 
building on the items included in the three codes in force during 2010-2017. In doing so our 
analysis builds on the extant literature that focuses on certain corporate governance mechanisms 
and adds all other items that included in the most comprehensive list of recommendations of 
the codes (Huang, Shen, Shieh, & Tzeng, 2019). Our approach also benefits from data whose 
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consistency has been reviewed by the stock market supervisor. During 2010-2017, the Good 
Governance Code had contained recommendations that can be classified in three categories 
according to their nature: (1) Board, bylaws & General Shareholder Meetings; (2) Directors 
and (3) Committees. The first category includes generic recommendations regarding the board 
of directors -size, composition, dedication, meeting frequency, attendance, information and 
advice, roles of the chairman and secretary, board evaluation- and regarding the general 
shareholder meeting and firm’s bylaws. The second category deals with directors’ selection, 
resignation and compensation and the third one comprises recommendations regarding audit, 
appointments and remunerations committees. During this period the Code has been amended 
twice, although these amendments do not respond to a significant change of approach in 
corporate governance -they are basically due to the gradual inclusion of some recommendations 
into mercantile law over time-. Nevertheless, we adjust for these amendments by constructing 
a corporate governance index for each category: -Board, bylaws & GSM; Directors and 
Committees- at the beginning of the period and identifying the correspondent recommendations 
in each of the subsequent codes, so that homogenous indexes can be used throughout the period. 
To this end we have disregarded those recommendations that disappear in later codes, -17 
recommendations were removed from codes because they were transferred to law- and 23 
recommendations that were added in the 2015 Code and lack a correspondent recommendation 
in the previous indexes. Table 9 describes the recommendations included in each category 
across the three codes.  
We have checked the prima facie adequacy of the categories chosen -Board, bylaws & GSM; 
Directors and Committees- with an expert on corporate governance and we will leverage on 
factor analysis to select and weight the recommendations included in these categories, so that 
we arrive at reliable indexes.  
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The extant literature uses equally-weighted indexes Aggarwal et al. (2009); Chung & Zhang, 
(2011); Holm & Schøler (2010) that are forms with the simple addition of categorical variables. 
This approach assigns the same importance to recommendations widely discussed in the 
literature -i.e. reaching an adequate proportion of independent directors in the board – than to 
other recommendations which could be considered less important in relative terms -i.e. extent 
of information regarding directors’ bios at the webpage-. The relevance of each of these 
recommendations can vary as can be observed in the annual corporate governance reports 
submitted to CNMV. For example, during 2010, only one firm out of the 153 public companies, 
did not follow recommendation number 16 -Chairman’s responsibilities- while 45 firms did not 
follow recommendation number 12 -proportion between proprietary and independent directors- 
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Table 9: Corporate Governance recommendation and weights 
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As a consequence, we have used factor analysis to create reliable and unidimensional corporate 
governance indexes -in terms of Cronbach’s alpha and factors eigenvalues- and to assign 
weights -factor loadings- to each of the recommendations. We have traced comparable 
recommendations along the period of analysis and, out of the initial 58 recommendations, we 
have identified 41 that can be considered in force throughout the period of analysis -a category 
just changes its number or experiments minor adjustments to its wording-. We have then chosen 
23 recommendations with the criteria of forming reliable and unidimensional indexes -the 
polychoric procedure used for multivariate exploratory analysis of ordinal data excludes items 
with very low variability (Angeles & Kolenikov, 2004)-. The factor analysis allows us to assign 
individual weights -see table 10- to each of the corporate governance recommendations 
included in the categories Board, bylaws & GSM -10 recommendations-, Directors -7 
recommendations- and Committees -6 recommendations-.  
Table 10 Factor analysis for each of the Corporate Governance Indexes 
 
In this way we calculate a score for every company, for each of the three corporate governance 
indexes and for each of the 8 years, enabling us to measure the state of corporate governance at 
the precise years when foreign investors participate in initial public offerings and capital 
increases 
Moderating variables 
First, our model tests the moderating effect of the board international diversity on the 
relationship between corporate governance code adoption and foreign capital attraction. 
Although the Spanish code recommends a “diversity of knowledge, experience and gender” 
CNMV (2015):23) no mention is made to diversity in terms of nationality. We have argued that 
Varimax rotation Board, bylaws & GSM Directors Committees
Factor 1 Eigenvalue 4.0902 3.00931 4.41487
Factor 2 Eigenvalue 0.89813 0.78853 0.95636
Cronbach’s alpha 0.7129 0.6586 0.7734
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the proportion of board members that come from a country different to the nation where firm 
is headquartered is related to the firm’s capacity to gain foreign investors’ confidence, so we 
need an extra variable to test this relationship. We will compute the proportion of foreign 
directors as percentage of total number of directors in line with (Du, Jian, & Lai, 2017; 
Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). 
The model also tests a second moderating effect: that of the presence of a controlling 
shareholder has on the effectiveness of corporate governance code adoption in terms of foreign 
capital attraction. We identify “controlling shareholder” as those holding at least 20% of 
capital, in line with La-Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio & Lang (2002). We hypnotized that the 
presence of a controlling shareholder may be a deterrent for foreign investors, unless there is 
other relevant shareholder and both monitor each other (Pagano & Roell, 1998). Following the 
criteria set up in La-Porta et al. (1999), we consider 10% as sufficient for monitoring the 
controlling shareholder. We have gathered data for the identification of “controlling 
shareholders” (+20%) and “monitors of controlling shareholders” (+10%) from the filings that 
all shareholders with more than 3% of a Spanish listed company must disclose. 
Control variables 
The analysis of foreign capital attraction must take into account the liquidity of the shares -
investors prefer liquid shares that can be bought and sold with less impact on prices Bushee et 
al. (2014); Chung & Zhang (2011); Kim et al. (2011)-; firm size -with smaller companies being 
perceived as riskier Aggarwal et al. (2011); Bushee et al. (2014); Holm & Schøler (2010); 
Miletkov et al. (2014); Oxelheim & Randøy (2003)-; equity value/ book value -investment in 
firms with high market to book ratios are riskier Aggarwal et al. (2011); Bushee et al. (2014); 
Ferreira & Matos (2008); Hadani, Goranova, & Khan (2011); Kim et al. (2011)-; return on 
assets -firms with higher profitability levels are preferred Aggarwal et al. (2011); Chung & 
Zhang (2011); Lo, Wu, & Kweh (2017); Neupane & Neupane (2017)-; and leverage -highly 
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leveraged firms are perceived as riskier- (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Chung & Zhang, 2011; Ferreira 
& Matos, 2008; Hadani et al., 2011; Miletkov et al., 2014)-. 
Two additional controls are considered. We control for degree of firm’s internationalization 
(Filatotchev, Poulsen, & Bell, 2018). Internationalization has been characterized in the 
literature by the extent of international experience, measured with the track record of foreign 
sales in terms of number of years exporting Stoian & Rialp (2011) and the geographical 
diversity of international sales, measured with the number of foreign markets served (Brouthers 
& Nakos, 2005). Sullivan (1994)  proposed five measures -foreign sales as a percentage of total 
sales, foreign assets as a percentage of total assets, overseas subsidiaries as a percentage of total 
subsidiaries, psychic dispersion of international operations and top managers' international 
experience- and we will use foreign sales as a percentage of total sales given the homogenous 
measure that it provides to compare internationalization across companies -i.e. while only some 
companies report on foreign assets or top managers' international experience, all of them report 
foreign sales- . This ratio is also the most common measure (Aitken, Hanson, & Harrison, 1997; 
Bernard & Jensen, 2004; Chevassus-Lozza & Galliano, 2003).  
Lastly, it must be considered that most of the companies in the sample conduct several 
transactions. We have controlled by this fact by creating a dummy variable that equals cero 
during the first three transactions and one from the forth transaction onwards, since only 25% 
of firms conduct more than 3 transactions. Firms attempting to raise funds in the market an 
anomalous high number of times are more likely trying to replenish equity after losses rather 
than financing growth, therefore facing increasing difficulty in attracting foreign capital. 
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics 
 
Foreign participates: Dummy, foreign investors participate=1, Board, Directors and Committees: Indexes 
constructed as described in section 4, Eqweigh Index: Index averaging all corporate governance 
recommendations, Firm Size: Market capitalization, in thousands €, Market-book: Market capitalization / book 
value, ROA: Net income / total assets, Leverage: Long term liabilities / total assets, Liquidity: Share turnover 
value / market capitalization, First transactions: Dummy =0 during the 3 first transactions, Foreign sales: 
Percentage of revenues coming from abroad, Controlling shareholder: Dummy =1 if a controlling shareholder is 
present, Foreign directors: Percentage of foreign directors at the firm’s board 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Foreign participates 401 0.7257 0.4467 0.0000 1.0000
Board&others 401 0.8657 0.1388 0.2133 1.0000
Directors 401 0.8655 0.1573 0.1357 1.0000
Committees 401 0.8924 0.1784 0.0000 1.0000
Eqweigh_Index 401 0.9110 0.0665 0.5375 1.0000
Firm size 401 1560839 5127230 6576 50900000
Market-book 401 1.6549 13.5982 -63.6284 188.2568
ROA 401 -0.6127 3.3758 -30.5664 4.8593
Leverage 401 0.3755 0.2152 0.0000 0.9209
Liquidity 401 1.6640 1.5716 0.0000 7.2560
First transactions 401 0.6234 0.4851 0.0000 1.0000
Foreign sales 401 0.4250 0.3425 0.0000 0.9599
Controlling Shareholder 401 0.3117 0.4638 0.0000 1.0000
Foreign Directors 401 0.1358 0.1677 0.0000 0.6667
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Table 12: Correlation matrix 
 
 
Foreign 
participates
Board 
&others Committees Directors
Foreign 
directors
Controlling 
shareholder
Foreign 
sales
Firm 
size Leverage Liquidity
Market-
book ROA
First 
transactions
Foreign participates 1
Board&others 0.078 1
Committees 0.1705* 0.2476* 1
Directors -0.0339 0.1804* -0.0392 1
Foreign directors 0.0825 -0.0167 0.1820* -0.1189* 1
Controlling shareholder 0.0518 -0.0976 0.2609* -0.2845* 0.1903*  1
Foreign sales 0.0011 0.1191* 0.1327* 0.2665* - 0.0888  -0.1146* 1
Firm size 0.0788 0.0654 0.1273* 0.1542* 0.1623* -0.023 0.1470* 1
Leverage 0.0903 0.0033 0.2565* -0.2159* 0.1572* 0.0078 0.3031*  0.1031* 1
Liquidity -0.0154 0.0279 -0.071 -0.1537* -0.2172* -0.0218 0.1636* -0.0646 -0.1711* 1
Market-book 0.0014 -0.1193* 0.0871 0.0756 0.0153 -0.1364* 0.0268 0.0158 0.1486* 0.0027 1
ROA 0.1079* -0.0343 0.0305 -0.0904 0.1019*  0.1246* 0.0644 0.0768 0.0913 0.0524 0.0046 1
First transactions -0.1087* 0.0998* 0.0073  -0.2275* -0.0365 0.1008* 0.1057*  -0.2002*  0.1797* 0.2523* -0.0765  0.1628* 1
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3.5 Results 
Since we are testing whether foreign investors participate capital market transaction, and our 
dependent variable is binary, we are using logit repressions for our analysis. We compare the 
results of four models fitted with logit regressions in table 13. The first model includes only 
control variables (column #1). The second and third models (columns #2 and #3) build on the 
first one by adding the 3 corporate governance indexes that we have constructed using factor 
analysis, with fixed year effects in the case of the third model. The inclusion of fixed year 
effects significantly increases the explanatory power of the second model -Pseudo R2 of 0.1067 
versus 0.0594-. The forth model is a robustness check for our measure of corporate governance 
through the indexes constructed (column #4). We use an alternative index -the equally-weighted 
index- by calculating the arithmetic mean of the values for the 41 recommendations that the 
three Corporate Governance Codes in force during the period of analysis have in common. 
Among control variables, the dummy variable “first transactions” indicates whether the 
transaction is among the 3 first in the period of analysis. It is significant at the 1% level and 
shows how firms gradually exhaust their capacity to attract foreign capital: from the forth 
transaction onwards, the probability of attracting foreign capital significantly decreases, which 
is the case of 25% of firms in the sample. Firms attempting to raise funds in the market more 
than three times are more likely trying to replenish equity after losses rather than financing 
growth, therefore facing increasing difficulty in attracting foreign capital -this is certainly the 
case of one of the firms which tapped the capital market 72 times during the eight years -. We 
also observe that return on assets is significant at the 5% level and its odd-ratio indicates that, 
as expected, higher profitability increases the probability of attracting foreign investors. It is 
interesting that the control variable foreign sales is not significant. Although as noted in Sanders 
(1998) internationalization compounds the agency problem, making corporate governance 
more relevant for foreign investors, due to increased information asymmetry between owners 
100 
 
and managers with privileged access to dispersed information across countries, it may be the 
case that foreign investors are less reluctant to participate in transactions of companies that are 
well known through their foreign sales -and corporate governance less relevant in the 
transactions performed by well know firms-In the second model, only the Committees index is 
significant and indicates that a higher compliance with the Committees recommendations is 
associated to a higher probability of attracting foreign capital. Foreign investors particularly 
value -in order of importance- the recommendations regarding the internal audit unit reporting 
to the audit committee, functions of the audit committee, internal codes of conduct, risk control 
and management policy, the empowerment of the audit committee to talk to any employee and 
the functioning of the remuneration committee (Fairchild, Gwilliam, & Marnet, 2019; Park, 
2019; Pérez-Cornejo, Quevedo-Puente, & Delgado-García, 2019). Once fixed year effects are 
taken into account, both Board, bylaws and GSM and Committees are significant at the 5% level 
and cause higher probability of foreign capital taking part in the transactions, in line with 
hypothesis 1. Therefore, together with the Committees recommendations, the following ones 
also become appreciated by foreign investors -in order of importance-: secretary of the board 
responsibilities, chairman responsibilities, directors dedication, board annual evaluation, 
disclosure for appointing proprietary directors that represent less than 3% of capital, directors 
advice, proportion of proprietary directors no greater than the percentage of capital represented, 
executive directors as few as possible, directors training and board frequency meetings. The 
odds ratios of Board, bylaws and GSM (7.581) and Committees (5.099) indicate that foreign 
investors assign a relatively bigger importance to the Board group of recommendations. It is 
well worth mentioning that we included fixed year effects for every year except one to avoid 
multicollinearity among them. We did not include the worst year in terms of financial crisis -
2012, since the Spanish government requested financial assistance on June 2012- and, as 
expected, all significant fixed year effects for the remaining years are positive. The equally-
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weighted index is significant at the 10% level, versus the indexes Board, bylaws and GSM and 
Committees that are significant at the 5%. Additionally, the Board, bylaws and GSM and 
Committees comprise 10 and 6 recommendations respectively, versus the equally-weighted 
index that includes 41 recommendations. Board, bylaws and GSM and Committees allow firms 
to focus on a reduced number of recommendations to attract capital, also being able to 
discriminate in advance, according to their weights, the predicted impact of the 
recommendations contained in both indexes on foreign capital attraction. We analyze the impact 
of Foreign Directors as a moderating variable in columns #5, #6 and #7 of Table 13 The 
percentage of members of the board that are foreigners interacts significantly with the index 
Committees (column #7). Foreign Directors is significant at the 1% level and drastically 
increases the probability of attracting foreign capital. Compliance with the recommendations 
of the Committees index is also significant at the 1% level and attracts foreign capital. Lastly, 
we examine the impact of Controlling Shareholder as a moderating variable in columns #8, #9 
and #10 of Table 13. The presence of a controlling shareholder drastically decreases the 
probability of attracting foreign capital -at the 1% significance level- and interacts significantly 
with the index Directors (column #9), indicating that those transactions performed by firms 
with a controlling shareholder and a high degree of compliance with the Directors index, are 
more likely to obtain foreign capital at the 1% level. 
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Table 13: Impact of corporate governance indexes on foreign capital attraction 
 
 
Controls
CG 
Indexes
CG 
Indexes 
YFE
Eqweight 
Index YFE   
Foreign 
directors 
moderating 
Board&o.
Foreign 
directors 
moderating 
Directors
Foreign 
directors 
moderating 
Committees
Controlling 
shareholder 
moderating 
Board&o.
Controlling 
shareholder 
moderating 
Directors
Controlling 
shareholder 
moderating 
Committees
Firm size 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market-book 0.995 0.995 0.992 0.989 0.991 0.99 0.966** 0.992 0.993 0.991
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ROA 1.075** 1.080*** 1.122*** 1.124*** 1.119*** 1.117*** 1.098** 1.121*** 1.109** 1.120***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Leverage 4.097** 2.763 2.586 6.844*** 2.39 2.288 4.753*  2.714 2.732 2.688
(2.5) (1.89) (2.04) (4.81) (1.9) (1.82) (3.96) (2.15) (2.28) (2.11)
Liquidity 1.086 1.098 1.043 1.067 1.05 1.062 1.039 1.039 1.015 1.028
(0.08) (0.09) (0.1) (0.09) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
First transactions 0.465*** 0.430*** 0.496** 0.516** 0.504** 0.512** 0.594*  0.498** 0.598* 0.487** 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)
Foreign sales 0.723 0.696 0.75 0.499 0.771 0.728 0.706 0.768 0.669 0.795
(0.28) (0.3) (0.37) (0.22) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.38) (0.32) (0.39)
fe2010 7.244** 5.878** 7.406** 5.214** 5.488** 8.277*** 5.699** 8.648***
(5.82) (4.54) (5.91) (4.28) (4.49) (6.7) (4.78) (6.98)
fe2011 2.318 1.773 2.395 1.943 2.798*  2.488* 2.503* 2.545*  
(1.23) (0.91) (1.28) (1.06) (1.57) (1.34) (1.33) (1.37)
fe2013 2.188 1.529 2.250* 1.735 2.114 2.248 1.812 2.279*  
(1.06) (0.70) (1.1) (0.91) (1.08) (1.11) (0.92) (1.13)
fe2014 2.700** 2.048 2.857** 2.209 2.046 2.999** 2.173 3.264** 
(1.34) (0.97) (1.43) (1.19) (1.07) (1.56) (1.19) (1.71)
fe2015 6.778*** 3.503** 7.368*** 4.998** 6.202*** 7.450*** 3.845** 7.898***
(3.9) (1.89) (4.31) (3.14) (3.97) (4.3) (2.35) (4.6)
fe2016 7.725*** 4.723*** 7.901*** 5.598*** 7.569*** 7.910*** 5.918*** 9.679***
(4.49) (2.77) (4.61) (3.5) (4.72) (4.63) (3.59) (6.09)
fe2017 4.155** 2.908*  4.276*** 2.840* 4.068** 4.707*** 3.241* 5.074***
(2.3) (1.6) (2.37) (1.79) (2.29) (2.82) (1.99) (3.07)
Board & others 3.153 7.581**                9.704** 8.239** 2.729 8.743* 6.898* 7.037*  
(2.59) (7.34)                (10.77) (8.24) (2.81) (9.97) (6.99) (7.16)
Directors 0.700 0.313                0.322 0.081 0.74 0.396 0.038** 0.417
(0.66) (0.34)                (0.35) (0.13) (0.82) (0.43) (0.06) (0.45)
Committees 4.924** 5.099**                4.691** 5.591** 43.593*** 3.895* 5.693** 3.017
(3.12) (3.5)                (3.17) (3.78) (34.52) (2.94) (4.16) (2.39)
Eqweight Index 62.376*  
(141.98)
Foreign directors 14.543 0.000 1.930e+24***
(57.04) (0.00) (3.23E+25)
Board&o. # Foreign Dir. 0.074                
(0.34)                
Directors # Foreign Dir. 18344.593                
(139899.6)                
Committees # Foreign Dir. 0.000***
(0.00)
Controlling shareholder 1.326 0.006*** 0.183
(2.18) (0.01) (0.33)
Board&o. # Controlling shareholder 1.022
(1.97)
Directors # Controlling shareholder 574.810***                
(1227.05)                
Committees # Controlling shareholder 8.358
(15.71)
Constant 2.646*** 0.408 0.118 0.027*  0.091* 0.446 0.017*** 0.089 0.900 0.123
(0.85) (0.46) (0.17) (0.05) (0.13) (0.86) (0.02) (0.14) (1.53) (0.18)
Pseudo R2 0.0382 0.0594 0.1067 0.0861 0.1078 0.1114 0.1684 0.1085 0.1283 0.1103
Number of obs 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401
Standard errors in parentheses using robust standard errors to adjust for heteroskedasticity
The symbols *, **, *** denotate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
103 
 
3.6 Discussion 
Overall, we have seen that firms that follow corporate governance recommendations increase 
their probability of attracting foreign capital, as stated in hypothesis 1. This positive effect of 
corporate governance code adoption is in line with the results obtained by Goncharov et al. 
(2006), although these authors found the benefits in terms of corporate valuation, rather than 
foreign capital attraction.  
Our data show a significant relationship for corporate governance recommendations related 
with Board, bylaws & General Shareholder Meeting and Committees, but not for those 
recommendations related to Directors’ selection, resignation and compensation. While some of 
these recommendations may not be monitored by investors because of being followed by most 
firms -information on directors’ cvs on the corporate web- or because of being too detailed– 
the setup of rules on directors’ resignation following legal actions against them-, it is not 
obvious why recommendations on compensation are not significant in terms of foreign capital 
attraction. A plausible explanation may be found in the extensive compulsory legislation on 
directors’ compensation that reduces the relevance of voluntary corporate governance. Codes 
of good governance have been found to be complements to national laws and regulations 
Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) and since Spain has implemented a detailed regulation 
regarding directors’ remuneration reporting in the last years (Sustainable Economy Act 2/2011, 
Order ECC/461/2013, CNMV Circulars 4/2013 and 7/2015), this matter may be less of a 
concern for foreign investors after compulsory law have been enacted. Additionally, 
compensation of Spanish executives has not been at the front of controversy, in contrast with 
other countries.  
Regarding hypothesis 2, we find that following Committees recommendations strongly 
increases the likelihood of attracting foreign capital, that a high proportion of Foreign Directors 
drastically increases the probability of attracting foreign capital, in line with the beneficial 
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effects predicted by Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) and a significant interaction of Foreign 
Directors and the corporate recommendations dealing with Committees. This interaction’s odd-
value close to zero points to the fact that firms choose between these two corporate governance 
mechanisms alternatively. Therefore, a high proportion of foreign directors poses such a strong 
incentive for foreign investors that, rather than reinforcing the effect of corporate governance 
on foreign capital attraction, firms with those high number of foreign directors do not invest in 
compliance with the Committees index. On the other hand, a low proportion of foreign directors 
is compensated by firms with a high level of compliance with the Committees index.  
Regarding hypothesis 3, we have found that the presence of a controlling shareholder 
drastically decrease the probability of attracting foreign capital, in line with the adverse effects 
described by Pagano & Roell (1998); Young et al. (2008) but the effect of a controlling 
shareholder on corporate governance recommendations is not significant with the exception of 
those recommendations related to Directors: those transactions performed by firms with a 
controlling shareholder and a high degree of compliance with the Directors index, are more 
likely to obtain foreign capital. This result is challenging because we had not found compliance 
with the recommendations of the Directors index significant prior to considering the presence 
of controlling shareholders. A plausible explanation lies in the fact that the presence of a 
controlling shareholder is such a strong deterrent for foreign investors that compliance with 
Directors -which otherwise is not valued by foreign investors- becomes a necessary 
complement to gain the confidence of foreign investors. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In a similar way that exposure to foreign investment has been found connected to codes 
diffusion at the country level Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), we have found evidence of a 
positive relationship between the degree of code adoption at the firm level and the volume of 
foreign funds attracted by the firm. We have identified a reduced set of corporate governance 
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recommendations that foster foreign investors to overcome these obstacles and provide 
financing to Spanish firms conducting capital increases and IPOs. Out of the 64 
recommendations contained in the Spanish Good Governance Code, 10 recommendations 
dealing with the board of directors, bylaws and general shareholder meeting; and 6 
recommendations dealing with the committees of the board are found to be relevant and positive 
for attracting foreign capital. When a controlling shareholder is present at the firm, another 7 
recommendations become relevant and positive to attract foreign capital.  
Foreign directors contribute to reduce information asymmetries associated with cultural and 
linguistic differences, are more independent from the firm than local investors, use their 
superior monitoring skills to control management, and provide higher advisory capabilities that 
can contribute to increase the level of confidence of foreign investors. We have found that the 
presence of a high proportion of foreign directors is a strong incentive for foreign investors to 
participate in capital market transactions and firms use as alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms a high proportion of foreign directors and compliance with Committees 
recommendations  
Our research suffers from the limitation of considering only transactions conducted in Spain. 
Investors may regard corporate governance mechanism differently when assessing transaction 
undertaken in countries with different legal systems. We have not discriminated for foreign 
investors’ country of origin: it would be interesting to analyze if their preferences of corporate 
governance recommendations vary according to their home countries. Lastly nationality of 
foreign directors has not been discriminated either, which poses an additional limitation. 
Foreign directors superior monitoring skills and higher advisory capabilities may be restricted 
to those countries whose capital markets are more developed. 
Future research could explore which corporate governance recommendations are implemented 
by firms depending on institutional factors related to directors, such as their nationality, 
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education or professional background. Additionally, it would be valuable to construct corporate 
governance indexes similar to the 3 presented in this work for a common law country, 
characterized by stronger investor protection and dispersed ownership structures. Also, since 
the adoption of corporate channels may decrease information asymmetries and increase the 
likelihood of foreign capital attraction, future research could explore the channels through 
which these reduction of information asymmetries takes place. 
Spanish firms pursuing foreign capital may use the weighted indexes presented to focus their 
efforts on a reduced number of recommendations, rather than the large number contained in the 
Code of Good Governance. Firms may draw on cost-benefit analysis to decide on the 
implementation of different recommendations taking into account that the index Board has a 
higher impact than Committee and discriminating recommendations according to their weight 
in each index.  
Lastly, the weighted indexes have implication for the design of corporate governance codes by 
stock market supervisors and group of experts that participate in their drafting. The comply or 
explain principle lead codes to list all recommendations without assigning any relative 
importance to them, which implies a burden on investors. Although is up to investors to judge 
each of the explanations that firms provide when they decide not to follow a recommendation, 
and up to investors to decide which recommendations are more important for them, regulators 
could signal somehow the importance that prima facie recommendations present. 
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Chapter 4. The impact of the institutional framework on board 
composition 
4.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance has been defined as the “ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). These “suppliers of finance” aiming at a return can be classified into minority and 
controlling shareholders, being the latter able to significantly influence or even to control the 
company. Minority shareholders are particularly vulnerable: they make sunken investments, 
and both managers and controlling shareholders might extract rents from the firm in detriment 
of minority shareholders (Lozano, Martínez, & Pindado, 2016). 
As predicted by the agency theory, the separation of ownership and control may lead to 
managers or “agents” behaving opportunistically in detriment of minority shareholders or 
“principals” (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers may divert 
corporate assets by selling assets to themselves at favorable prices, by above market salaries, 
stock options or through outright theft. This rent extraction is called “tunneling” (Johnson et 
al., 2000). Managers may also follow corporate strategies that yield them personal benefits of 
control, such as growth or diversification -“empire building”- at the expense of shareholders’ 
interest; resist to value-increasing takeovers or simply manage inefficiently (La-Porta et al., 
2000a). Additionally, the “tunneling” or transferring of funds out of the firm may be done not 
by managers, but by a controlling shareholder. In this case, instead of the traditional “principal-
agent” conflict, there is a “principal-principal” conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders (Young et al., 2008). This abuse can be performed by direct ownership or by 
control enhancing mechanisms designed to achieve high control rights without the equivalent 
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proportion of ownership, such as the use of pyramids and dual class shares - shares with 
differential voting rights- (Claessens et al., 2002).  
The composition of the board of directors is at the center of corporate governance  (Dalton et 
al., 1998). Members of the board of directors are either executive directors - “insiders” of the 
firm that belong to the top management team-  or outside directors. Non-executives or 
“outsiders” are heterogenous in nature: they may be independent from the firm – “outside-
independent directors”- or represent a relevant shareholder – “outside-proprietary directors”. 
Independent and proprietary directors are particularly well suited to act as a counterbalance to 
the power that the CEO accumulates and allow for efficient monitoring of its performance 
(Pearce & Zahra, 1992). 
More than twenty years after Jensen & Meckling (1976) highlighted the relevance of board 
composition, abundant studies have focused on, first, the impact that outside directors have on 
firm performance and, later, on the specific relevance of the chairman of the board being an 
outside director, rather than an insider, as is the case of dual CEOs who also chair the board of 
directors.  A majority of outside directors confers the board with both independence from the 
company and capacity to monitor and control its management. But board independence does 
not seem consistently linked to firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998). Why do most corporate 
governance codes advocate for it? Are all kind of outside directors effective under different 
institutional frameworks? 
Abundant research has leveraged on the agency theory to study the monitoring role of the firm’s 
main governance body, the board of directors. The extant literature has focused on the 
contribution of outside directors, less biased and theoretically better prepared to judge 
manager’s performance and protect shareholders (Fama, 1980; Hillman et al., 2000; Jakpar, 
Tinggi, Kah, Khin, & Myint, 2019; Mizruchi, 2004; Pearce & Zahra, 1989; Weisbach, 1988). 
But outside directors are heterogeneous in nature: they may be independent from the CEO or 
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not, by, for instance, having personal or business relations with the firm or represent a relevant 
investor. To gain a better understanding between the presence of outside directors in the board 
and firm performance, this paper will try to contribute by breaking up the outside director 
category and focusing on the two different kinds that may influence firm performance 
significantly: outside-independent directors and outside-proprietary directors. Outside-
independent directors’ capacity to control managers have concentrated a significant part of the 
literature, but scant attention has been devoted to the role of those directors that represent 
shareholders with a significant stake: the proprietary directors  (Acero & Alcalde, 2014; Garcia-
Sanchez, Cuadrado-Ballesteros, & Sepulveda, 2014). Proprietary directors do not only monitor 
managers, but also provide useful advisory and access to outside resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). This paper will contribute by comparing the contribution of boards with a prevalence of 
outside-proprietary directors with that of outside-independent directors. 
Besides the heterogeneous nature of outside directors, the existence of different institutional 
frameworks may also contribute to explain the lack of conclusive findings between board 
composition and firm performance. The impact of the legal system on investor protection has 
given rise to a whole wave of research on corporate governance. Laws and their enforcement 
are key in investor protection, and examples of this protection are the right to receive the same 
per share dividends, to the right to vote on important corporate matters, such as the election of 
directors or the right to sue the company for damages (La-Porta et al., 2000a). Until the mid-
1990s most research on corporate governance was focused on the United States but since then 
a growing interest is being developed on international comparisons, based on each country legal 
system –laws and enforcement systems-. The last generation of corporate governance literature 
has focused on the influence of a particular country’s legal system on investors protection 
(Djankov et al., 2008; Hail & Leuz, 2006; Jackson & Roe, 2009; La-Porta et al., 2006). There 
is an increasing need for research around the institutional factor of corporate governance. As 
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pointed out by Aguilera & Jackson (2003):449), “despite a growing consensus that institutions 
matter, comparative institutional analysis remains in its infancy. Comparing and explaining 
cross-national diversity require systematic specification of what institutions matter and how 
they shape corporate governance”. We will address the following research question: what kind 
of outside directors are more effective in terms of firm performance for different institutional 
frameworks? 
With this objective, this paper integrates the approach of corporate governance studies that 
focus on the effectiveness of governance mechanisms used by firms at one country Bhagat & 
Black (2001); Dahya, Mcconnell, & Travlos (2002); Holderness (2003); Huson, Parrino, & 
Starks (2001), with the approach of studies that explore the impact of the legal system on 
corporate governance at the country level (Djankov et al., 2008; La-Porta et al., 2006; La-Porta, 
Lopez-de-SIlanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002; Mintz, 2005). We investigate the impact of 
different institutional frameworks at seven countries on the effectiveness of board composition, 
finding statistical significance for the relationship between the proportion of strongly 
independent directors and firm valuation: this relationship is found to be positive in common 
law countries. We also take into consideration the impact of ownership structure, namely the 
extent to which the power of the largest shareholder is contested by the second and third largest 
shareholders, to revisit the effectiveness of board composition. We find that in civil law 
countries, where ownership concentration allows relevant shareholders to have board 
representation, the positive effect of proprietary directors does not compensate for the negative 
effect of several proprietary directors representing a powerful largest shareholder, who may 
abuse his position in detriment to minority investors. But in civil law countries, the joint 
presence of proprietary directors and a “controlling coalition” that limits the power of the 
largest shareholder has a positive impact on valuation. 
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4.2 Management control,  resource provision and different outside directors 
The board works as a link between firm management and owners. While the CEO and the top 
management team are in charge with executing the company strategy and managing the 
business, the board of directors defines the company strategy, controls its execution and assists 
the management by contributing their industry and functional expertise, networking, 
legitimacy, and access to suppliers, public policy decision makers and social groups, therefore 
increasing survival likelihood (Gales & Kesner, 1994; Singh et al., 1986).  
In order to assess the effectiveness of a board composition, it is necessary to consider both its 
control and resource provision roles, building on the work by (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). While 
agency theory emphasizes the role of incentives to ensure that the board monitors and controls 
managers Fama & Jensen (1983b), resource dependence theory Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) 
emphasizes the role of board capital –both human and relational capital- to provide resources 
such as advice, legitimacy, communication with external organizations and preferential access 
to outside resources (Tuggle et al., 2010). 
These two roles of the board of directors, management control and resource provision, are 
interrelated. Resource provision depends on board capital, that is, the human and relational 
capital provided by its directors: skills, network, expertise and knowledge. But board capital 
affects not only the provision of resources, but also management control: if the board does not 
have the necessary skills, it will be unable to effectively evaluate and control management. 
Management control is facilitated by board independence, but board independence is not so 
helpful for the provision of resources: directors with personal or professional ties with the firm 
are likely to be very active providing advice and counsel (Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Hillman et 
al., 2000; Lynall et al., 2003). 
Members of the board of directors are either executive directors - “insiders” of the firm that 
belong to the top management team- or outside directors. “Outsiders” are non-executives 
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directors that may be independent from the firm and its shareholders – “outside-independent 
directors”- or independent from the firm but represent a relevant shareholder – “outside-
proprietary directors”. It is well worth clarifying terminology in this regard: extant literature 
has devoted so far scant attention to outside-proprietary directors and when the term 
“independent director” is used, it refers to outside-independent directors, in spite of both kind 
of outside directors being independent from the firm. 
4.2.1 Management control and independent directors 
Dealing with the role that outside directors play, different studies have shown the contribution 
of outside directors to management control, focusing on their independence from the 
management team. When managers divert corporate assets, use them to pursue investment 
strategies that yield them personal benefits of control at the expense of shareholders’ interest 
or are simply not efficient, outside directors will replace them to improve performance. Outside 
directors are less biased and theoretically better prepared to judge manager’s performance and 
protect shareholders (Fama, 1980; Mizruchi, 2004; Pearce & Zahra, 1989; Weisbach, 1988). 
Daily & Dalton (1994) analyzed the relationship between governance structure and corporate 
bankruptcy and found that bankrupt firms will have higher proportions of affiliated (non-
independent) directors than survivor firms. Outside directors also play a fundamental role in 
mitigating the agency problem by requiring the firm to increase its level of transparency, 
therefore reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. Voluntary disclosure increases with 
the proportion of outside directors (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005; Donnelly & Mulcahy, 
2008; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Gul & Leung, 2004). The need for independence to control the 
power of the management team has led not only to advocate for a majority of outside directors, 
but even to limit the CEO as the only insider at the board Joseph, Ocasio, & McDonnell (2014), 
to eliminate the CEO’s role as a board member entirely Wade et al. (1990) or to limit the tenure 
of the CEO (Kay & Silberstone, 1995).  
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Although some evidence support the contribution of outside directors to management control 
and firm performance and valuation, the existing literature is not conclusive (Dalton et al., 
1998). The heterogeneous nature of outside directors may be behind this lack of evidence, as 
outside directors may have personal or business relationships with the firm – “outside-affiliated 
directors”-, may be independent from the firm – “outside-independent directors”- or represent 
a relevant shareholder – “outside-proprietary directors”. To gain a better understanding between 
the presence of outside directors in the board and firm performance, rather than considering all 
kind of outside directors, a fine-grained analysis have contributed by analyzing in isolation two 
different kind of outside directors: those that are independent from the firm and its shareholders 
– “outside-independent directors”- and those that are independent from the firm but represent 
a relevant shareholder – “outside-proprietary directors”. 
Outside-independent directors, given the absence of ties with the management team, are well 
positioned to protect all minority investors, but the definition of independence is challenging, 
as it varies depending of the code of corporate governance of each country. While in the US 
independence is presumed for any director who is not an executive or shareholder with over 
10% of capital, in Europe corporate governance codes include detailed and different 
characterizations of independence, sharing family ties and former employment relationships as 
disqualifying features for independence (Aguilera, 2005). Public criticism has been constant 
about the lack of genuinely independent directors at public companies and several studies have 
failed to prove a positive relationship between the presence of independent directors and firm 
performance and valuation (Tung, 2011). Ma & Khanna (2016) offered a different approach by 
directly showing the lack of real independence. Taking advantage of a peculiarity in the Chinese 
regulation –disclosure of dissent by directors is compulsory-, they tested the degree of directors’ 
real independence and found that dissent is more likely to occur when the board chair who 
114 
 
appointed the independent director has left the board, or when the board “game” is reaching its 
last round, defined as a 60-day window before chairman or director departure.  
Setting up a minimum proportion of independent directors may be a corporate governance 
mechanism aimed at gaining legitimacy, but it is not clearly stated to which extent it responds 
to genuine will to protect shareholders or to what Meyer & Rowan (1977) called “myth and 
ceremony”. A more stringent definition or “strong independence” can be obtained after making 
two adjustments to formal classifications of “independent” directors. Firstly, the independent 
director has necessarily joined the board prior to the CEO tenure, following the results of Coles, 
Daniel, & Naveen (2014), who found that board monitoring decreases with the fraction of the 
board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. And secondly, the 
independent director cannot not serve in more than two additional boards. Although multiple 
directorships were initially considered a certification of a director’s abilities Fama & Jensen 
(1983b), directors with multiple appointments have less time available to effectively control 
management, as shown by (Cashman, Gillan, & Jun, 2012). Actually CEOs have been found to 
prefer “independent” directors with multiple board directorships Shivdasani & Yermack (1999) 
and firms with a majority of outside directors serving in multiple boards have worse 
performance and are less likely to fire the CEO (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). 
Independent directors, given their lack of ties with the management team, may be capable of 
effectively controlling the firm, as long as their independence is real and can be exercised with 
enough dedication of time. We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with a higher proportion of strongly independent directors in their board 
obtain a higher stock market valuation 
4.2.2 Resource provision and “proprietary directors” 
Besides the governance function of the board of directors –controlling managers and ensuring 
that corporate action is aligned with shareholders’ interests-, the board also serve as a link with 
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the external environment, contributing to resource provision, environmental scanning and 
opportunity seeking (Tuggle et al., 2010). In the resource dependence theory, several factors 
are a source of uncertainty and external dependencies that directors can help to mitigate –i.e. 
availability of capital, regulatory environment, new technologies, etc.- (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Moreover, the access to valuable resources increases firm legitimacy by enhancing the 
reputation and credibility of their firms (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Daily & Schwenk, 1996; 
Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992). This is for example the case when a family controls multiple 
firms: each firm of the informal business group gain access to the family resources and share 
the group’s reputation capital. The controlling family works as a boundary spanner of the 
organization and its environment (Peng & Jiang, 2010b). Also firms showing high performance 
may be less concerned about management control, since a track record of high performance 
may be a good sign of alignment between shareholders and executives (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). These high performing companies may overweight the resource acquisition role of their 
Board of Directors, rather than management control. 
The extant literature has examined the resource provision role of outside-directors. But scant 
attention has been devoted to the contribution of outside-proprietary directors in particular. One 
reason for this paradox may be of institutional nature. To the best of our knowledge, only the 
legal systems of Spain and Mexico include a mechanism that allow investors to directly appoint 
a number of directors proportional to their stake in the firm’s capital. Actually directors 
appointed through this mechanism must be reported to the stock market supervisor as 
“consejeros dominicales”, so that their link to the relevant shareholder is clearly signaled to all 
market participants. This is not the case in the rest of the world, although relevant investors 
obviously try to vote and get some directors elected according to their preferences in spite of 
the lack of a direct mechanism to appoint a number of directors proportional to their stake in 
the firm’s capital. Across the world, some companies disclose the link between certain outside 
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investors and relevant shareholders in their websites and annual reports, other do not. This may 
explain why the term “outside-proprietary” director is seldom used, and most of the literature 
has focused on outside-independent directors. 
As the ownership stake of the investor increases, she has a greater incentive to increase firm 
value (Holderness, 2003). The significant amounts of funds necessary to get board 
representation are an incentive to commit resources, provide contacts and devote extensive time 
to assist the management team, given the size of the investment at risk made by the shareholder 
represented by the proprietary director. Theoretically, outside-independent directors can also 
contribute to resource acquisition with their expertise as long as they devote the requisite time 
and attention to the board. Outside-proprietary directors may have less outside boards and 
devote more time than outside-independent directors, who are chosen because of their skills, 
accomplishments, and connections, therefore most of them are extremely busy (Hambrick, 
Misangyi, & Park, 2015). Outside-proprietary directors have a string incentive to contribute to 
the board not only because their reputation is at risk, as in the case of independent-outside 
directors Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2014), but because of their linkage to relevant shareholders, 
who are risking their wealth. Large institutional investors such as pension funds, hedge funds 
and insurance companies are represented by proprietary directors typically have direct access 
to management and use their skills to closely monitor firm performance. Also, economies of 
scale due to the size of their investment render the cost of acquiring value-relevant information 
relatively lower. Proprietary directors can be instrumental for the information advantage of 
large institutional owners described by (Schnatterly, Shaw, & Jennings, 2008). And even 
institutional investors with smaller stakes in the firm –“blockholders”- hold a regular 
communication with management and try to influence it, but if their stake is big enough they 
would rather be directly involved in management supervision and advice through membership 
of the board of directors (Holderness, 2003). 
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The significant funds invested by the shareholders represented by outside-proprietary directors 
provide strong incentives for the effective contribution of these directors to resource acquisition 
and eventually also to management control. In contrast with the debate over the independence 
of directors classified as such, proprietary directors are clearly defined by its association with 
a relevant shareholder and we contend that their commitment with the firm will contribute to 
improve its performance and valuation. Based on that, we propose that:  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with a higher proportion of outside-proprietary directors in their board 
obtain a higher stock market valuation 
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4.3 The impact of the institutional framework on the composition of board of directors 
Both outside-independent and outside-proprietary directors can contribute to the board and 
therefore to firm’s valuation. As we have discussed, the contribution of independent directors 
can be particularly significant in terms of management control Ajinkya et al. (2005); Donnelly 
& Mulcahy (2008); Elshandidy & Neri (2015); Gul & Leung (2004) while proprietary directors 
are well suited for resource provision, environmental scanning and opportunity seeking 
(Holderness, 2003; Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013; Schnatterly et al., 2008; Tuggle et al., 
2010). The board needs both contributions, but in which context is each role particularly 
relevant? The institutional framework in which the firm makes business will impact the need 
for management control and resource provision, moderating the relationship between the 
presence of each kind of director and firm valuation.  
The institutional framework of a country is characterized by its local legal system, but the 
ownership structure of the firm must be also taken inti consideration, since the power of the 
largest shareholder will impact the effectiveness of directors (Mees & Smith, 2019). 
4.3.1 The legal system 
The relevance of the legal system was first pointed out by (La-Porta et al., 1998). Civil law is 
associated with greater government intervention in economic activity and weaker protection of 
private property than common law, whose vague fiduciary duty principles are more protective 
of investors than the bright line rules of the civil law (Ergungor, 2002; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). 
There are historical reasons for this: Civil law, since the 19th century, has been an instrument 
of the State in expanding its power, actually the French and German codes were introduced by 
Napoleon and Bismarck. Earlier on, Civil law had developed as part of the control that 
European monarchs retained over their subjects versus the aristocracy. In contrast, Common 
law developed as a mechanism for protecting the subjects from the crown, with the emphasis 
on protecting the individual against the government (La-Porta et al., 1997). 
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Common law countries, versus French, German and Scandinavian civil law countries, provide 
the strongest degree of protection for shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008). If the law does not 
protect shareholders from the potential opportunistic behavior of managers, shareholders with 
enough funds will seek a significant influence on the firm by holding large stakes of equity 
Peng and Jiang (2010), so that weak investor protection fosters a tendency towards concentrated 
capital structures. This difference in the legal system and in ownership concentration has 
implications in terms of the relative effectiveness of independent versus proprietary directors.  
Capital dispersion accentuates the separation of ownership and control that makes necessary 
mechanisms to prevent agents from damaging the principals’ wealth (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). 
In common law countries shareholders’ stakes are relatively small, so they are seldom 
represented in the board and when they do it is not through a controlling stake. US investors 
rarely hold more than 2% of a public company and “blockholders” or influential stakes are 
considered with as low as 5%. This dispersed ownership provides CEOs with significant 
discretion. On the other hand, it is ordinary business for a bank to own 25% of a German public 
company: this allows influential investors to limit management discretion (Crossland & 
Hambrick, 2007). La-Porta et al. (1999) defined “closely held” firms as those that have one or 
more owner with at least 20% of the firm’s capital. While 10% of medium-sized U.S. firms 
were closely held, 70% percent of Japanese firms and 90% of German firms were closely held. 
In common law countries, dispersed ownership seldom allows investors to be represented in 
the board, but the legal system provides sufficient investor protection to rely on independent 
directors to look after the interests of all shareholders. On the contrary, civil law countries have 
weaker investor protection environments where the effectiveness of director’s independence is 
often questioned, and the use of outside-independent directors is usually complemented by 
outside-proprietary directors. 
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Hypothesis 3: In Civil Law countries, the positive relationship between high proportion of 
outside-independent directors and higher firm valuation is weaker than in Common Law 
countries. 
In contrast, Civil Law countries have a relatively weak legal system of investor protection and 
firms usually have one or several relevant shareholders that can effectively control management 
(La-Porta et al., 1999). The role of proprietary directors, appointed by relevant shareholders, is 
particularly important when firms are performing poorly, since the economic exposure of the 
main shareholders will drive them to make the necessary adjustments to management practices 
or even replace the CEO.  
In civil law countries, proprietary directors can also contribute to firm performance given their 
resource provision capabilities. The significant amounts of funds necessary to get board 
representation are an incentive to commit resources, provide contacts and devote extensive time 
to assist the management team, given the size of the investment at risk made by the shareholder 
represented by the proprietary director. Sobhan (2016) provides evidence of this role: 
institutional investors with presence on the board of directors in Bangladesh reduce 
overstatement in corporate governance reports. Considering these aspects, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 4: In Civil Law countries, the positive relationship between high proportion of 
outside-proprietary directors and higher firm valuations is reinforced 
4.3.2 Ownership structure 
In civil law counties the conflict between agents and principals is mitigated by a concentrated 
ownership structure: firms usually have relevant shareholders that can effectively control 
management. But these concentrated ownership structures give rise to a new conflict of interest 
between the power of the largest shareholders and minority shareholders –the “principal-
principal” conflict. This conflict requires different mechanisms to ensure that minority 
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shareholders are not exploited, this time by large shareholders, rather than by the management 
of the firm (Young et al., 2008). 
In civil law countries, the largest shareholder might particularly fill the institutional void, 
compensating for lower levels of investor protection. This is also the case of family-controlled 
groups in emerging countries that pursue significant private benefits of control in weak 
institutional environments (Jacoby, Liu, Wang, Wu, & Zhang, 2019; Peng & Jiang, 2010b; 
Young et al., 2008). 
But a group of relevant investors may cooperate and act as a counterbalance to the power of the 
largest one. A “controlling coalition” may contest the power of the largest shareholder and 
prevent him from extracting rents from the firm. Once a “controlling coalition” is in place, 
neither the largest shareholder nor the members of the coalition will be able to control decision 
making or abuse their position in detriment of minority shareholders (Pagano, Röell, & 
Zechner, 2002). Both the largest shareholder and the “controlling coalition” may control each 
other, and all of them, together with independent directors, effectively control managers and 
foster the valuation of the firm.  
It has been discussed how in civil law countries a high number of proprietary directors may 
benefit the firm, since the significant amounts of funds necessary to get board representation 
are an incentive to commit resources, provide contacts and devote extensive time to assist the 
management team. It has been also described how the presence of a “controlling coalition” 
formed of several large shareholders can mitigate the potential abuse of the largest shareholder. 
We contend that the positive effect of proprietary directors in civil law countries will be 
reinforced if the power of the largest shareholder is contested by a “controlling coalition”. 
Hypothesis 5: In Civil Law countries, the presence of a “controlling coalition” increases the 
positive effect of proprietary directors on firm valuation.  
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As a summary of the model, Figure 2 represent the hypotheses proposed, considering the direct 
effect of strongly independent directors and proprietary directors on firm value, and the 
moderating effects of the legal system and controlling coalitions. 
Figure 2: Model proposed 
 
4.4 Data 
Since we are testing the relationship between the composition of the board of directors and 
corporate valuation, it is essential that the firms analyzed reach a valuation in the market as 
efficient as possible. In this vein we examine the market capitalization of companies that are 
members of the main stock market indexes. The stocks of these companies are actively traded 
by institutional investors and since liquidity increases the information content of market prices 
Fang, Noe, & Tice (2009), the valuation of companies belonging to the main indexes will 
efficiently incorporate public information regarding the company. 
Data were obtained from both the annual reports of each company and the ORBIS database. 
We have analyzed companies belonging to the stock market indexes IBEX35 (Spain), CAC40 
(France), BEL20 (Belgium), FTSE100 (UK), OMX30 (Sweden), OMXH25 (Finland) and 
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OMXC20 (Denmark) during the last year for which data is available (2017). In order to control 
for each country institutional environment, we exclude foreign companies listed in the stock 
indexes of these countries, and we also disregard companies in the banking and insurance 
sectors, given their special regulation, in line with (Acero & Alcalde, 2014). If a company has 
recently gone public, the lack of track record in the market may impair the causal inference 
between corporate governance and firm valuation, therefore we have used 10 years cut off for 
this minimum track record in the stock market to make sure that valuations incorporate 
corporate governance mechanisms, but the results are robust for a 5-years cut off. This provides 
us with 174 firms in seven countries: France, Spain and Belgium representing the French-civil 
law origin; Finland, Denmark and Sweden representing the Scandinavian-civil law origin and 
the United Kingdom representing common law. We have only analyzed board composition in 
the European context, to avoid variables different from the legal system from distorting our 
analysis. 
Dependent variable: Firm valuation 
Measuring the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms, such as different 
composition of the board of directors, can be achieved through different metrics such as Tobin’s 
Q (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Lins, 2003; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003; Singh, Tabassum, 
Darwish, & Batsakis, 2018), return on assets Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, & Tehranian (2007) 
and stock price returns Baek, Kang, & Park (2004); Field & Lowry (2009); Gompers et al. 
(2003). We will use Tobin’s Q to allow for a combined measure of market perception -market 
capitalization- and accounting valuation -book value of assets-. 
Independent variables: Board of Directors composition 
We have researched the composition of the board of directors by means of a thorough 
investigation of the annual report of each company in our sample.  
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Regarding independent directors, we use the variable percentage of outside-independent 
directors to the total number of directors (Miletkov et al., 2014; Suchard, 2009). We have started 
from the companies’ statement of independence about their directors but have investigated 
further. We define as “strongly independent directors” as those who meet two criteria: firstly, 
they are not members of two additional board of directors and therefore have the necessary time 
availability to effectively control management, in line with the findings of (Cashman et al., 
2012). Secondly, they have joined the board prior to the CEO tenure, following the results of 
Coles et al. (2014), who found that board monitoring decreases with the fraction of the board 
comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. We have reviewed the curricula 
of 1.977 directors to estimate both dedication and appointment date of each director. 
A second variable employed in this research dealing with the board of directors composition is 
proportion of outside-proprietary directors. Although the variable “proportion of outside 
directors” has been used in previous research Coles & Hesterly (2000); Neupane & Neupane, 
(2017), referring to the proportion of directors that are not firm’s executives –regardless of 
whether they are outside-independent or have linkages to the firm’s main shareholders-, to the 
best of our knowledge the variable “proportion of  outside-proprietary directors” has not been 
used before. We are interested in these outside directors that represent relevant shareholders, 
but except for Spain and Mexico, where corporate governance filings classify directors that 
represent a significant shareholder as “proprietary”, in the rest of countries they are simply 
considered “outside directors” or even “independent” depending on the size of their 
shareholding, so we have examined the curricula of every director in our sample to identify 
those with an affiliation to a relevant shareholder, labelling them as outside-proprietary 
directors. 
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Moderating variables 
We first consider, as a moderating variable, whether the legal system of the country in which 
the company is headquartered is “common law” or “civil law”, following (La-Porta et al., 
1998). As discussed, in common law countries, dispersed ownership seldom allows investors 
to be represented in the board, but the legal system provides enough investor protection to rely 
on independent directors to look after the interests of all shareholders. In contrast, Civil Law 
countries have a relatively weak legal system of investor protection and firms usually have one 
or several relevant shareholders that can effectively control management La-Porta et al. (1999) 
through proprietary directors and also contribute to firm performance through their resource 
provision capabilities. We have created a dummy variable that takes value “1” for Civil Law 
countries and “0” otherwise. The countries chosen for this research are representative of each 
legal system: France, Spain and Belgium represent the French-civil law origin; Finland, 
Denmark and Sweden represent the Scandinavian-civil law origin and the United Kingdom 
represents the European common law.  
The model also needs to measure the presence of a “controlling coalition” formed of several 
large shareholders that can mitigate the potential abuse of the largest shareholder. A 
“controlling coalition” may contest the power of the largest shareholder and prevent him from 
extracting rents from the firm. Once a “controlling coalition” is in place, neither the largest 
shareholder nor the members of the coalition will be able to control decision making or abuse 
their position in detriment of minority shareholders (Pagano et al., 2002). Both the largest 
shareholder and the “controlling coalition” may control each other, and all of them, together 
with independent directors, effectively control managers and foster the valuation of the firm. 
Following the criteria set up in Attig, Ghoul, Guedhami, & Rizeanu (2013), we measure the 
relative weight of a coalition formed by the second and third largest shareholders versus the 
largest shareholder, computed with their respective voting rights:  
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Where VR2 and VR3 are the voting rights of the second and third shareholders and VR1 are 
the voting rights of the largest shareholder.  
Control variables 
The analysis of foreign capital attraction must take into account the liquidity of the shares -
investors prefer liquid shares that can be bought and sold with less impact on prices (Bushee et 
al., 2014; Chung & Zhang, 2011; Kim et al., 2011)-. We also include beta calculated over a 
five-years period and leverage, measured as total liabilities over shareholder’s equity, to proxy 
for various dimensions of risk -firms with higher betas and highly leveraged are perceived as 
riskier- (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Chung & Zhang, 2011; Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Hadani et al., 
2011; Miletkov et al., 2014)-. We control for firms’ growth opportunities by the firm 
investments measured by capital expenditure over assets (Aggarwal et al., 2011, 2009; Attig et 
al., 2013; Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; Jafarinejad, Jory, & Ngo, 2015). Since cash-rich firms 
reach higher valuations, we also compute cash holdings to total assets (Aggarwal et al., 2011; 
Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Kim et al., 2017). 
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4.5 Results 
We are testing the impact of the relative weight of each kind of outside directors on firm 
valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Table 14 shows the descriptive statistics. Tobin’s Q 
average is 205.11, indicating that the market value of both equity and debt more than doubles 
the firm’s book value. While the average percentage of independent directors is 63.03%, this 
average of “strongly independent directors” is 14.37%, similar to the average percentage of 
proprietary directors (12.70%). The average weight of the “controlling coalition” is 0.99, 
indicating that the second and third largest shareholders voting rights almost compensate for 
the power of the largest investor. 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics 
 
TobinQ: (market cap+debt)/assets, %Independent: as reported, %True Indep: devoted independent appointed 
prior to CEO, %Proprietary: director with ties to shareholder, Leverage: total liabilities/shareholders equity, 
Growth potent: Capex/assets, Share Liquidity: annual traded shares/outstanding shares, Beta: 5 years beta 
factor, Cash over assets: liquid assets/total assets, Civil law system: as reported in La-Porta et al. (1998), Largest 
shareholder contested: relative weight of a coalition formed by the second and third largest shareholders versus 
the largest shareholder, computed with their respective voting rights: (VR2+VR3) /VR1 
 
Table 15 shows correlation among the variables. We have calculated the variance inflation 
factors and multicollinearity does not significantly affect coefficient estimation -maximum 
individual VIF is 2.28 and average VIF is 1.37 
- 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tobin Q 174 205.1138 153.2111 54.68909 958.1732
% Independent 174 63.02609 19.00306 15.38461 100
% True Indep. 174 14.37493 18.26973 0 100
% Proprietary 174 12.69672 15.86566 0 73.33334
Leverage 174 281.6196 1491.062 -599.6629 19675.59
Growth potent. 174 5.273557 6.30365 -11.68365 40.55298
Share liquidity 174 81.5927 62.76956 11.05431 642.2369
Beta 174 0.889975 0.2208603 0.458337 1.983539
Cash over assets 174 10.08282 11.06053 0.01167 89.49967
Civil law sytem 174 0.6724138 0.4706875 0 1
Largest shareholder contested 174 0.9867751 0.5662719 0.0466667 2
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Table 15: Correlation matrix 
 
Tobin Q % Independent % True Indep. % Proprietary Leverage
Growth 
potent.
Share 
liquidity Beta
Cash 
over 
assets
Civil law 
sytem
Largest 
shareholder 
contested
Tobin Q 1
% Independent -0.071 1
% True Indep. 0.0157 0.3683* 1
% Proprietary -0.0266 -0.6879* -0.2455* 1
Leverage -0.0789 0.0813 0.1413 -0.085 1
Growth potent. 0.2472* -0.0265 0.034 -0.0383 -0.0709 1
Share liquidity -0.1685* -0.0076 -0.0367 -0.0451 -0.0324 -0.026 1
Beta -0.0838 0.1933* 0.1235 -0.1003 0.0171 -0.027 0.1927* 1
Cash over assets 0.3550* -0.0478 -0.0454 0.0605 -0.0243 -0.113 0.0991 0.1502* 1
Civil law sytem 0.0024 -0.3655* -0.2567* 0.4964* -0.1338 -0.001 -0.0474 0.102 0.1519* 1
Largest shareholder contested -0.0284 0.2689* 0.1256 -0.3577* 0.0785 -0.04 0.1083 0.0082 -0.0239 -0.3325* 1
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We  have used a Huber estimator -robust standard errors- in models #1, #2 and #3 so that it is 
not required that the errors follow a normal distribution, nor is it required that they be identically 
distributed from one observation to the next, therefore our estimation is robust to 
heteroskedasticity of the errors. Models #4, #5 and #6 use country clusters, which are a 
generalization of the robust standard errors calculation that relaxes the assumption of 
independence of the errors and replaces it with the assumption of independence between 
clusters. Thus the errors are allowed to be correlated within clusters. We compare the results of 
six models fitted with OLS in Table 17. While the first model includes only control variables, 
the second and third models incorporate the relative weight of independent and proprietary 
directors. The measure of independent directors varies across models #2 and #3: while model 
#2 uses the percentage of independent directors as reported by each firm, model #3 qualifies 
independence with “strongly independent directors” -among the reported as independent, those 
who can devote enough time to the board and have been appointed before the CEO tenure-. 
Among control variables, leverage is significant at the 5% level, and its coefficient shows that 
highly leveraged firms are perceived as riskier, impacting their valuation. Growth potential is 
significant at the 10% level -5% when true independence is considered-, and the positive sign 
of its coefficient signals the premium that investors are ready to pay for firms with high 
investment projects that will foster growth. 
As discussed, civil law countries are characterized by higher ownership concentration, which 
makes board representation more likely. Table 16 shows how while in the UK, a common law 
country, proprietary directors only account for 1%, they reach 30% of the board in Spain, where 
the law specifically recognizes the right of shareholders to have a board representation 
proportional to their stakes. Models #4 and #5 analyze the impact of the variable Civil Law as 
a moderating variable. 
130 
 
Table 16: Board composition by country 
 
 
It is very interesting that the percentage of independent directors is not significant neither with 
independence according to firm’s statements nor with “strong independence”. Only when we 
add the legal system (model #4), the proportion of strongly independent directors becomes 
significant at the 5% level and contribute positively to firm valuation. 
Analogously, the percentage of proprietary directors is not significant in models #2 and #3, but 
becomes significant at the 1% once the legal system is incorporated to model #5. The negative 
coefficient (-5.790) indicates that a higher proportion of proprietary directors causes lower 
valuation. As the proportion of proprietary directors increases, it is more likely that several of 
them represent a controlling shareholder who may abuse his position in detriment to minority 
investors. The joint effect of a high proportion of proprietary directors and civil law has a 
positive coefficient of 5.554, reflecting the resource provision role discussed, but the total effect 
of proprietary directors in civil law countries is still negative (5.554-5.790) in this model.  
In model #6 we account for the negative factor associated with proprietary directors, that is: the 
possibility of a powerful largest shareholder. The joint effect of a high proportion of proprietary 
directors, civil law and a “controlling coalition” that mitigates the power of the largest 
shareholder is significant at the 5% level, positive (7.502) and higher than the effect of 
proprietary directors and civil law (5.554). 
 
 
UK Spain France Belgium Finland Sweden Denmark
% independent 73% 44% 55% 48% 91% 57% 53%
% true indepent 21% 8% 7% 4% 23% 15% 8%
% proprietary 1% 31% 17% 27% 7% 15% 12%
Number of firms 174 57 21 30 12 19 21 14
Number of directors 1977 581 272 431 149 146 263 135
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Table 17: Impact of board composition on firm valuation 
 
 
4.6 Discussion 
The extant literature is not conclusive on the contribution of outside directors Chaganti, 
Mahajan, & Sharma (1985); Daily & Dalton (1992); Dalton et al. (1998); Rechner & Dalton, 
(1986); Zahra & Stanton (1988), perhaps because of their heterogeneous nature -outside 
directors may be independent from the firm and its relevant shareholders or  independent from 
the firm but represent a relevant investor-. We have broken down this category of directors into 
outside-independent and outside-proprietary directors and examined the impact on firm 
valuation of each category in the light of different institutional frameworks. 
(1) Controls
(2) Reported 
independence
(3) True 
Independence
(4) Civil law 
moderating   
% True Indep.
(5) Civil law 
moderating   
% Proprietary
(6) Largest 
contested&Civil law 
moderating % Prop.
Leverage -0.005** -0.006** -0.006** -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth potential 6.891*** 6.666** 6.807*** 6.640* 6.681* 6.463*  
(2.6) (2.57) (2.57) (3.01) (3.00) (3.10)
Share liquidity -0.451*** -0.476*** -0.453*** -0.455** -0.470* -0.497*  
(0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21)
Beta -71.297 -63.671 -78.214 -63.541** -68.869** -60.114** 
(48.67) (51.94) (47.49) (21.20) (22.45) (24.49)
Cash over assets 5.812*** 5.831*** 5.892*** 5.815*** 5.992*** 5.979***
(1.65) (1.59) (1.66) (1.37) (1.38) (1.29)
% Independent -1.027 0.223 1.026*** 0.188 0.074
(0.75) (0.58) (0.20) (0.67) (0.67)
% Proprietary -1.468 -0.58 -0.512 -5.790*** 5.372** 
(0.93) (0.64) (1.37) (0.88) (1.48)
Civil law 14.335 -25.408 43.663
(53.17) (43.24) (29.07)
Civil law # % Indep -1.672*
(0.86)
Civil law # % Prop 5.554** -4.140** 
(1.91) (1.68)
Largest contested 72.320***
(7.47)
Largest contested # % Prop -9.321***
(1.40)
Civil law # Largest contested -51.650*  
(21.98)
Largest contested # %Prop # Civil law 7.502** 
(2.29)
Constant 211.945*** 291.698*** 222.293*** 201.938*** 231.101*** 138.404***
(49.83) (65.59) (51.91) (23.75) (33.41) (35.65)
R-squared 0.263 0.2754 0.2678 0.2779 0.2749 0.2958
Number of obs. 174 174 174 174 174 174
Standard errors in parentheses using robust standard errors to adjust for heteroskedasticity (columns 1-3) and country clusters (columns 4-6)
The symbols *, **, *** denotate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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Regarding independent directors, the literature has failed to prove a positive relationship 
between the presence of independent directors and firm performance and valuation (Tung, 
2011). The nomination of independent directors does not have to respond to a genuine will to 
diminish CEO power or to enhance monitoring of the board of directors. As pointed out by 
Joseph et al. (2014), the adoption of new structures may be shaped by a new legislation or 
willingness to comply with corporate governance codes. These are examples of “elaboration 
opportunities that sparks power mobilization and increases the likelihood that structures will be 
altered in ways that accord with the interests of powerful executives, as well as the expectations 
of prevailing logics” (Joseph et al., 2014):1851. Public criticism has been constant about the 
lack of genuinely independent directors: firms may appoint independent directors under 
pressure from institutional investors’ claims and stock market regulations, but if the 
independence of these directors is not strong enough, it may respond to a cosmetic exercise. 
Additionally, corporate governance codes include different characterizations of independence 
(Aguilera, 2005). We build a more stringent definition, “strong independence”, built after the 
findings of Coles et al. (2014) -monitoring decreases with the fraction of the board comprised 
of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office- and Cashman et al. (2012) -directors with 
multiple appointments have less time available to effectively control management. In spite of 
this attempt to refine independence, and in line with the extant literature, we have not found 
evidence of a general and positive association with firm valuation (hypothesis 1). But once we 
account for the institutional framework in terms of the legal system (hypothesis 3), our 
definition of “strongly independent director” provides evidence of a positive contribution to 
corporate valuation: in common law countries, characterized by low ownership concentration, 
shareholders do not reach a stake high enough to appoint proprietary directors, but can control 
managers through strongly independent directors. 
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Regarding proprietary directors, evidence for the positive impact of their presence in the board 
of directors (hypothesis 2) is again only provided when taking into consideration the interaction 
with the institutional framework in terms of legal system (hypothesis 4). We have discussed 
how the board, besides controlling managers, also serve as a link with the external environment, 
contributing to resource acquisition, reducing environmental dependency, and aiding in 
establishing legitimacy (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Hambrick and 
D’Aveni, 1992). Outside directors that represent a significant investor or “proprietary directors” 
are particularly well suited for this resource provision role. As the ownership stake of the 
investor increases, he has a greater incentive to increase firm value (Holderness, 2003). But 
only with ownership concentrations, shareholders reach stakes high enough to appoint 
proprietary directors. This explains the positive interaction of civil law and proprietary directors 
(hypothesis 4). 
We have also found support for the positive impact on valuation of a joint presence of a 
controlling coalition, civil law and the proportion of proprietary directors (hypothesis #5). 
Before considering the relative power of the largest shareholder, the net effect of proprietary 
directors was negative, since the positive effect of proprietary directors under civil law -
resource provision- did not compensate for the negative effect of several proprietary directors 
representing a powerful largest shareholder, who may abuse his position in detriment to 
minority investors. But in civil law countries, the joint presence of proprietary directors and a 
“controlling coalition” that limits the power of the largest shareholder has a positive impact on 
valuation (Attig et al., 2013; Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, 2000). 
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4.7 Conclusion 
We have investigated why, in spite of the abundant literature focusing on the contribution of 
outside directors, less biased and theoretically better prepared to judge manager’s performance 
and protect shareholders Fama (1980); Hillman et al. (2000); Mizruchi (2004); Pearce & Zahra 
(1989); Weisbach (1988), there are no conclusive results on their contribution (Chaganti et al., 
1985; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Dalton et al., 1998; Rechner & Dalton, 1986; Zahra & Stanton, 
1988). We have revisited the studies of board composition and firm performance with a two-
fold approach.  
Firstly, we have compensated public criticism about the lack of genuinely outside-independent 
directors and their nomination to gain legitimacy with a more stringent definition of 
independence. We have coined the term “strongly independent” after making two adjustments 
to corporate filings. Firstly, the independent director has necessarily joined the board prior to 
the CEO tenure, following the results of Coles et al. (2014), who found that board monitoring 
decreases with the fraction of the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO 
assumed office. And secondly, the independent director does not serve in more than two 
additional boards. directors with multiple appointments have less time available to effectively 
control management, as shown by Cashman et al. (2012). When we account for the institutional 
framework, we find statistical significance for the relationship between the proportion of 
strongly independent directors and firm valuation: this relationship is found to be positive in 
common law countries. 
Secondly, we have been attracted by the scant attention devoted to outside-proprietary directors 
that represent investors. Outside directors that represent a significant investor or “proprietary 
directors” are particularly well suited for the resource provision role, in addition to the 
traditional monitoring role of outside directors. As the ownership stake of the investor increases, 
he has a greater incentive to increase firm value (Holderness, 2003). The significant amounts 
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of funds necessary to get board representation are an incentive to commit resources, provide 
contacts and devote extensive time to assist the management team, given the size of the 
investment at risk made by the shareholder represented by the proprietary director. Since firms 
generally do not report “proprietary directors” we have examined the curricula of 1977 directors 
in search of ties with relevant shareholders. Again, we need the institutional context to arrive 
at a significant finding. We have found that in civil law countries, where ownership 
concentration allows relevant shareholders to have board representation, the positive effect of 
proprietary directors does not compensate for the negative effect of several proprietary directors 
representing a powerful largest shareholder, who may abuse his position in detriment to 
minority investors. But in civil law countries, the joint presence of proprietary directors and a 
“controlling coalition” that limits the power of the largest shareholder has a positive impact on 
valuation. 
Our research suffers from the limitation of taking for granted the initial classification of 
independence assigned by firms to their directors. We have only analyzed board composition 
in the European context, to avoid variables different from the legal system from distorting our 
analysis. Future research could develop a worldwide definition of independence and re-classify 
directors according to this tailor-made definition. This paper has explored different civil law 
areas: France, Spain and Belgium representing the French origin; and Finland, Denmark and 
Sweden representing the Scandinavian origin. It would be useful to add the geographical scope 
by considering civil law countries of German origin, such as Switzerland, Germany or Japan. 
Additionally, the analysis could be enriched by including common law countries outside 
Europe, such as the US, Australia or India.  
Lastly, both firms and stock market supervisors, may foster practices that our data have proved 
contrary to shareholders’ interest. In this vein the definition of independence could include a 
limit on the number of external boards and independent director should not be removed from 
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their positions, facilitating not only the effective exercise of their duties in a strongly 
independent way, but its consolidation as the CEO is renewed. Firms should be transparent 
regarding the ties of directors to relevant shareholders, since we have shown how proprietary 
directors can contribute to share-value creation, in civil law countries, particularly when a 
controlling coalition is in place. 
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Chapter 5. Monitoring by blockholders and independent directors 
5.1 Introduction 
The need for corporate governance arises from the separation of ownership and control that 
may lead to managers or “agents” to behave opportunistically in detriment of minority 
shareholders or “principals” (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). And capital 
dispersion accentuates the need for corporate governance: managers will find it easier to divert 
corporate assets, to follow corporate strategies that yield them personal benefits of control, to 
resist to value-increasing takeovers, to receive excessive compensation or simply to manage 
inefficiently if management control is diluted by the vast group of shareholders present in public 
companies. Ownership structure -the type of investors and the size of their stakes- is considered 
by itself a corporate governance mechanism related to firm value (Edmans & Holderness, 
2017). Blockholders, who gather significant stakes at public companies, are a relevant actor in 
ownership structure and corporate governance. 
Moreover, differences in the institutional framework of the countries where firms are located 
precede ownership concentration and its influence on corporate governance. Common law 
countries provide the strongest degree of protection for shareholders and dispersed ownership 
structures are common among them. In these countries the founding families of a firm feel 
comfortable diluting their stake and eventually becoming minority investors, minority 
shareholders also feel comfortable investing in a firm where the founding family still holds a 
significant stake, and professional managers run the daily operations of the company. 
But when the law does not protect shareholders from the potential opportunistic behavior of 
managers, shareholders will seek a significant influence on the firm by holding large stakes of 
equity, leading to concentrated ownership structures, as is the case in French, German and 
Scandinavian civil law countries (La-Porta et al., 1998). In the absence of proper legal 
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protection, not only capital will remain concentrated but families will manage their firms 
directly, not risking to hire professional managers (Peng & Jiang, 2010b). Concentration of 
ownership can compensate for the problem of separation between ownership and control. 
But even in countries with relatively dispersed ownership structures, shareholders often choose 
to accumulate significant stakes. In a random sample of manufacturing firms in the US, 56% of 
companies had shareholders holding over 5% of the firm’s capital (Mehran & Carroll, 1995). 
While the regulatory need to report holdings over 5% has led to define blockholders at that 
level, the literature refers to large shareholders as those with at least 10% of capital and to 
controlling shareholders as those with over 20% of capital. La-Porta et al. (1999) defined 
“closely held” firms as those that have one or more owner with at least 20% of the firm’s capital. 
While 10% of medium-sized U.S. firms were closely held, 70% percent of Japanese firms and 
90% of German firms were closely held. 
Corporate governance mechanisms are internal to the firm –board composition, compensation 
and ownership structure- and external, namely the legal system and the role that competition 
plays in different markets –product, labour and takeover markets- (Denis & McConnell, 2003). 
The study of blockholders is part of the literature dealing with an internal mechanism: 
ownership structure.  
In this sense, this paper firstly tries to contribute by providing further theoretical base about the 
relationships between the presence of blockholders and firm value. Although this relationship 
has been broadly analyzed in previous research, findings are not conclusive (Cremers & Nair, 
2005; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Farber, 2005; Holderness, 2003; Holderness & Sheehan, 
1985; Lins, 2003; Lins & Warnock, 2004). Since independent directors are one of the most 
analyzed and diffused corporate governance mechanism, we also try to contribute by both 
sharpening their definition with the notion of “strongly independent directors” and by exploring 
the joint relationship between the proportion of strongly independent directors, blockholders 
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capital and firm valuation. We find statistical significance for a joint and positive relationship 
between the proportion of strongly independent directors, blockholders capital and firm 
valuation. Independent directors seem to act as complement to the presence of blockholders. 
In this study we posit that this lack of previous confirming results is due to the fact that 
blockholder bring improved monitoring and improvements in firm’s value -shared benefits of 
control- but also may abuse their position and extract rents from the firm  or “private benefits 
of control” Holderness (2003), particularly if the blockholders is a controlling shareholder 
Young et al. (2008) who diverts corporate resources for private consumption as in the 
“tunneling” or transferring of funds out of the firm (Johnson et al. 2000). In this case, instead 
of the traditional “principal-agent” conflict between managers and shareholders, there is a 
“principal-principal” conflict between blockholders and minority shareholders. We finally try 
to contribute by exploring the relationship between the presence of a controlling shareholder, 
the volume of the remaining blocks and firm value. We find statistical significance of the 
presence of a controlling shareholder, mitigated by the volume of the remaining blocks. We 
also find statistical significance for the positive effect on valuation of the presence of a 
controlling coalition between the second and third shareholders, who can compensate for the 
power of the largest investor. The net effect on valuation of blockholders will depend on the 
relative power of this coalition: if the sum of blockholders capital is high enough, either the 
largest shareholder or the coalition may become a controlling one, negatively impacting 
valuation. 
5.2 Blockholders: shared and private benefits of control 
Minority shareholders face a free rider problem to afford management monitoring, an expensive 
and time consuming activity necessary to prevent managers from behaving opportunistically. 
In the case of blockholders, the size of their stake makes it worthwhile to dedicate resources to 
monitoring and getting involved with corporate decision making. If the blockholders’ stake is 
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big enough, the shareholder may be represented at the board of directors as proprietary director. 
Although stock market regulations will prevent him from trading during certain periods -i.e. 
prior to financial or corporate announcements-, the presence of a proprietary director will allow 
the investor to access management and corporate information frequently, enhancing company 
monitoring and resulting in an informed view on the company. Blockholders that are also 
proprietary directors partially compensate for the agency problems derived from the separation 
of ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990) (Chung 
et al., 2002). 
Blockholders are shareholders with a relevant stake in the firm that allows them to gather more 
information on the firm than minority shareholders (Edmans & Manso, 2011). An insider -i.e. 
a manager or director- can also accumulate a block of shares, but stock market regulation will 
prevent him from benefiting from this informational advantage, so this definition focus on 
outside blockholders that can build and benefit from an informational advantage. There is no 
empirical threshold for the stake considered a block, but based on existing regulation, most 
research considers the presence of blockholders on stakes beyond 5%.  
The size of blockholders’ stakes grants them access to the firm’s management, provides 
incentives to afford detailed and expensive analysis of corporate information and may also lead 
to decision-making power derived from the political rights of his stake -directors nomination 
and decisions adopted at the shareholders meeting-. When investors forgo the benefits of 
diversification and concentrate capital in a block they pursue both shared and private benefits 
of control (Holderness, 2003). 
Shared benefits of control derive from the fact that the higher the stake, the higher is total risk 
assumed by the investor, who will also have higher incentives for monitoring and increasing 
firm value. The increase in firm value that results from blockholders’ intervention is shared by 
all shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
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But blockholders may enjoy advantages that are not shared with minority investors -private 
benefits of control-. This would be the case of a blockholder who is a firm that enjoy synergies 
with the company where it holds the stake or, on a more negative note, if the blockholder is 
diverting corporate resources for its private consumption as in the “tunneling” or transferring 
of funds out of the firm. In this case, instead of the traditional “principal-agent” conflict between 
managers and shareholders, there is a “principal-principal” conflict between blockholders and 
minority shareholders, particularly if the blockholder is a controlling shareholder (Young et al., 
2008). Controlling shareholders are blockholders with the capacity to exert influence on the 
company management, not necessarily with a majority stake. We will refer to “controlling 
shareholders” as those blockholders with over 20% of capital, in line with (La-Porta et al., 
1999).  
The potential abuse by controlling shareholders can be performed by direct ownership or by 
control enhancing mechanisms designed to achieve high control rights without the equivalent 
proportion of ownership -cash flow rights-, such as the use of pyramids and dual class shares - 
shares with differential voting rights-. In this vein Claessens et al. (2002) found that the 
difference between ownership -cash-flow rights- and political rights is negatively related to 
corporate valuation, suggesting that entrenched shareholders may exert their influence to 
extract rents from the firm. Nguyen Thi (2018) found evidence of firm value decreasing as the 
controlling shareholder increases his stake -reflecting a positive relationship between power 
and expropriation-, until 45% of capital is reached: from this point onwards, the controlling 
shareholder has the power to expropriate minority shareholders but his incentives decrease due 
to private gains being lower. 
Therefore, the impact of blockholders presence on firm value will depend on the trade-off 
between share benefits of control, enjoyed by all shareholders, and those private benefits of 
control that are detrimental to minority investors. A bigger stake in the company increases the 
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incentives to monitor management and reduce agency problems, unless the stake becomes big 
enough to generate expropriation incentives: the blockholder may use his political rights to 
influence the firm towards the adoption of decision that are in his interest, rather than the firm’s. 
This is consistent with the results of Park et al. (2008), who find evidence of a positive market 
reaction to outside block formation after removing from their sample majority control blocks. 
In the same line, Schnatterly et al. (2008) argue that large institutional owners have an 
informational advantage in terms of access to management, economies of scale in the 
acquisition of information due to the size of their investments and expertise in processing 
financial information, improving their monitoring capabilities. 
Lastly there is evidence of a learning curve for blockholders, as shown by Kang et al. (2018): 
the experience obtained from holding multiple blocks in different companies reduces 
monitoring costs and improves the blockholders capabilities. Better monitoring is achieved 
when investors have block holdings in several companies of the same industry, when they keep 
them over long periods of time or when they have prior experience in firm intervention. 
5.3 Blockholders actions and firm value 
Blockholders gain an informational advantage through monitoring, but how do they profit from 
this advantage? Blockholders have two options: firstly, they can interact with the management 
team to influence the running of the business, exerting “voice” through an informal dialogue 
with the management team or voting at the annual shareholder meeting. Secondly, they can sell 
their shares -the “exit strategy” or “wall street walk” (Chen, Harford, & Li, 2007)-. And it is 
not even necessary that blockholders actually influence the company’s management or sell their 
shares: the mere threat of doing so may foster managers action and influence firm value (Admati 
& Pfleiderer, 2009). 
Evidence of the benefits of blockholder intervention can be found in Farber, (2005)- firms that 
have manipulated their financial statements have less blockholders- and in Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, 
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& Thomas (2008) - success in limiting CEO compensation and removing poor performing 
CEOs.  
Regarding intervention, blockholders face a free-rider problem: actively intervening a firm is 
costly– promoting the removal of an underperforming CEO, opposing a value destroying M&A 
transaction, advising the management team, etc.- and all shareholders will benefit from it in 
spite of the intervening blockholder assuming most of the costs. As discussed, as blockholders 
increase the size of their participation in the company, they assume more risk relative to the 
size of their portfolio and increase their incentives to intervene and improve the management 
of the company. Also, as the size of the block increases, it becomes harder to sell without 
affecting the price, and this liquidity problem leads to higher intervention as blockholders may 
have to keep their investment for longer periods (Park et al., 2008). 
In contrast with intervention, the smaller the size of the block, the easier becomes exit, since it 
is possible to sell the block without affecting the price. This is the case when there are a large 
number of blockholders: both its lower size and the increased difficulty to implement a 
coordinated intervention favor the exit strategy (Edmans & Manso, 2011). The size of 
blockholders’ investment provide them with incentives to monitor and gather valuable 
information, so blockholders trades contain private information that improves the stock price 
informativeness (Edmans, 2014). Trading by blockholders will be more effective as the 
blockholder invest more of his own money. As shown by Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015), the 
threat of exit loses credibility in the case of money managers that compete for investor capital 
as fiduciary investors, managing money for others and facing short term incentives. On the 
contrary, as the fund self-invests in the company, long term incentives arise and threat of exit 
becomes an effective mechanism. 
The threat of exit is an incentive for managers to perform, since a disappointed blockholder 
selling its stake might cause a drop in the stock price, negatively impacting on the top 
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management compensation that is linked to the stock price. But exit, and not only the threat of 
it, may end up being the rational response by blockholders that are disappointed with firm 
performance and do not succeed in persuading the management team to change its course of 
action or do not gather enough votes at shareholders meetings. Effective exit, although a radical 
outcome, is not a rare mechanism: in a corporate governance survey conducted by McCahery, 
Sautner, & Starks (2016) among institutional investors, 49% stated that dissatisfaction with 
performance had led them to exit a firm.  
As previously referred, extant literature refers to large shareholders as those with at least 10% 
of capital and to controlling shareholders as those with over 20% of capital (La-Porta et al., 
1999). But it does not take neither a large blockholder nor a controlling blockholder to gain 
access to management and to be able to analyze the firm in detail, gaining a valuable private 
information. Blockholders have the incentive and resources to perform effective monitoring 
and influence the firm’s management, opposing managers actions that are not aligned with 
shareholders’ interest -i.e. a dilutive acquisition- and fostering decisions that lead to value 
creation -i.e. substitution of underperforming CEOs-. Since blockholders will either intervene 
or sell their shares if managers underperform, their presence in the capital is a positive signal 
for other investors. We therefore formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms where blockholders’ ownership is high achieve higher valuations. 
Blockholders have incentives to monitor managers, to provide advice, prevent value-destroying 
acquisitions from being executed or even remove underperforming CEOs. This intervention in 
the firm, together with the credible threat of selling their shares if underperforming managers 
do not correct their course of action, mitigate the potential conflict of interest between managers 
and owners. But we have also discussed that the presence of shareholders with a relevant stake 
increase the probability of a controlling shareholder abusing his power in detriment to the rest 
of minority shareholder. In addition to the traditional “principal-agent” conflict between 
145 
 
managers and shareholders, a new agency problem arises in the presence of a controlling 
shareholder: the controlling shareholder may try to extract rents from minority shareholders -a 
“principal-principal” conflict (Young et al., 2008)-. Alternatively to the presence of a 
controlling shareholders, a group of them could form a coalition Bennedsen & Wolfenzon 
(2000) or even cooperate to extract rents from the firm (Attig et al., 2013; Faccio et al., 2001). 
This abuse can be prevented through corporate governance mechanisms such as the control 
exerted by independent directors, but as ownership concentration increases, the cost of these 
mechanisms is increasingly borne by the controlling shareholder, reducing his incentives to 
implement them (Barroso, Burkert, Dávila, & Oyon, 2016). But if the company has a second 
large shareholder who acts as “monitor of controlling shareholders”, both of them will control 
each other and together will control the management team (Pagano & Roell, 1998). If the 
company has a controlling shareholder whose power is not contested by a second large 
shareholder, blockholders will not be able to influence the firm and the monitoring benefits 
associated to their presence will be offset but the controlling shareholder. Based on that, we 
propose the following: 
 Hypothesis 2: Firms where blockholders ownership is high but have a controlling shareholder 
achieve lower valuations than those without a controlling shareholder. 
Firms with several large investors may benefit from their increased monitoring, but if the 
dispersion of ownership concentration across multiple large shareholders is high, corporate 
valuation may suffer (Laeven & Levine, 2008).  
The more even is the distribution of voting rights, the less likely is the firm to suffer from 
agency problems Attig et al. (2013) and the lower the cost of equity capital will be Attig, 
Guedhami, & Mishra (2008), probably because the presence of multiple blockholders with 
comparable voting power improves the firm's information quality and prevents abuse by the 
largest shareholder. Maury and Pajuste (2005) also provides evidence for the relevance of the 
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contestability of the largest shareholder, since controlling shareholders tend to extract rents 
from the firm unless they are monitored by another large blockholder (Claessens et al., 2002). 
The extreme case of ownership dispersion would be that of a single blockholder in the capital 
structure that is also a controlling shareholder. The controlling shareholder will effectively 
control management La-Porta et al. (1998), therefore mitigating the conflict between agents 
and principals. But in the absence of any blockholder with a stake big enough to challenge his 
control, the controlling shareholder may try obtain private benefits of control by extracting rents 
from minority shareholders -a “principal-principal” conflict (Peng & Jiang, 2010b; Young et 
al., 2008) -.  
The presence of multiple blockholders is an effective mechanism for investor protection, since 
their joined efforts improve management monitoring and prevent rent extraction from the 
controlling shareholder, therefore mitigating both the principal-agent and principal-principal 
problems. More than 35 percent of European firms Laeven & Levine (2008), have not one, but 
multiple large shareholders -blockholders with at least 10% of capital-. The presence of 
multiple large blockholders increases the contestability of the largest shareholder’s control and 
investors may perceive it as an effective monitoring mechanism, since blockholders will try to 
influence the company before affording the costs of exiting -avoiding potential losses 
associated to a declining selling price, transaction and tax expenses, portfolio adjustments, etc.-
. The presence of several blockholders may challenge the power of the largest blockholder and 
prevent rent extraction from the firm. Therefore we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms where blockholders ownership is high and the relative power of the main 
shareholder is low achieve higher valuations than those where the relative power of the main 
shareholder is high. 
Additionally, to the monitoring that blockholders conduct, the board of directors exerts direct 
monitoring on management, who is accountable to the board on behalf of all shareholders of 
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the company. Convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance has 
underpinned codes of corporate governance diffusion (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). 
Codes of good corporate governance include widely shared recommendations across countries 
and firms adopt them to gain legitimation Tolbert & Zucker (1983) in the global capital markets. 
A corporate governance recommendation widely implemented in companies all over the world 
is to include a high proportion of independent directors in the board (Cumming et al., 2017).  
Although theoretically independent directors, given the absence of ties with the management 
team, are well positioned to protect all minority investors, the definition of independence is 
challenging, as it varies depending of the code of corporate governance of each country. While 
in the US independence is presumed for any director who is not an executive or shareholder 
with over 10% of capital, in Europe corporate governance codes include detailed and different 
characterizations of independence, sharing family ties and former employment relationships as 
disqualifying features for independence (Aguilera, 2005). Public criticism has been constant 
about the lack of genuinely independent director at public companies and several studies have 
failed to prove a positive relationship between the presence of independent directors and firm 
performance (Tung, 2011).  
Setting up a minimum proportion of independent directors may be a corporate governance 
mechanism aimed at gaining legitimacy, but we wonder to which extent it responds to genuine 
will to protect shareholders or to what Meyer and Rowan (1977) called “myth and ceremony”. 
A more stringent definition or “strong independence” can be obtained after making two 
adjustments to formal classifications of “independent” directors. Firstly, the independent 
director has necessarily joined the board prior to the CEO tenure, following the results of Coles 
et al. (2014), who found that board monitoring decreases with the fraction of the board 
comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. And secondly, the independent 
director does not serve in more than two additional boards. Although multiple directorships 
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were initially considered a certification of a director’s abilities Fama & Jensen (1983b), 
directors with multiple appointments have less time available to effectively control 
management, as shown by (Cashman et al., 2012). Actually CEOs have been found to prefer 
“independent” directors with multiple board directorships Shivdasani & Yermack (1999) and 
firms with a majority of outside directors serving in multiple boards have worse performance 
and are less likely to fire the CEO (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). 
As the total capital accumulated by blockholders increases, it becomes more likely to find a 
controlling shareholder or several shareholders able to form a coalition acting in detriment of 
minority investors. In this context of high capital held by blockholders, a high proportion of 
strongly independent directors, given their lack of ties with the management team, may be 
capable of preventing abuse by relevant shareholders and effectively monitoring the firm 
(Grosman, Aguilera, & Wright, 2018). We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms with a high proportion of strongly independent directors and high 
proportion of blockholders’ capital achieve higher valuations. 
As a summary of the model, Figure 3 represent the hypotheses proposed, considering the direct 
effect of blockhlders’ capital on firm value, and the moderating effects of controlling 
shareholders, the presence of a controlling coalition and a high proportion of strongly 
independent directors. 
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Figure 3: Model proposed 
 
5.4 Data 
Since we are testing the relationship between the presence of blockholders and corporate 
valuation, it is essential that the firms analyzed reach a valuation in the market as efficient as 
possible. In this vein we examine the market capitalization of companies that are members of 
the main stock market indexes. The stocks of these companies are actively traded by 
institutional investors and since liquidity increases the information content of market prices 
Fang et al. (2009), the valuation of companies belonging to the main indexes will efficiently 
incorporate public information regarding the company. 
Data were obtained from both the annual reports of each company and the ORBIS database. 
We have analyzed 174 firms in seven countries–Spain, France, Belgium, UK, Sweden, Finland 
and Denmark-, so that different ownership structures are included. We have analyzed 
companies belonging to the stock market indexes IBEX35 (Spain), CAC40 (France), BEL20 
(Belgium), FTSE100 (UK), OMX30 (Sweden), OMXH25 (Finland) and OMXC20 (Denmark) 
during the last year for which data is available (2017). We exclude foreign companies listed in 
the stock indexes of these countries, so that we can control for the local ownership structure, as 
well as companies in the banking and insurance sectors -given their special regulation- and 
companies without a track record as quoted companies long enough. We have used 10 years 
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cut off for this minimum track record in the stock market to make sure that valuations 
incorporate the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, but the results are robust for a 5-
years cut off.  
Dependent variable: Firm valuation 
Measuring the impact of blockholders monitoring can be achieved through different metrics 
such as Tobin’s Q (Coles et al., 2008; Lins, 2003; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003; Singh et al., 
2018), return on assets Cornett et al. (2007) and stock price returns (Baek et al., 2004; Field & 
Lowry, 2009; Gompers et al., 2003). We will use Tobin’s Q to allow for a combined measure 
of market perception -market capitalization- and accounting valuation -book value of assets-. 
Independent variable: Blockholders capital 
We have researched the impact of blockholders in the firm’s capital by examining the total 
share of capital held by this kind of investors. There is no empirical threshold for the stake 
considered a block, but since disclosure regulation provides information on stakes beyond 5%, 
this is the threshold commonly used in the literature (Acero & Alcalde, 2014; Dai, Dharwadkar, 
Si, & Zhang, 2017; Dasgupta & Piacentino, 2015; Edmans & Holderness, 2017; Holderness, 
2003; Nguyen Thi, 2018). We construct our independent variable as the sum of all stakes equal 
to or higher than 5%. 
Moderating variables 
Firstly, we measure the impact of a controlling shareholder on the effectiveness of blockholders 
as monitors. We identify controlling shareholders as those holding at least 20% of capital, in 
line with La-Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio & Lang (2002). Our hypothesis is that the presence 
of a controlling shareholder is a deterrent for other investors, unless there is other relevant 
shareholder and both monitor each other (Pagano & Roell, 1998). We refer to this second kind 
of relevant shareholder as “monitors of controlling shareholders”. Following the criteria set up 
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in La-Porta et al. (1999), we consider 10% as sufficient for monitoring the controlling 
shareholder. We have gathered data for the identification of “controlling shareholders” (+20%) 
and “monitors of controlling shareholders” (+10%) from the filings that all shareholders with 
more than 5% of a listed company must disclose. We have also computed the variable 
“majority” to measure the impact of a majority investor with over 50% of capital on the 
effectiveness of blockholders monitoring. 
The model also tests a second moderating effect:  the presence of a “controlling coalition” that 
controls the power of the largest shareholder, so that both monitor each other (Pagano & Roell, 
1998). Following the criteria set up in Attig et al. (2013), we measure the relative weight of a 
coalition formed by the second and third largest shareholders versus the largest shareholder, 
computed with their respective voting rights:  
!"#$%"&&'#(	*"+&'$'"#,-	./'(ℎ$ = 232 + 233231 	
 Where VR2 and VR3 are the voting rights of the second and third shareholders and VR1 are 
the voting rights of the largest shareholder. 
Lastly, and regarding independent directors, we have computed the average percentage of 
strongly independent directors in our sample, which equals 14%. We use a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the percentage of true independent directors is higher than this average value. 
To arrive at the definition of “strong independence”, we have started from the companies’ 
statement of independence about their directors but have investigated further. We define as 
“strongly independent directors” as those who meet two criteria: firstly, they are not members 
of two additional board of directors and therefore have the necessary time availability to 
effectively control management, in line with the findings of Cashman et al. (2012). Secondly, 
they have joined the board prior to the CEO tenure, following the results of Coles et al. (2014), 
who found that board monitoring decreases with the fraction of the board comprised of directors 
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appointed after the CEO assumed office. We have reviewed the curricula of 1.977 directors to 
estimate both dedication and appointment date of each director. 
Control variables 
The analysis of corporate valuation must take into account the liquidity of the shares -investors 
prefer liquid shares that can be bought and sold with less impact on prices (Bushee et al., 2014; 
Chung & Zhang, 2011; Kim et al., 2011)-. We also include leverage, measured as total 
liabilities over shareholder’s equity, and beta, calculated over a five-years period, to proxy for 
various dimensions of risk -firms with higher betas and highly leveraged are perceived as 
riskier- (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Chung & Zhang, 2011; Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Hadani et al., 
2011; Miletkov et al., 2014)-. We control for firms’ growth opportunities by the firm 
investments measured by capital expenditure over assets (Aggarwal et al., 2011, 2009; Attig et 
al., 2013; Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; Jafarinejad et al., 2015). Since cash-rich firms reach 
higher valuations, we also compute cash holdings to total assets (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ferreira 
& Matos, 2008; Kim et al., 2017). Lastly, we control for heterogeneity between the two largest 
shareholders of the firm. Families, individuals or institutions investing their own money are 
beneficiary shareholders and have strong incentives to get involved in the firm management, 
while fiduciary shareholders that invest other people’s money – banks, corporations, the State, 
mutual and pension funds- may engage with management to a lesser extent (Connelly, Tihanyi, 
Certo, & Hitt, 2010). Heterogeneity makes it more difficult to cooperate among investors, so 
when the two largest shareholders belong to different categories, firm valuation is negatively 
impacted (Laeven & Levine, 2008). We use a dummy variable that equals 1 if the first and 
second largest shareholders are of different nature. 
5.5 Results  
Table 18 presents the main descriptive statistics of the variables. As it can be observed, the 
average block capital is over 36%, controlling shareholders -without another shareholder able 
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to "monitor" them- are present in 27% of firms, only 15% of firms have a majority shareholder 
and the coalition formed by the second and third investors almost equals the largest shareholder 
in terms of voting rights. 
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Table 18: Descriptive statistics 
 
TobinQ: (market cap+debt)/assets, Blocks: aggregated capital of all investors holding at least 5%, Leverage: total 
liabilities/shareholders equity, Growth potent: Capex/assets, Share Liquidity: annual traded shares/outstanding 
shares, Beta: 5 years beta factor, Cash over assets: liquid assets/total assets, Heterogenous investors: dummy=1 
if 1st and 2nd largest shareholders are of different nature, Controlling 20%: largest shareholder controls at least 
20% of voting rights and no other investor reach 10%, Largest shareholder contested: relative weight of a 
coalition formed by the second and third largest shareholders versus the largest shareholder, computed with their 
respective voting rights: (VR2+VR3) /VR1, Controlling 50%: largest shareholder controls at least 50% of voting 
rights High true independent: proportion of independent directors that have joined the board prior to the CEO 
tenure and have no more than 2 outside boards is over the mean (14%) 
 
Table 19 shows correlation among the variables. The presence of a controlling shareholder with 
at least 20% is correlated with the controlling coalition’s weight, since that the later is the sum 
of the second and third shareholders votes divided by the largest shareholder. Analogous 
relations explain correlations between “controlling coalition” and “controlling 50%” and 
“controlling 20%”. We have calculated the variance inflation factors and multicollinearity does 
not significantly affect coefficient estimation -maximum individual VIF is 3.92 and average 
VIF is 1.74-  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tobin Q 174 205.1138 153.2111 54.68909 958.1732
Blocks 174 36.08345 21.80556 0 92.76
Leverage 174 281.6196 1491.062 -599.6629 19675.59
Growth potent. 174 5.273557 6.30365 -11.68365 40.55298
Share liquidity 174 81.5927 62.76956 11.05431 642.2369
Beta 174 0.889975 0.2208603 0.458337 1.983539
Cash over assets 174 10.08282 11.06053 0.01167 89.49967
Heterogenous investors 174 0.5172414 0.5011448 0 1
Controlling 20% 174 0.2701149 0.4453004 0 1
Largest shareholder contested 174 0.9867751 0.5662719 0.0466667 2
Controlling 50% 174 0.1551724 0.3631139 0 1
High true independent 174 0.4022989 0.4917768 0 1
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Table 19: Correlation matrix 
 
Correlation coefficients, * denotes significance at the 5% level 
Tobin Q Blocks Leverage
Growth 
potent.
Share 
liquidity Beta
Cash over 
assets
Heterogenous 
investors
Controlling 
20%
Controlling 
coalition
Controlling 
50%
Strongly 
independent
Tobin Q 1
Blocks 0,1278 1
Leverage -0,0789 -0,0226 1
Growth potent. 0.2472* -0,0148 -0,0709 1
Share liquidity -0.1685* -0,1017 -0,0324 -0,0257 1
Beta -0,0838 0,0832 0,0171 -0,0267 0.1927* 1
Cash over assets 0.3550* 0,0598 -0,0243 -0,1134 0,0991 0.1502* 1
Heterogenous investors -0.1549* 0.2071* -0,0973 -0,0436 0,0246 0,0843 0,075 1
Controlling 20% 0,0267 0.4938* -0,0641 0,0504 -0,0798 -0,027 0,0229 0.2251* 1
Controlling coalition -0,0284 -0.4951* 0,0785 -0,0401 0,1083 0,0082 -0,0239 -0.2507* -0.8275* 1
Controlling 50% 0,1484 0.5605* -0,0546 0,0453 -0.2138* -0,09 0,0772 0,1282 0.7045* -0.6409* 1
Strongly independent -0,0526 -0,0539 0,1063 0,0395 -0,032 0.2658* -0,0491 -0,0283 -0,0504 0,1116 -0,125 1
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Table 20 shows the prevalence of blockholders across countries in the sample. Although the 
total capital accumulated by blockholders is lower in UK -due to the scarcity of controlling 
shareholders-, they represent a significant share of total capital across all countries in the 
sample: 26% in the UK and between 35% (France) and 48% (Spain) in the rest of countries. 
This reflects the fact of a higher ownership concentration in civil law countries: the lower 
investor protection is, the more investors protect themselves accumulating significant stakes. 
While the largest shareholder controls 12% of capital in the UK, this percentage is between 
22% (France) and 36% (Denmark) in civil law countries.  
Table 20: Blockholders and Controlling shareholders by country 
 
Blockholders capital: average aggregated capital of all stakes greater than 5%, Number of blockholders: average 
number of shareholders with over 5% of capital, % Firms with controlling shareholder: percentage of firms 
with an investor holding over 20% of capital and no other investor reaching 10%, % Firms with majority 
shareholder: percentage of firms where an investor holds over 50% of capital 
 
While the average firm in the UK has 3 blockholders holding 8% of capital each, in Denmark 
that average firm has 2.2 blockholders with 20% of capital each. While in the UK only 12% of 
companies have a controlling shareholder, this percentage increases to between 40% (France) 
and 75% (Belgium) in the rest of the sample. The most significant figure about ownership 
concentration may be the percentage of firms with a majority shareholder: 2% in the UK and 
between 17% (France) and 43% (Denmark) in the rest of the sampled countries. 
UK Spain France Belgium Finland Sweden Denmark
Blockholders capital 26% 48% 35% 43% 44% 38% 45%
Number of blockholders 3.04 3.38 2.37 2.25 2.63 2.38 2.21
Average block 8% 14% 15% 19% 17% 16% 20%
Average stake of largest shareholder 12% 29% 22% 34% 27% 27% 36%
Average stake of 2nd largest shareholder 7% 9% 8% 7% 11% 8% 6%
Average stake of 3rd largest shareholder 5% 6% 6% 4% 7% 5% 4%
% Firms with controlling shareholder 12% 57% 40% 75% 47% 67% 50%
% Firms with majority  shareholder 2% 29% 17% 25% 21% 10% 43%
Number of firms 174 57 21 30 12 19 21 14
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According to the model proposed, in Table 21 it is tested the impact of the presence of 
blockholders on firm valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q. We  have used a Huber estimator -
robust standard errors- in models #1 and #2 so that it is not required that the errors follow a 
normal distribution, nor is it required that they be identically distributed from one observation 
to the next, therefore our estimation is robust to heteroskedasticity of the errors. Models #3 to 
#6 use country clusters, which are a generalization of the robust standard errors calculation that 
relaxes the assumption of independence of the errors and replaces it with the assumption of 
independence between clusters. Thus the errors are allowed to be correlated within clusters. We 
compare the results of six models fitted with OLS. While the first model includes only control 
variables (model#1), the second model add as independent variable the aggregated capital of 
all blockholders (model #2). The third and fourth models incorporate the presence of a 
controlling shareholder with over 20% of capital and no other shareholder with at least 10% of 
voting rights that would allow to act as “monitors of the controlling shareholders”, (model #3) 
and the presence of a majority shareholder, with over 50% of capital (model #4). The fifth 
model considers the power of the collation formed by the second and third largest shareholders 
versus the largest shareholder (model #5) and the sixth and last model tests the impact on 
valuation of the joint presence of blockholders and a high proportion of “strongly independent 
directors” -among the reported as independent, those who can devote enough time to the board 
and have been appointed before the CEO tenure-. 
The share of capital owned by blockholders is not significant until we incorporate the 
moderating variable “controlling coalition”. The relative power of a collation formed by the 
second and third largest shareholders is significant at the 5% and has a positive impact on firm 
valuation (coefficient +72.761), although its net impact will be lower depending on the sum of 
blocks capital (coefficient -1.395). This is a sensible result since at the sum of blocks capital 
increases, it becomes more likely to have a controlling shareholder or controlling coalition. 
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The presence of a controlling shareholder with over 20% of capital, not compensated with the 
presence of another shareholder with at least 10% of capital, is negative for firm’s value 
(coefficient of -113.15), although the presence of a high proportion of blockholders moderates 
this negative impact (coefficient of +1.1915). As more blockholders are added, even if none of 
them reach 10%, their joint presence is a deterrent for abuse by the controlling shareholder. 
This situation is more pronounced in the case of a majority shareholder with over 50% of 
capital: although the negative impact on valuation of a majority is very high (coefficient -
344.02), the joint presence of blockholders and majority has a very positive impact (coefficient 
of 5.488). Once a firm has a majority shareholder, it will be very rare to have a blockholder 
different from the majority investor. But should the firm have a second blockholder, its presence 
will be valued very positively: there is a blockholder that trust the majority shareholder. 
It is very interesting that the variable high percent of strongly independent directors is not 
significant by itself, but the joint effect of high percent of strongly independent directors and 
blockholders is significant at the 5% level and positively associated with firm valuation 
(coefficient +1.481).  
Among control variables, leverage is significant at the 5% level -1% when blocks are considered-
, and its coefficient shows that highly leveraged firms are perceived as riskier, impacting their 
valuation. Growth potential is significant at the 1% level -10% when interactions are considered-
, and the positive sign of its coefficient signals the premium that investors are ready to pay for 
firms with high investment projects that will foster growth. Share liquidity does not show an 
intuitive sign, probably because of its high correlation with firm beta, which makes its 
individual point estimates not always reliable. Cash holdings to total assets is significant at the 
1% level -5% when accounting for a controlling shareholder- and its positive coefficient reflects 
the fact that cash-rich firms reach higher valuations. Lastly, we control for heterogeneity 
between the two largest shareholders of the firm and find a negative impact on valuation, 
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reflecting the difficulty to cooperate between heterogenous investors, although the level of 
significance varies between 1% and 10% depending on the model. 
Table 21: Blockholders and firm valuation 
 
 
 5.6 Discussion 
The extant literature is not conclusive on the contribution to firm valuation of neither 
blockholders nor of independent directors. Reasons for this may be found in the following 
aspects: blockholders interact with controlling shareholders and shareholders coalitions Attig 
et al. (2013); Bennedsen & Wolfenzon (2000); Faccio et al. (2001); some directors classified 
(1) Controls (2) Blocks
(3) Controling 20% 
moderating blocks
(4) Controling 50% 
moderating blocks
(5) Largest shar. 
contested 
moderating blocks
(6) High true 
independent 
moderating blocks
Leverage -0.007** -0.007*** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
0 0 0 0 0 0
Growth potential 6.717*** 6.726*** 6.699* 6.908* 6.556* 6.760*  
(2.5) (2.48) (3.09) (3.24) (3.08) (3.03)
Share liquidity -0.451*** -0.408*** -0.419** -0.410** -0.427** -0.409** 
(0.14) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13)
Beta -62.306 -70.337 -60.379** -67.826** -63.990** -84.005***
(50.55) (48.33) (18.43) (18.69) (19.57) (21.97)
Cash over assets 5.944*** 5.860*** 5.697** 5.657*** 5.678*** 5.890***
(1.53) (1.61) (1.48) (1.5) (1.43) (1.45)
Heterogenous investors -51.875** -60.217*** -55.550* -52.499* -56.429** -61.885*  
(20.89) (22.85) (23.03) (21.99) (22.6) (25.56)
Blocks 0.964 0.763 0.673 2.555** 0.503
(0.58) (0.96) (0.96) (0.89) (0.71)
Controlling 20% -113.150**
(44.59)
Controlling 20%  # Blocks 1.915***
(0.44)
Largest contested 72.761*
(33.15)
Largest contested # Blocks -1.395***
(0.37)
Controlling 50% -344.020**
(117.33)
Controlling 50%  # Blocks 5.488***
(1.47)
High true independent -54.59
(30.56)
High true independent # Blocks 1.481** 
(0.55)
Constant 230.851*** 204.817*** 206.229*** 208.718*** 113.482* 235.368***
(47.23) (50.52) (28.92) (32.79) (49.02) (29.21)
R-squared 0.2911 0.3087 0.3192 0.3254 0.3213 0.318
Number of obs. 174 174 174 174 174 174
Standard errors in parentheses using robust standard errors to adjust for heteroskedasticity (columns 1-2) and country clusters (columns 3-6)
The symbols *, **, *** denotate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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as independent may hold informal connections with the firm and even when they do not, 
corporate governance codes provide different characterizations of independence across 
countries (Aguilera, 2005). We construct a more stringent definition or “strong independence”, 
built after the findings of Coles et al. (2014) -monitoring decreases with the fraction of the 
board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office- and Cashman et al. 
(2012) -directors with multiple appointments have less time available to effectively control 
management-. A high value for “blockholders” may be the consequence of one of them being 
a large shareholder or the sum of many smaller blockholders, so it does not directly translate 
into higher valuation -as hypothesis #1 suggested-. A large number of small blockholders 
facilitates disciplining managers through trading. While one single blockholder will execute 
her trades progressively to avoid disclosing private information, a large number of small 
blockholders  will trade competitively and incorporate more information into the price of the 
shares: if managers perform, they will quickly move the price up and if managers underperform 
or extract rents from the firm they will sell the shares, moving the price down and punishing 
managers compensation, therefore trading by blockholders provides an incentive for managers 
to create value for all shareholders. There is a trade-off between intervention and trading: while 
a small number of blocks favors intervention, a large number of blocks favors trading (Edmans 
& Manso, 2011). While trading will be likely used by passive investors, intervention will be 
associated with active blockholders.  
But a high value for “blockholders” will translate into higher valuation -as hypothesis #1 
suggested- when jointly considered with the percentage of strongly independent directors  
(hypothesis #4), capable of preventing abuse by large shareholders. This complementarity 
between blockholders and independent directors is coherent with Edmans & Holderness (2017), 
who argue that blockholders may be complements to internal governance. 
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A high proportion of blockholders capital also causes higher valuation when we factor in the 
moderating variable “controlling coalition” (hypothesis #3). This result is in line with the 
findings of Konijn, Kräussl, & Lucas (2011), who showed a negative relationship between firm 
value and blockholders dispersion. Our result can also be interpreted arguing that a high value 
for “blockholders” may be the consequence of a very large first shareholder, in which case the 
high value of blockholders will only translate into higher valuation if a coalition of the second 
and third shareholders, able to prevent abuse from the largest, is in place. Should the largest 
investor be a “controlling shareholder”, it will negatively impact valuation (hypothesis #2) in 
line with the results of Nguyen Thi (2018), although the presence of a high proportion of 
blockholders moderates this negative impact. 
5.7 Conclusion 
We have investigated why, in spite of the widespread presence of blockholders, who have the 
incentive and resources to perform effective monitoring and influence the firm’s management, 
opposing managers actions that not aligned with shareholders’ interest and fostering decisions 
that lead to value creation, there is little empirical evidence about their relationship with firm 
performance (Cremers & Nair, 2005; Faccio et al., 2001; Farber, 2005; Holderness, 2003; 
Holderness & Sheehan, 1985; Lins, 2003; Lins & Warnock, 2004). 
Since independent directors are also a widespread mechanism to judge manager’s performance 
and protect shareholders Fama (1980); Hillman et al. (2000); Mizruchi (2004); Pearce & Zahra 
(1989); Weisbach (1988), we have explored the interaction of both mechanisms; blockholders 
and independent director. We have first adjusted the definition of independence in two ways. 
Firstly, the independent director has necessarily joined the board prior to the CEO tenure, 
following the results of Coles et al. (2014), who found that board monitoring decreases with 
the fraction of the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. And 
secondly, the independent director does not serve in more than two additional boards, since 
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directors with multiple appointments have less time available to effectively control 
management, as shown by Cashman et al. (2012). We find statistical significance for a joint 
and positive relationship between the proportion of strongly independent directors, 
blockholders capital and firm valuation. Independent directors seem to act as complement to 
the presence of blockholders. 
Secondly, as the ownership stake of the investor increases, he has a greater incentive to increase 
firm value Holderness (2003), so total capital accumulated by blockholders should have a 
positive impact on valuation. But if one of those blockholders is a controlling shareholder, he 
will negatively impact valuation. We find statistical significance of the presence of a controlling 
shareholder, mitigated by the volume of the remaining blocks.  
Lastly, we have found statistical significance of the positive effect on valuation of the presence 
of a controlling coalition between the second and third shareholders, who can compensate for 
the power of the largest investor. The net effect on valuation of blockholders will depend on 
the relative power of this coalition: if the sum of blockholders capital is high enough, either the 
largest shareholder or the coalition may become a controlling one, negatively impacting 
valuation. 
Our research suffers from the limitation of analyzing only European firms. Future research 
could develop a worldwide definition of independence and re-classify directors according to 
this tailor-made definition. This paper has explored different civil law areas: France, Spain and 
Belgium representing the French origin; and Finland, Denmark and Sweden representing the 
Scandinavian origin. It would be useful to add the geographical scope by considering civil law 
countries of German origin, such as Switzerland, Germany or Japan. Additionally, the analysis 
could be enriched by including common law countries outside Europe, such as the US, Australia 
or India.  
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Both firms and stock market supervisors, could adopt a more stringent definition of 
independence, including a limit on the number of external boards and independent director not 
being removed from their positions, facilitating not only the effective exercise of their duties in 
a strongly independent way, but its consolidation as the CEO is renewed. A common definition 
of controlling shareholder could also be useful in terms of measuring investor protection. 
And lastly, investors should monitor the presence of blockholders in the companies where they 
plan to invest: with the discussed caveats regarding controlling shareholders and coalitions, a 
significant share of capital in the hands of blockholders may signal that investor protection is 
in place. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions 
6.1 Summary 
Different definitions have been proposed for governance, such as “determination of the broad 
uses to which organizational resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among 
the myriad participants in organizations” Daily et al. (2003):371), “the structure of rights and 
responsibilities among the parties with a stake in the firm” Aoki (2000), “a set of mechanisms 
through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders” La-
Porta et al. (2000b) or “ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves 
of getting a return on their investment" (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Since the objective of this 
research is to explain how corporate governance mechanisms across different institutional 
frameworks contribute to the protection of shareholders and their wealth in the firm’s equity, 
we have taken into account previous definitions and adopted the definition of corporate 
governance as “the set of mechanisms that are at reach of shareholders and can be used to 
protect their wealth”. 
Three theories are useful to approach corporate governance study: Agency Theory, Resource 
Dependence and Stewardship Theory. The Agency Theory played a seminal role in the 
development of corporate governance literature. As a mainly economic perspective, it focuses 
on the monitoring role of directors, assuming the need to control managers given the 
misalignment between shareholders and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b). The Resource Dependence model offers a much more eclectic view for the role of a 
member of the board of directors. While under Agency Theory the role of directors is 
monitoring, for Resource Dependence the board of directors, rather than an instrument of 
control, is an instrument of contribution to the firms’ operations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
(Singh et al., 1986) (Gales & Kesner, 1994). All directors are valuable as long as they contribute 
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to obtain resources and reduce environmental uncertainties. Executive directors’ main role is 
not to control managers, but to provide their privileged view on both the firm and the sector in 
which it operates. A board composition with a majority of external board directors will be 
appropriate to provide the environmental linkages advocated by this theory. The Resource 
Dependence model contributes to the analysis of board of directors by identifying additional 
roles for outside directors but does not address the main problem of corporate governance: the 
protection of the minority shareholder.  
The Stewardship Theory Donaldson (1990); Donaldson & Davis (1991) proposes an opposite 
view for managers than the Agency Theory does. Enriched by Psychology and Sociology, this 
theory relies not only on economic arguments for manager’s incentives converging with those 
of the corporation–prestige and future employment- but on the very nature of man: executives 
are good stewards of corporate assets with a natural motivation to do a good job. Without the 
focus on monitoring, no need for a majority of outside directors is derived from stewardship 
theory, that actually values the presence of inside director in the board, who far from 
compromising the board’s effectiveness, add significant experience, facilitates contrasting of 
points of view with management and also provides extra motivation for the executives of the 
company. The Stewardship Theory contributes with an alternative model of man, but fails to 
offer an explanation for the abundant frauds and corporate scandals of the last decades.  
Along with these theories related with governance and considering that a mayor objective of 
this research is to evaluate corporate governance mechanisms across different institutional 
spheres, we have also incorporated the Institutional Theory. The Institutional Theory Tolbert 
& Zucker (1983); Zucker (1987) has a dominant sociological and political perspective, and  
emphasizes that organizations and nations are more than a means to produce goods and 
services—they are also social and cultural systems (Judge et al., 2008). As a consequence, 
organizations and their managers not only compete for resources but also seek for legitimacy. 
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Therefore, it is necessary to study the forces within the institutional environment that guide or 
constrain legitimacy seeking. These constraints and forces converge to create isomorphism, or 
similarity of structure within institutional environments, as described by (Dimaggio & Powell, 
1983). In the case of corporate governance, companies have adopted voluntary 
recommendations regarding the functioning of their shareholder meetings and board of 
directors looking for legitimacy, but we wonder to which extent these measures respond to 
genuine will to protect shareholders or to what Meyer & Rowan (1977) called “myth and 
ceremony”.  
This work has leveraged on Agency Theory to study both the principal-agent conflict between 
shareholders and managers and the principal-principal conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders. The Agency Theory is in our view the most powerful theory to approach 
corporate governance analysis, and we have integrated in our theoretical model the institutional 
theory as a complementary external perspective that takes into account the legal, social and 
cultural factors that have an impact on the firm. It will not be possible to define the set of 
mechanisms that are optimal from a corporate governance point of view without taking into 
account the institutional environment of the firm (Aguilera, Judge, & Terjesen, 2018).  
We have first studied capital market transactions where corporate governance is particularly 
relevant given the information asymmetries associated to them: capital increases and initial 
public offerings. In these transactions, firms face an additional degree of difficulty to attract 
foreign capital, due to the home bias effect. Both the enhanced information asymmetries and 
the home bias effect make these transactions ideal to analyze the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. In a similar way that exposure to foreign investment has been found connected to 
codes diffusion at the country level Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), we have found 
evidence of a positive relationship between the degree of code adoption at the firm level and 
the volume of foreign funds attracted by the firm. We have identified a reduced set of corporate 
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governance recommendations that foster foreign investors to overcome these obstacles and 
provide financing to Spanish firms conducting capital increases and IPOs. Out of the 64 
recommendations contained in the Spanish Good Governance Code, 10 recommendations 
dealing with the board of directors, bylaws and general shareholder meeting; and 6 
recommendations dealing with the committees of the board are found to be relevant and positive 
for attracting foreign capital. When a controlling shareholder is present at the firm, another 7 
recommendations become relevant and positive to attract foreign capital. Foreign directors 
contribute to reduce information asymmetries associated with cultural and linguistic 
differences, are more independent from the firm than local investors, use their superior 
monitoring skills to control management, and provide higher advisory capabilities that can 
contribute to increase the level of confidence of foreign investors. We have found that the 
presence of a high proportion of foreign directors is a strong incentive for foreign investors to 
participate in capital market transactions and firms use as alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms a high proportion of foreign directors and compliance with Committees 
recommendations  
Our second line of research has investigated why, in spite of the abundant literature focusing 
on the contribution of outside directors, less biased and theoretically better prepared to judge 
manager’s performance and protect shareholders Fama (1980); Hillman et al. (2000); Mizruchi, 
(2004); Pearce & Zahra (1989); Weisbach (1988), there are no conclusive results on their 
contribution (Chaganti et al., 1985; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Dalton et al., 1998; Rechner & 
Dalton, 1986; Zahra & Stanton, 1988). We have revisited the studies of board composition and 
firm performance with a two-fold approach. Firstly, we have compensated public criticism 
about the lack of genuinely outside-independent directors and their nomination to gain 
legitimacy with a more stringent definition of independence. We have coined the term “strongly 
independent” after making two adjustments to corporate filings. Firstly, the independent 
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director has necessarily joined the board prior to the CEO tenure, following the results of Coles 
et al. (2014), who found that board monitoring decreases with the fraction of the board 
comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office. And secondly, the independent 
director does not serve in more than two additional boards. Directors with multiple 
appointments have less time available to effectively control management, as shown by 
Cashman et al. (2012). When we account for the institutional framework, we find statistical 
significance for the relationship between the proportion of strongly independent directors and 
firm valuation: this relationship is found to be positive in common law countries. Secondly, we 
have been attracted by the scant attention devoted to outside-proprietary directors that represent 
investors. Outside directors that represent a significant investor or “proprietary directors” are 
particularly well suited for the resource provision role, in addition to the traditional monitoring 
role of outside directors. As the ownership stake of the investor increases, he has a greater 
incentive to increase firm value (Holderness, 2003). The significant amounts of funds necessary 
to get board representation are an incentive to commit resources, provide contacts and devote 
extensive time to assist the management team, given the size of the investment at risk made by 
the shareholder represented by the proprietary director. Since firms generally do not report 
“proprietary directors” we have examined the curricula of 1977 directors in search of ties with 
relevant shareholders. Again, we need the institutional context to arrive at a significant finding. 
We have found that in civil law countries, where ownership concentration allows relevant 
shareholders to have board representation, the positive effect of proprietary directors does not 
compensate for the negative effect of several proprietary directors representing a powerful 
largest shareholder, who may abuse his position in detriment to minority investors. But the joint 
presence of proprietary directors and a “controlling coalition” that limits the power of the 
largest shareholder has a positive impact on valuation. 
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Our third line of investigation has explored why, in spite of the widespread presence of 
blockholders, who have the incentive and resources to perform effective monitoring and 
influence the firm’s management, opposing managers’ actions that not aligned with 
shareholders’ interest and fostering decisions that lead to value creation, there is little empirical 
evidence about their relationship with firm performance (Cremers & Nair, 2005; Faccio et al., 
2001; Farber, 2005; Holderness, 2003; Holderness & Sheehan, 1985; Lins, 2003; Lins & 
Warnock, 2004). Since independent directors are also a widespread mechanism to judge 
manager’s performance and protect shareholders Fama (1980); Hillman et al. (2000); Mizruchi 
(2004); Pearce & Zahra (1989); Weisbach (1988), we have explored the interaction of both 
mechanisms; blockholders and independent director, benefiting again from our adjusted 
definition of independence -the independent director has necessarily joined the board prior to 
the CEO tenure and the independent director does not serve in more than two additional boards-
. We find statistical significance for a joint and positive relationship between the proportion of 
strongly independent directors, blockholders capital and firm valuation. Independent directors 
seem to act as complement to the presence of blockholders. Secondly, as the ownership stake 
of the investor increases, he has a greater incentive to increase firm value Holderness (2003), 
so total capital accumulated by blockholders should have a positive impact on valuation. But if 
one of those blockholders is a controlling shareholder, he will negatively impact valuation. We 
find statistical significance of the presence of a controlling shareholder, mitigated by the 
volume of the remaining blocks. Lastly, we have found statistical significance of the positive 
effect on valuation of the presence of a controlling coalition between the second and third 
shareholders, who can compensate for the power of the largest investor. The net effect on 
valuation of blockholders will depend on the relative power of this coalition: if the sum of 
blockholders capital is high enough, either the largest shareholder or the coalition may become 
a controlling one, negatively impacting valuation. 
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6.2 Limitations and future research 
Our research on the relationship between code adoption and foreign capital attraction suffers 
from the limitation of considering only transactions conducted in Spain. Investors may regard 
corporate governance mechanism differently when assessing transaction undertaken in 
countries with different legal systems. We have not discriminated for foreign investors’ country 
of origin: it would be interesting to analyze if their preferences of corporate governance 
recommendations vary according to their home countries. Lastly nationality of foreign directors 
has not been discriminated either, which poses an additional limitation. Foreign directors 
superior monitoring skills and higher advisory capabilities may be restricted to those countries 
whose capital markets are more developed. Future research could explore which corporate 
governance recommendations are implemented by firms depending on institutional factors 
related to directors, such as their nationality, education or professional background. 
Additionally, it would be valuable to construct corporate governance indexes similar to the 
three presented in this work for a common law country, characterized by stronger investor 
protection and dispersed ownership structures. 
Regarding our analysis of board of directors’ composition, ownership structure and firm value, 
our research suffers from the limitation of taking for granted the initial classification of 
independence assigned by firms to their directors. Although we have tried to contribute with a 
more stringent definition of “strong independence”, our starting point in the set of directors 
classified as independent by the firm, rather than assessing independence case by case. 
Additionally, we have only analyzed the European context, to avoid variables different from 
the legal system from distorting our analysis. Future research could develop a worldwide 
definition of independence and re-classify directors according to this tailor-made definition. 
We have explored different civil law areas: France, Spain and Belgium representing the French 
origin; and Finland, Denmark and Sweden representing the Scandinavian origin. It would be 
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useful to add the geographical scope by considering civil law countries of German origin, such 
as Switzerland, Germany or Japan. Additionally, the analysis could be enriched by including 
common law countries outside Europe, such as the US, Australia or India.  
6.3 Implications  
It has been discussed how, as expected by Institutional Theory, companies have adopted 
voluntary codes of corporate governance looking for legitimacy, and we have questioned to 
which extent this adoption respond to genuine will to protect shareholders or to what Meyer & 
Rowan (1977) called “myth and ceremony”.  
Spanish firms pursuing foreign capital may use the weighted indexes presented on chapter 3 to 
focus their efforts on a reduced number of recommendations, rather than the large number 
contained in the Code of Good Governance. Firms may draw on cost-benefit analysis to decide 
on the implementation of different recommendations taking into account that the index Board 
has a higher impact than Committee and discriminating recommendations according to their 
weight in each index. Lastly, the weighted indexes have implication for the design of corporate 
governance codes by stock market supervisors and group of experts that participate in their 
drafting. The comply or explain principle lead codes to list all recommendations without 
assigning any relative importance to them, which implies a burden on investors. Although is up 
to investors to judge each of the explanations that firms provide when they decide not to follow 
a recommendation, and up to investors to decide which recommendations are more important 
for them, regulators could signal somehow the importance that prima facie recommendations 
present. 
Regarding board composition, both firms and stock market supervisors may be fostering 
practices that our data have proved contrary to shareholders’ interest. The institutional 
framework, and in particular the legal system, must be considered to assess the effectiveness of 
outside-independent versus outside-proprietary directors. In this vein the definition of 
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independence could include a limit on the number of external boards and independent director 
should not be removed from their positions, facilitating not only the effective exercise of their 
duties in a strongly independent way, but its consolidation as the CEO is renewed. Firms should 
be transparent regarding the ties of directors to relevant shareholders, since we have shown how 
proprietary directors can contribute to share-value creation, in civil law countries, particularly 
when a controlling coalition is in place.  
Lastly, and regarding ownership structure, a common definition of controlling shareholder 
could be useful in terms of measuring investor protection. Investors should monitor the 
presence of blockholders in the companies where they plan to invest: with the discussed caveats 
regarding controlling shareholders and coalitions, a significant share of capital in the hands of 
blockholders may signal that investor protection is in place.  
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